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A Magazine of Finance, Commerce and Economics


VOL. 16, NO. 412

NEW YORK, MONDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1920

Ten Cents

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Other Assets 1,758,315.49	
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Reserve Fund 8,400,000.00
Undivided Profits 260,774.98
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Annual Review

THE ANNALIST

January 3, 1921

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NEW YORK, MONDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1920

Ten Cents

Dangerous Shoals in Shipping Board's Rate-Making Course

Economic Writer Sees the Welfare of Our Commerce Threatened by Conditions Produced by Regulation Vagaries for Which the Law Rather Than the Board Is Held Responsible, and in the Meantime the Huge Fleet Exists at Expense of the Taxpayer

By EDWARD A. BRADFORD

IN his address to the Boston Chamber of Commerce, Admiral Benson said the Shipping Board, of which he is Chairman, "would ultimately be to ship what the Interstate Commerce Commission is to the railroads." If "ultimately" then sooner, it may be hoped.

After thirty-three years of regulation of the railways under the Interstate Commerce act it is not yet settled whether Federal or State authority is supreme. The dispute over intrastate and interstate rates is so hot that thirty-nine States have filed a brief on the part of the State commissions alleging that the attempt of the nation to control railway rates within the States is little better than treason to local self-government. The plight of the railways under Federal rate regulation, their enormous losses and the near insolvency of many of them, the equivalent burdens on the taxpayers, and the land blockade resulting from the inadequacy of the railways to the demands of continental commerce under the stress of war conditions, are known to all.

The purpose of recalling these familiar facts is to use them as a shocking example of dangerous shoals to be avoided in the regulation of rates for ocean traffic by our merchant marine. The regulation of railway rates is now known to be a matter of considerable difficulty, but it is child's play compared with the world task of regulating rates on the open seas, where there is no national authority, and no international authority recognized by all. Admiralty law is international law, but it is no regulator of rates. Ocean rates are fixed, and perhaps can be fixed, only by competition without stint or limit. The fittest and strongest set the pace, and the rest accommodate themselves as best they can.

Into this maritime cockpit the United States descended with a chip on its shoulder, equipped with billions, led by naval officers innocent of commercial training and politicians, and naked to the weapons of competitors experienced in the combat. Emphasis will not be placed here on the waste of billions by inefficiency of ships under stress of war. Even graft will not be the text of this preaching. If the entire three billions were gone, and the ships were sunk, the loss would be small compared with the twenty billions at stake in the regulations of the railways. But if the regulation of railways taught us nothing else it did teach that the welfare of commerce was superior to the reduction of rates, and that cheap freights were costly if procured at the expense of disordered distribution of goods. That is the point on which it is desired to say something, for it is no exaggeration that the disorder of railway rates is trivial compared with the conditions produced by the policy or lack of policy of our Shipping Board's rate regulation vagaries.

FRENCH LINE'S POSITION

Perhaps there may be an intrastate rate which has nothing to do with interstate commerce. If so it must be an intrastate rate which cannot be combined with any other rate so as to cross the borders of a State. It is a difficult supposition, but it may be imagined, at least theoretically. Land and water rates are connected at least as closely. It makes no difference whether rates and routes begin on the land and extend over seas, or whether

they begin on the sea and are carried inland, such rates are economically indissoluble, and neither can be disturbed without disturbing the other. To disturb one rate is to disturb all related rates, just as the unraveling of a thread destroys a fabric. No one is expert enough to say where such a disturbance of rates may lead, and the results of starting a fight of which none can see the end are so serious that sea rates have been accustomed to be regulated by combinations in restraint of trade. There was a time when all such maritime combinations were regarded as obnoxious to our law, and many were investigated and prosecuted. Foreign laws classed them as reasonable or unreasonable, as good or bad "trusts," and judged them by their conduct, punishing them when they were found to be contrary to public interest. Our Shipping Board gayly and innocently, as one of its first acts in the regulation of ocean rates, prodded one of these hornets' nests.

The Admiral (whose naval qualifications are not relevant in this connection) declared that war to the knife, and no limit but the sky, would be the result if the French line refused to join the North Atlantic conference and maintain its rates. The French line's explanation of this declaration of war was that the Shipping Board flooded the trade with so much tonnage that the freights offering were not enough to enable the French Line to get enough business to make them self-sustaining. The French line offered to maintain rates if it were guaranteed its pre-war volume of business, but that was essential, because the French line had no resources but its earnings, and must be solvent or disappear. The Shipping Board was not confronted by such an alternative, the proposal was not accepted, and the rates were halved.

DISCRIMINATORY RATES

The Shipping Board then affronted the other members of the conference, by discriminations in favor of our millers, to facilitate their shipments of flour rather than wheat. This was attempted by reducing the rate for flour to 5 cents more than wheat, instead of 25 cents. This differential, or practical bounty, on flour exports was established without public inquiry as to what reduction would be reasonable, or whether there should be any reduction, or what would be the economic or maritime effect of the reduction. The newspaper announcement was the first information, and it brought out protests from both sides of the ocean which led to the Admiral's expressing his regrets at his action. But the milk had been spilt, and his troubles have only begun.

On the morrow of the announcement the Admiral received an official cablegram reminding him that he had made a working arrangement with foreign ship conferences on rates to leading European ports, and that he had taken independent action without consulting them, on a matter of far-reaching importance. Five cents more for flour does not cover the extra cost of loading and unloading flour, and makes no allowance for the fact that 1,000 tons of flour take the space which will carry 1,200 tons of wheat. At the five-cent differential no one will carry flour, for wheat will pay better, and the object of the differential will not be attained. During the war there was no question of differentials. Anything was paid and nothing was grudged if only the freight were carried. In 1919 26,000,000 barrels of flour were exported. Now flour exports are not worth mention. The milling of flour con-

sumed abroad is done abroad, and foreign cattle get a million tons a year of mill feed. That interests our dairymen, who are remarking the import of butter from Denmark, and the accumulation of \$50,000,000 of canned milk designed for export but untaken.

This is only the threshold of the subject. The other cereal trades descended on the Shipping Board and demanded that their trades also should have a reduction of their differential of 25 cents to 5 cents. All sack goods should have the same rate, they argued, or they would be discriminated against. Oatmeal, cornmeal and flour are so similar that Government could not make a difference for their rates on the sea any more than on the land, where such discrimination is not allowed by the Interstate Commission. It is hard to say what the end will be, but the present situation is that British ships are loading with American wheat, and that flour is not carried. There is no sign that American exporters prefer to ship in American vessels at higher rates, and a deaf ear is turned to the Admiral's warning that foreign rates will soar if the American merchant marine is forced out of business. The idea seems to be that it is the business of the American merchant marine to keep itself on the seas by its economies and efficiency—at present not conspicuous.

SHIPPING LAW RESPONSIBLE

The end is not yet, but there is a humorous chapter. As a smasher of conference trusts the Shipping Board is a greater success than Congress and the Department of Justice together. But the Shipping Board's Chairman publicly declares his opinion that cutthroat wars of rates, and excess of commercial rivalry, lead to armed conflicts, and that a world conference to fix and regulate rates for all lines and oceans is desirable. That, the Admiral thinks, would enable every country to engage in sea trade on a basis of absolutely fair competition. The foreign lines are hospitable. They will admit the American vessels rather than fight them. But, of course, there must be an agreement on the division of the traffic, and the American lines must accept the conference methods of maintaining the division agreed upon by rebates. This is friendly satire, of course. The pooling of traffic and the system of rebates are anathema to American courts. The Shipping Board neither can nor will accept such terms. Its amiable alternative is the exclusion from American ports of shipping guilty of such practices. That is a naïve way of clubbing an entrance into commercial combinations already alienated by hostility toward them.

The shipping law, not the Shipping Board, is responsible for the policy of discriminating in favor of American ocean commerce by preferential rail rates, which has set our railways by the ears among themselves, and threatens international complications through disturbance of treaty relations. The Eastern railways have refused to concur in the rates made by the Western lines in order to make export rates comparable with those existing before the recent increase in railway rates by order of the Interstate Commission. Thus stated the intention is commendable, but rate wars on land and sea are the result. The intention was to give preference to American shipping on routes to the Orient. The effect was to prejudice traffic from the Middle West to the Orient, via New York and the Panama

Canal. Before the general advance in railway rates shippers had a choice of routing via either coast. There was no wish to disturb this option, but Pittsburgh steel no longer has this privilege. Transpacific business through Pacific ports is now limited to points west of Chicago, and exporters through Atlantic ports have lost the Mid-Western business, or must go via the Gulf and by rail to California.

MARITIME IMPERIALISM

On the Pacific Ocean the result was equally unfortunate. The Japanese and British steamships, the latter co-operating with the Canadian railways, reduced rates so that the Shipping Board lost money through its costly ships and crews, and preferred to tie them up, disorganizing the service upon which shippers depended, and giving tramps an advantage in competition with liners. This is merely a prelude to the full program of discrimination and preference to American shipping in what has the appearance of maritime imperialism. Just as the Old World armaments were always spoken of as for purposes of defense, so our Shipping Board disclaims all intention of taking any business from those who possess it by offering service. Our intentions are friendly to all, and we merely seek to supply ourselves with a merchant marine for the delivery of our exports and the bringing home of our imports.

That would be our right if we used economic means. But we are using our strength against the weak in methods which they think unfair. We are buttressing our strength by legislation which offends them, and which we excuse by adopting the methods which we condemn when used against us. As yet this is only a proposal, President Wilson having refused to denounce the treaties of commerce with twenty-seven nations which prevent us from laying duties discriminating in favor of imports and exports when carried in American ships. It is called retaliation for practices which prejudice our shipping, and is alleged not to be a fresh offensive inviting retaliation in return. Even if the exchange of commercial hostilities were on even terms it would be a case of two wrongs, neither justifying the other. The friendlier way would be to propose the removal of discriminations against us, if there are any, and to so conduct ourselves that there would be no occasion for retaliation. It

ill-becomes us to object to others doing what we propose to do, and which was done by the first American Congress, when the conditions offered better excuse. After the war of 1812 we offered exemptions for exemptions to nations which would make the exchange, and that is more urbane than offering retaliation for retaliation.

If only the Shipping Board could be as successful in its own affairs as it is disturbing to the affairs of others little would be left to be desired. Its Chairman has said that the board was making money, but the profits were of the sort earned by the Panama Canal, which makes no allowance for capital or depreciation. That the Shipping Board is not making profits on a commercial basis, although allowed the use of three billions of capital, appears from the statement that Congress will be asked next week for \$150,000,000 as a revolving fund to even its accounts for the next fiscal year.

FREIGHTS DECREASING

It might be thought that the board's receipts from operation of its ships, and from the sale of ships and surplus supplies, would suffice to make it self-supporting. But the board has operated its fleet on the basis of payment of expenses by the Government, and the payment to the operators of a percentage of the gross freights, 5 per cent. outward and 2½ per cent. inward. Thus, if expenses were \$125,000 and freight \$100,000, the operators made \$5,000, although the board, or rather the taxpayers, lose \$25,000. During October one-fourth of the ships which entered at New York brought no cargo. There are no similar figures for outward cargoes, but many vessels sailed only 60 per cent. full.

The board claims that its vessels are doing better than the foreign, but the operation is very costly, and freights are dropping owing to the surplus shipping. Cotton is said to go from Southern ports at one-fifth of the rate of two years ago, about double the pre-war rate, while costs have trebled and quadrupled. The board's agent on the Pacific Coast is quoted as saying that the loss on recent round voyages to the Orient was \$40,000 each. Despite the optimistic views of spokesmen for the board other reports say that the share of American ships is decreasing as that of foreign ships increases. There is no doubt that shipbuilding here is losing ground to foreign shipbuilding, and that

the capital value of American ships is falling, although the board is as stubborn in holding them as the farmers are in holding their crops. The result is unfortunate in both cases.

Cargo ships of foreign build are offered here around \$100 a ton, and the Shipping Board's price is \$160 upward. That is less than original cost, but about present cost of replacement. As the American costs of operation are \$5,315 for an 8,000-ton vessel, against \$2,735 for British, \$2,926 for Japanese and \$1,820 for Norwegian, the Shipping Board's rashness in antagonizing its competitors seems clear. It would be agreeable to find the facts otherwise, but it is necessary to think that the board instead of speaking softly and carrying a big stick has spoken roughly and its club is stuffed.

It is unreasonable to be hypercritical toward the Shipping Board when it functions as might be expected from the dispositions of Congress. The law makes no requirement of fitness of board members for management of shipping. Political qualifications are stipulated, and that is little different from a guarantee of political management which needs no definition. Sectional qualifications are stipulated, and the result is seen in prejudice against the nation's chief port of foreign commerce in favor of outports, which reap the dollars sown by the taxpayers through the board. There is nothing surprising about this. It is the customary method of Government management, a mere repetition of the procedure with the regulation of railways. For a full generation the particular qualification of Interstate Commissioners was hostility to the railways. The experiment of vivisection of the railways was carried as far toward the bitter end as the country could endure, and until Congress and the commission was educated into seeing a business light.

A second experience of that sort would be inexcusable. It would be a pleasure to support the Admiral's plea for a patriotic support of his well-meant attempt to give the country a merchant marine. His task has been difficult, worthy of a superman, perhaps even impossible. Criticism should be sympathetic and within the facts. The record shows that our huge merchant fleet exists only at a cost to the taxpayers, and there is in sight little to indicate a change of that condition if the facts are not appreciated as well as known. There is neither pride nor patriotism in a merchant marine of the sort the country now possesses.

England Faces Shipping Rivalry With Equanimity

An Initial Cost Much Lower Than American Is Seen as a Powerful Factor in the Empire's Favor—Tendency to Amalgamation Is Recognized but the Harriman Combine Recalls the Fate of the Morgan-Lord Pirrie Venture Which Failed With a Far Lower Tonnage Cost Than Obtains Now

Special Correspondence to *The Annalist*

LONDON, Nov. 18, 1920.

WHILE the shipping industry is admittedly not in very good shape at the present time, there appears to be more optimism prevalent in England as to its immediate future than in the United States. Shipbuilding has continued at a relatively higher level here, and an early increase of activity is anticipated.

The recent decreases in freight rates which, in the case of the Italian coal trade, have dropped from \$26.50 a ton to \$10.50, have affected the tramp steamers for the most part, as conference rates have dropped comparatively little. The great question of the future appears to be how American shipping will hold out against the increasing competition of British vessels.

An important consideration is the fact that British ship-owners are able to buy ex-German tonnage from Lord Inchcape, of the War Disposals Board, for £20 a ton, or, roughly, \$70, which is being sold in the United States at anywhere from \$170 to \$200 a ton. This much lower initial cost to the British operator means, in addition to requiring a comparatively smaller amount of capital, smaller expenses in the way of depreciation, interest on invested capital, insurance based on the cost of the vessel, and the like.

As to the alleged difference in operating costs, on examination it appears to consist almost entirely in the lower wages paid to British seamen, and lower costs per man for food and maintenance while on board ship. And it may be pointed out, in the words of a practical shipping man, that "expenses above deck are only two per cent. of the cost of running a ship; 98 per cent. of the expenses come below decks," implying, of course, the engine and boiler rooms. The only advantage that Great

Britain can claim here, that of having the older and more experienced engineers, is nullified somewhat by the fact that vital improvements have been introduced into ship machinery since the present generation of older engineer officers received their training, and that during the war there was trained in the United States a corps of marine engineers thoroughly capable of running a ship efficiently.

It is also true, to some extent, that the higher wages and probably better living conditions prevalent on American ships, as compared with the ships of most other nations, induce a relatively better type of man to adopt the sea as a career. This fact has been commented on to the writer by old ship officers, who say that the average level of the

Continued on Page 734



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Charles H. Sabin, President of the Guaranty Trust Company, Says National Banks Have Exhausted Their Power to Aid Foreign Trade—He Cites the Need of Continued Development and Puts the Task of Insuring This Straight to the American People

By CHARLES H. SABIN,
President of the Guaranty Trust Company of
New York

ON Dec. 10 and 11 a group of representative business men and bankers of all sections of the country will meet in Chicago at the call of John S. Drum of San Francisco, President of the American Bankers Association, to consider the formation of a corporation of \$100,000,000 capital for the financing of American export trade. If this meeting responds to the ideas as the interest in its formulation has led those who have developed it to hope, the corporation, with a maximum financial capacity under the Edge law of a billion dollars, may be within a short time no longer a project, but a reality before the American manufacturer and producer, and the American people. The plan of a foreign trade financing corporation of this magnitude under the provisions of the Edge law, has been developed by the Committee on Commerce and Marine of the American Bankers Association and approved by the association.

The situation which the United States faces in its export trade today arises from the tremendous disruptions of the war. American industry and production have expanded during the war until their output is far in excess of the powers of the domestic market to absorb.

The surplage of goods above the demands of domestic consumption in the United States this year, for example, has been estimated at 2,000,000 bales of cotton, 300,000,000 bushels of wheat, \$750,000,000 worth of semi-manufactured raw materials and finished manufactured products, and \$250,000,000 worth of packing house products. If the American producer is to be prosperous he must continue to have open to him the foreign markets, to which he has been exporting so heavily.

TERMS OF SALE THE PROBLEM

At the same time the production of the foreign countries which have bought American goods to so large an extent during the war is far below the requirements of their own markets. They continue to need the surplus output of the American producer. In many cases they need this output as raw material for reconstruction, which must be effected if they are to pay their bills, and the economic balance of the world is to be restored. It is important to the American nation again for this reason, that these goods shall reach them. The difficulty comes with arranging the terms of sale.

Foreign nations, and European nations in particular, impoverished by the last six years, have no further liquid assets with which to pay for our goods. Our manufacturers and producers are unable to accept long-term payments and thus tie up the money invested in producing the goods over a period of years. The only way in which this diverse position of the two parties to the transaction of our exporting can be adjusted is through an agency capable of accepting the offers for long-term payments from the foreign nations and advancing the money on them immediately to the American producer and manufacturer.

This is a task beyond the scope of the ordinary commercial bank of the country, the assets of which must be always in readiness for demand. It is possible to certain State banks, under their charters, and is being developed by some operated today.

Agencies of the kind operating under Federal incorporation and with the supervision of the Federal Reserve Board were made possible by the passage in December, 1919, of the Edge act. They are permitted to receive the promises to pay of foreign buyers, and issue interest-bearing debentures against them. These debentures will be offered for sale to investors, and the proceeds from them will pay the American manufacturer or producer for his goods.

The situation, as pointed out in an able analysis of the Edge law at the time of its passage by Gilbert H. Montague, is similar to that familiar in this country, of a street railway company which needs new equipment and an equipment company which has equipment to sell to it. The street railway company can only pay for the equipment through an issue of long-term bonds. The equipment company operates a subsidiary company which can accept these bonds and issue debentures against them

for sale to investors. From the proceeds of this sale it receives immediate cash for its equipment.

In the present case the European and other foreign nations are in the position of the street railway company; the United States, its manufacturers and producers, are in the position of the equipment company; and the purpose of the Edge law is to furnish the agency, analogous to the equipment company's subsidiary, to accept the foreign nation's securities, sell them, and with the proceeds give the manufacturer and producer cash for his goods. The plan which is to be considered at Chicago is of a single institution, national in its scope and control, of great financial power, operating under the supervision of the Federal Reserve Board and in accordance with the terms of the Edge law, which shall receive foreign securities and by selling debentures against them to the American investor, furnish to the American producer and manufacturer immediate payment for his exports.

A FEDERAL RESERVE FOR EXPORT

The plan is further for an institution of sufficient magnitude to take the place in relation to our foreign business that the Federal Reserve Board occupies with respect to our domestic business—a national institution to open the way for the financing of foreign trade to the American people—and it has been developed with that thought continually in view.

Banks, manufacturers, farmers, exporters and individuals generally from every section of the country will be asked to subscribe to the \$100,000,000 capital stock of the corporation, each Federal Reserve district subscribing an amount as nearly as possible proportionate to its resources, 25 per cent. to be paid in at the commencement of business and 10 per cent. every sixty days thereafter. (This is in accordance with the terms of the Edge law.) The Board of Directors will be chosen as nearly as possible according to Federal Reserve districts, vesting control in a national body. With the resources which the organization would have at hand, the operating personnel could and would be composed of the ablest experts in the country. It would operate under the guarantee of safety of the judgment of these experts working with a sense of national responsibility and checked and supervised by the highest Federal banking board in the land.

It is the belief of the men who have studied and laid out the plan that such a plan as proposed is essential if the country is to hold the grip on the markets of the world that its full prosperity requires. It has come, in the financing of its export trade, to a blank wall; the only feasible means of surmounting the wall is through agencies which can gain for foreign trade the support of the American people.

The stages by which we have come to this position are regular and logical. While we were still participants in the war the United States Government undertook the burden of financing the hard-pressed European nations in the purchase of our goods. Following the armistice the Government turned the problem over to the regular commercial agencies; it was taken up by the banks. Their limit has now been reached in handling it. They have discounted bills and furnished credit to the full extent that the liquid assets of European and other nations have permitted. Further steps are beyond their scope. The commercial banks of Federal incorporation in the United States and the average commercial bank of State incorporation are not equipped to extend long-term credits or to invest in foreign securities. Their assets must be easily available upon demand. It must be recognized that they have done everything within their power.

NO QUESTION OF ABILITY

A third stage has now been reached, in which the problem must go to the American investing public. The conception of the corporation which the American Bankers Association approves is of a great national organization for placing the financing of American exports before the American people, laying clearly in their minds the essential need of foreign markets and their prosperity and

asking them to make our continued establishment in these markets possible.

Of the ability of the American people to solve this problem through the investment of their surplus funds in foreign securities and the financing of our export trade there can be no doubt.

In the unbalance of business operations during the war the money of the world flowed to them in exchange for American goods. The largest part of available wealth today is in their hands. They have in addition vast potentialities for an increase of this wealth through increased production and thrift. It will be the problem of the proposed corporation to demonstrate to the American people the fundamental soundness of foreign investment and its need. It will further be its problem to encourage by every means within its power an added thrift and production which shall yield annually an added surplus of wealth for the carrying of our export trade.

As a nation we are in a position to appreciate the significance of foreign trade to our prosperity, as we have not been for many years. The cotton producers of the South see that foreign markets are essential to the wealth of cotton. The farmers of the West see that with the cutting down of foreign outlets for their crops their prices fall. Industries in every section of the country, expanded to a vast growth by the demands of the world during war times are retrenching as their markets narrow. And the people as a whole who have invested millions upon millions of dollars in the establishment of a merchant marine learn that that marine is lying idle in their harbors because there are not enough goods being shipped for it to carry.

Their interest generally has been demonstrated by the National Congress, which in addition to passing the Edge law, has put through recently the Webb act, permitting combinations of manufacturers for the purpose of furthering export trade, and the Merchant Marine act, designed to insure a continuance of American-owned ships by which our goods may be carried.

Under these conditions it is felt that the time has come when a single, central institution, of strong resources and national organization, capable of pointing the way under Federal supervision in which our foreign trade should go, is not only feasible, but will bring to the country the fullest services possible in the problem of readjustment and successful world competition.

Half Time in British Mills

THE American section of the cotton trade, which constitutes three-fourths of the whole industry, has decided by a ballot, the result of which was announced Friday, to reduce the weekly working hours from forty-eight to twenty-four. This decision affects 100,000 operatives.

The action of the industry is attributed to the recent decline in cotton and the poor demand for yarn and cotton goods from all quarters.

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All Attempts to Stabilize the Silver Market Unavailing

Continuing Downward Trend Is Looked for by Trained Observers and in the Meantime the Government Is Forced to Buy, at Increasing Premiums, Under the Replacement Act—Recent Price Fluctuations the Most Sweeping on Record

THREE have been more queer quirks in the action of the commercial silver market in recent months than in any other world market. Prices have fluctuated more than ever before and the great sweep in the early '90's, following the Silver Purchase act, has been made to appear only a mild gyration as compared with the tremendous sweep of the war period and the post-war readjustment. In the present case there has been a decline of far greater proportion than either the rise or the fall of the '90's, and in the face of a new purchase act which should have stabilized prices at high levels if it was to have any influence on the market at all.

The Silver Purchase act, which went into effect in 1890, sent the price in the open market, which is to say in the London open market, from 43½d. per fine ounce, to 54½d. in a period of about five months. Then there was a reaction which, by the latter part of 1894, carried the quotation down to 21 11-16d. For the recent war period and the readjustment the rise started from about 22d. in 1915 and continued to 55½d. in 1917, reacted then to 42d. and again rose to 89½d., the latter on February 11 of this year. Then the decline started in earnest and, with the exception of a sharp recovery in the past Summer, pointed unmistakably downward, touching 43½d. on December 1.

Comparing the two movements, that of the early '90's was a rise of 10½d., followed by a fall of 32½d. and then by a period of stagnation. The movement since the beginning of the World War has shown a rise, first, of 33½d., then a fall of 13½d., another rise of 47½d., and a fall of 45½d., the latter broken by a recovery of brief duration of, roughly, 19d.

Thus, the recent sweep has been by far the greatest that the market ever has known, and in

view of the fact that the United States Mint purchases under the Pittman act have failed utterly to hold the market in anything even approximating stability, most observers feel that, barring occasional rallies, the trend will be steadily downward for some time to come.

EFFECT OF PITTMAN ACT

The present demoralization of the market has its origin in the Orient. China, the great consumer of silver, is not buying. It was Chinese buying, made possible by Chinese wartime prosperity and the denuding of that country of its silver in the first years of the war, which accounted for the great rise. Now it is Chinese readjustment, which is another and a politer way of saying Chinese hard times, which is occasioning the decline. There are other incidents to the fall, of course, but most of them are incidental.

It is an old story of how the Allies, chiefly Britain, took from China most of her circulating silver in the early part of the war to adjust balances with British possessions in the Far East. Also, it is an old story of how the United States, after its entry into the war, eased this British burden by releasing, under the Pittman act, some 207,000,000 ounces of fine silver held in the United States Treasury as security for the silver certificates and in the form of silver dollars. Now the United States is buying back an equivalent amount of silver from American mines and refineries to replace that which was sent to the Orient.

This operation, in the opinion of most competent critics, is one of the most uneconomic the Government ever has engaged in. The Treasury silver has been an evil influence on the silver market for years, and when the Government took

advantage of its opportunity to dispose of its holdings at the very good price of a dollar an ounce in 1917 there was general rejoicing, both here and abroad. Unfortunately, however, there were political considerations and on account of these — whether they were real or merely supposed is a matter for debate — provision was made for the repurchase of silver "from American mines and reduction plants" at the price, which politicians said "was only fair," equal to the selling price, or \$1 an ounce.

In June of this year, because of the slump in the open market, the Mint put into effect its regulations for buying American silver at the dollar price and thereby committed itself to the unsound practice of paying far above the market for a commodity. What this added cost has amounted to is shown by the accompanying chart of The Engineering and Mining Journal, which gives the average price of commercial silver — "foreign silver" — by months.

COST OF THE PREMIUM

Thus, in June the average was .90957, which means that the Mint paid an average premium that month of more than 9 cents an ounce. In July the Mint paid a premium of slightly more than 8 cents an ounce. In August, because of the rally, the premium average was reduced to about 4 cents, but it grew to 6 cents in September, to nearly 17 cents in October and to more than 22 cents in November. For the current month the premium is likely to be around 50 cents.


And this practice of paying premium for American silver is likely to run on for years. Under the terms of the Pittman act there are some 207,000,000 fine ounces to be replaced in the Treasury. Thus far the purchases have totalled a little more than 20,000,000 fine ounces, and in the silver trade it is estimated that it will take at least four years to fill the Treasury's requirements, provided, of course, the open market price stays under a dollar an ounce for that length of time. If the price exceeds a dollar an ounce in the open market, the American producer, naturally, will sell there and not to the Government. Only when the open market price is under a dollar is it profitable for the American miner or refiner to sell to the Government, and it is therefore plainly a case of heads the miner wins, tails the Government loses.

In some circles there is hope that the replacement provisions of the Pittman act will be repealed. Politicians say it cannot be done; that there would be too much pressure brought to bear against such action. But the pressure would come from mining and refining interests, hardly from the whole people if the situation were understood.

MEXICO'S POSITION

Meanwhile, the world is having its own troubles with silver. In European countries, thanks to the great depreciation of their exchanges, it has become vastly profitable to melt down silver coin and sell it for bullion. So extensive has this become that Europe today has virtually no silver coins. Metals of almost every other sort are being used. This condition, furthermore, is not confined to European countries which are not producers of the white metal, but lately has extended to some countries which are producers. For example, in the latest issue of the Samuel Montague & Co. silver bulletin there is an excerpt which says:

"Chile has accepted a tender for the minting in Paris of nickel 5, 10, and 20 centavos coins."



THE London price—pence per fine ounce—the recognized world standard, has been used to show the above fluctuations, which are given by years from 1870 to 1918 (inclusive), and by months for the years 1919 and 1920.

The so-called "New York official price," which quotes silver in cents per fine ounce, is worked from the London basis, with allowances made for the variations of sterling exchange, the cost of freight and insurance, and the relation of money

rates in New York and London. It may be stated here that, while the "New York official quotation" is used for the purpose of compiling charts and tables, it does not follow that actual business in New York is confined to this rate. As a matter of fact, the relation between the official quotation and the price at which actual sales are made frequently is of the vaguest, and on occasion there has been a spread of several cents between official and actual sales prices.

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DEC. 6

We are informed that this new money has been rendered necessary by the melting down of all old coin containing silver. This replacement of silver by nickel in an American silver producing country is well worth notice."

Chile, it may be noted in passing, is suffering from a depreciation in exchange with the United States of some 25 per cent., a depreciation great enough to raise silver coin in Chile from the standard of a medium of exchange or that of token money to the more profitable standard of a much-sought commodity.

But perhaps the strangest fact of all is that Mexico, after years of turmoil, finds itself on what appears to be the soundest currency basis of any country, since she is probably the one country of the world which is not suffering from paper inflation. There is a vast amount of Mexican paper currency, representing the various administrations of the past ten or a dozen years, but none of it is "good." The Mexicans themselves have calmly repudiated it and, what is more to the point, have replaced it with metal, mostly silver, coin.

The present Mexican Government, taking advantage of the low price of the metal, is converting about 180,000 fine ounces a day into coin. This is at the rate of 24,000,000 ounces a year. The chief demand for this coinage, which represents about a third of the estimated production, came from the men who worked the silver mines. They would take nothing else and carried their point. Then the demand spread to other classes until now practically all Mexicans want, and are getting, hard money.

Congress Will Not Interfere With Falling Price Movement

Appeals of Farmers and Planters for Financial Aid Will Obtain No Genuine Response in Present Sessions—Revenue and Tariff Measures to Await Advent of New Administration—Immigration and Panama Canal Toll Exemption May Claim Immediate Attention

Special Correspondence of The Annalist.

WASHINGTON, Dec. 4, 1920.

WITH the opening of Congress Monday for the short session, which must end by limitation on March 4, great pressure will be exerted by the farmers, representing the strongly organized wheat growers and the cotton planters, for relief of a financial sort from the situation resulting from the sudden reduction in the market price of their products, and the refusal of the Federal Reserve Board to extend loans that would enable them to hold their wheat and other products for a better market. Senator Capper of Kansas says that the fall in prices in the last two months has worked financial hardship everywhere in the West and has given a very serious aspect to the entire business situation. Farm products, he declares, have come first under the pressure for lower prices, with the result that, while the products of the farm have fallen about 42 per cent., the things that the farmer must buy—fertilizer and machinery, as well as clothing and the necessities—have suffered a reduction of only about 4 per cent.

When the farmer sought to continue the false situation that was created during the war by Government regulation he found the Federal Reserve Board uncompromisingly opposed to the proposition that the banks should grant loans to aid those producers of wheat and meat products and cotton to withhold from the markets their supply until better conditions might arise. The result has been that many farmers were forced to sell at prices below the cost of production, and the public is now beginning to realize upon the wisdom of the Federal Reserve Board's decision. The price of flour has tumbled to within reasonable figures. Bread in most cities is being sold at 4 to 5 cents cheaper than a year ago, and meat and chickens are on the decline. Leather is at the pre-war level. And with these declines has come a reduction in cotton materials, great reductions so far as the manufacturer is concerned, but not yet commensurably reflected in the retail prices demanded.

FARMER REASONING IN ERROR

This transitory stage, when the laws of trade are again operating, undoubtedly has hit the farmer first, and he is presented by the members of Congress representing him to be facing great financial losses and very bitter. He alone seems to be suffering, while he feels that those from whom he must buy are able through better management or financial assistance to control the prices. This reasoning is erroneous. The Federal Reserve Board has maintained an equitable policy as regards loans, and while not inclined to put the pressure down everywhere at once lest a panic ensue, it has exerted its influence to force the manufacturer to reduce his prices. This reduction has come, but it is not felt by the consumer to any great extent, because the retailer in most sections of the country has reasoned that he can hold up the prices until after the Christmas holidays. But those who have studied the market situation are of the firm opinion that prices in all commodities will seek a new level by the first of the year.

Senators representing the farm States know very well that the Federal Government cannot and will not do anything to prevent the markets returning to normal. The Federal Reserve Board will continue its policy. Leaders in Congress are also determined that the revenue and tariff laws shall remain untouched until the advent of the new Administration, by which time nearly normal conditions are expected, and a Republican tariff can be enacted with assurance that it will be approved by the President.

In the meantime, eager to show that they are doing something for their constituents, those Sen-

ators from the wheat growing and cotton belts are devising makeshifts or attempting to figure out legislation that will benefit the farmer. The most logical thing they have offered is the restoration of the War Finance Corporation to extend credits to Germany by using the \$400,000,000 of German-owned securities and property now held by the Alien Property Custodian. That plan does not have the support of the Administration, and the President has no authority to use the fund. This authority rests in Congress, and if legislation should be enacted the credits would be extended to all, and the farmer would receive very little if any benefit. Another proposition advanced is the placing of an embargo on the import of Canadian wheat. This plan seems hopeless, as the President, having authority under the war acts, has refused to exercise it, and Congress will not take up the matter until general tariff revision is considered in the special session. The outcome of the agitation, which surely will occupy a prominent place in the early days of this session, will be that the farmer will not receive any assistance to stop the operation of the laws of supply and demand. And the same policy will be pursued toward all others.

AN EVENING-UP PROCESS

This is the transitory stage when the producer, who had the advantage of the rise at the opening of the war in 1914 and 1915, must meet the economic conditions. Things produced cheaply were sold at excessive advances in the years 1914 and 1915, and now comes the evening-up process, when products produced at war figures must adjust themselves to the general market conditions and the ability of the consumer to buy.

All the wartime regulations will be repealed as promptly as possible by Congress. This will remove all barriers to trade and adjustment, it is believed, will come naturally. Leaders in the Republican Party argue that the present conditions are due to some extent to these regulations, and therefore, even though many may suffer, it would be unwise and unjust to enact legislation to continue abnormal conditions. So it can be said upon the best authority that there will be no legislation to stay the operations of the economic laws.

Republican leaders cannot hold this short session of Congress to the plan of limiting legislation to the supply measures. Much general legislation is certain to appear and demand attention. While the hope of accomplishment will be slight, yet the agitators intend to put forward their propositions with the expectation of exciting support. Labor will present an elaborate program, but, having been so completely routed in the last election, when the pendulum flew back from radicalism, they are expected to content themselves almost entirely in this session with a move to prohibit immigration for a period of two years at least. They argue that, with 2,000,000 men now idle in the United States and the number increasing, the situation confronting labor, if brought into competition with arriving aliens, would tend to reduce wages to the cheap plane of Europe. Further, the labor leaders assert that immigration should be shut off for this period in order to keep out the radicals who have come here in great numbers and are almost a majority in the ranks of even organized labor.

The immigration question, proposals to revive the War Finance Corporation to extend credits, some legislation to strengthen the Federal Reserve laws, and perhaps a movement to repeal the Panama Canal tolls to exempt American vessels in the coastwise traffic from tolls appear now as subjects that will crowd Congress for consideration.

If this session of Congress should enter upon the program outlined by Senator Harding in his campaign, the very first thing that will be dealt

with will be the Panama Canal question. In his campaign Mr. Harding declared himself in favor of exempting tolls on American coast vessels, and the old controversy between the railroads having steamship lines, especially the Canadian railroads, and the dispute as to the interpretation of the Hay-Pauncefort treaty will be revived with all its bitterness and international significance.

PANAMA TOLLS AGAIN

Senator Borah has announced that he will bring the issue before Congress, but he is uncertain whether to do so in this or the special session. Behind him will be Senator Knox, who, as Secretary of State, insisted that American vessels should be free of tolls, and interpreted this as in accord with the treaty. In August, 1912, the law exempting American vessels from tolls was passed by Congress by a decisive vote. Both Presidents Roosevelt and Taft favored this, and held that it was not in violation of the treaty. Before the law went fully into effect President Wilson, on March 5, 1914, appeared before Congress in joint session, and asked that the exemption clause be repealed, declaring that he agreed with the English interpretation, and saying, further, that he would not know how to deal with foreign affairs of a delicate nature unless Congress granted his request.

This had the effect desired, and the exemption clause was repealed, although many Democrats, including Speaker Clark and the then Democratic House leader, Oscar W. Underwood, opposed the President's attitude. It is safe to say that the exemption will be restored unless unforeseen foreign complications should arise, and this matter will be considered before the Senate seriously takes up some form of substitute for the League of Nations. There are so many things ahead in our foreign affairs that President Harding, when he comes to redeem his pledge, may consider it wiser to allow the toll question to remain as it is rather than to venture upon a career that may bring the United States into unfriendly relations with Great Britain.

Immigrant Arrivals and Departures

IMMIGRANT arrivals at the Port of New York during October exceeded departures by 49,072; in September the similar excess was 49,705. Arrivals exceeded departures in nine out of the ten months reported on, although the excess of arrivals in the first four months of the year was slight. For the ten completed months the excess of arrivals was 193,305.

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Europe's Vast, Unbalanced Debt to Us Alarms Free-Traders and High-Protectionists Alike—Banker Recommends a Middle Course, Improving Our Own Work and Investing Abroad So That Our Debtors May Send Us Goods in Settlement Without Danger to Home Industries

THE volume of Europe's unbalanced debt to the United States has brought new elements into discussion of the tariff. Both free-traders and high-protectionists find argument to support their respective tariff gospels in this debt and in the manner in which it is to be paid off.

Some free-traders point with particular emphasis to the fact that, since we have the bulk of the world's monetary gold, Europe must be allowed to pay off her debts here by sending us commodities. This view is fortified by the fact that other circumstances, such as shipping losses by Europe and mercantile marine expansion in America, have reduced foreign ability to pay for goods by rendering services upon which we were dependent before the war.

Another item that is emphasized in this connection is the fact that since Europe has resold most of her American securities to the United States she has been robbed of one of her great means of meeting her annual bills in this country arising from her unfavorable balance of trade. Before the war it was estimated that the interest earned by Europe on her investments in the United States amounted to several hundred million dollars and was an important factor in keeping the international books balanced.

A high tariff wall, the free-traders say, would retard Europe's payment of her debts here by making it difficult for her to market her goods in this country in the required volume. They also point to the continuing heavy balance of trade in favor of this country against Europe, arguing that the only way in which that unbalanced situation can be corrected is by stimulating a countervailing volume of imports into this country. Interest on the loans which this country has made to Europe must be paid, they argue, as well as the floating indebtedness which has been accumulating month by month, and, unless it can be done with goods, it cannot be done at all. Furthermore, it is contended, the foreign exchanges cannot be corrected until equilibrium is restored between imports and exports, and the future of our export trade is menaced by the continuance of existing exchange rates which assess Europe prohibitive prices for purchases in America.

PROTECTIONIST ARGUMENTS

With equal earnestness high-protectionists cite the existence of Europe's liabilities to this country as conclusive proof of the necessity of maintaining a staunch tariff wall. They agree with the free-traders that Europe cannot liquidate her debts here with gold, and they also lay stress on Europe's loss of dividends each year from her investments in this country and of other means for paying as she goes. The only answer to such a situation, they say, is an avalanche of Europe's products into this country, unless proper steps are taken to prevent such a catastrophe, as they see it. They fear this would mean the ruination of our domestic industries from competition by foreign goods, and an utter demoralization of our price structure through the flooding of our markets with merchandise from abroad. Their conclusion is that the only way to save the American producer, manufacturer and merchant from such consequences is by means of an ample protective tariff to prevent the dumping of European products into the United States.

Each school sees disaster if the theory of the other prevails. But both seem to overlook a number of important considerations. A somewhat middle position was indicated recently by a prominent banker who recognized the special problem created by Europe's debts to the United States. He emphasized the importance of industrial efficiency at home and liberal investments abroad as means of stabilizing the international situation rather than any radical tariff policy. He said that the question of industrial efficiency in this country was more important than ever before on account of the international trade situation, declaring that it was primarily on efficiency that we must depend for the protection of our industries against foreign competition, and that we must not lean too greatly on a protective tariff. He admitted that Europe owed us great sums of money which she could not liquidate with gold but must

pay off largely by sending us goods. But he added a significant thought when he said that she also must be enabled to pay her debts by attracting our investment in her enterprises.

As to industrial efficiency, although it is impossible to show, by exact figures on a broad basis, just how great a reduction in unit output there has been as a result of war conditions and their aftermath, there is evidence that it has been serious. It is undoubtedly true that American business, as it has been conducted recently, could not compete with foreign industry. Partial figures are available illustrating this. Data compiled by an association of employers in Indiana as to building construction give a striking instance. In 1909, according to these figures, bricklayers received 55 cents an hour and laid 1,100 bricks a day; in 1916 the pay had risen to 65 cents, and the stint of bricks laid had declined to 900 a day; in 1918 the pay was 80 cents, and the bricks laid in a day were down to only 614; in 1919 the wage was up to 100 cents an hour and the bricks down to 587; this year the wage is 125 cents an hour and the day's work has receded to 541 bricks. In other words, in 1909 \$4.40 was paid for 1,100 bricks in eight hours, but in 1920 it costs \$10 to get 541 bricks laid in eight hours. That is, the hourly rate of bricklaying declined from 138 to 68; costs rose from 55 cents to \$1.25.

THE SITUATION GENERAL

Facts show a similar depreciation in other industrial work. The Massachusetts Department of Labor and Industry has obtained statistics of hourly production from a number of representative establishments in the principal industries of the State, showing the relation of industrial efficiency to high wages during the war period. The figures presented were for October in the years 1914, 1918 and 1919. These years were selected as representative of prewar, war and reconstruction conditions. The figures covered seven establishments—two shoe factories, one paper factory, one chair factory, one mill manufacturing shirting, one candy factory and one factory producing rubbers. A special effort was made to make sure that only factories should be included whose units of production were of a standard character and whose processes of manufacture were identical in each of the years studied. Of the seven establishments for which data are given, four showed an increase in quantity of output per employee per hour in 1919 over 1914, while three showed a decrease. The rate of decrease was, by industries, as follows: Shirtings, 10.1 per cent.; chairs, 10.6 per cent., and rubbers, 17.8 per cent. The paper-making establishment showed an increase in production per employee of 11.3 per cent. over 1914, and the candy factory of 36.2 per cent.; one shoe factory showed an increase of 9 per cent., while the second shoe factory, which furnished data by departments, showed increases in production ranging from 6.7 per cent. in the treeing and dressing room to 142.7 per cent. in the stitching room. Wage increases were considered in conjunction with the production data. From these figures the conclusion was reached that increases in wages in the several establishments did not uniformly result in an increase in production per employee. On the contrary, in the three establishments in which a decrease in product per employee was reported in 1919 as compared with 1914, the increases in wages during the period were respectively 100 per cent., 90 per cent. and 110 per cent., while the increase in wages during the same period in establishments in which production per employee increased was, with one exception, less than 90 per cent.

While these figures do not show so flagrant a demoralization in efficiency as do the bricklaying figures, nevertheless they do show how efficiency has not kept pace with rising production costs, and they indicate that there has developed in industry considerable slack in operating costs that can be taken up in the process of readjusting business to a narrower margin of profits and enabling it to hold its own in competition with foreign industry. One of the marked developments in the evolution of American industry before the war was the narrowing of the margin of profits on which it could successfully operate, a tendency which was virtually abolished by war conditions in which the

competition for help made it possible for the inefficient to hold their jobs. With the growth of unemployment making it necessary for labor to compete for work again the premium on efficiency is being restored. This restored efficiency, as a protection to American industry against foreign competition, is as important as the tariff.

THE POWER OF INVESTMENT ABROAD

Equally important as a factor in the process of readjustment of our business to meet the situation created by Europe's debts to us is American investment in European enterprise. It is a fallacious assumption that Europe must pay her debts in this country entirely by sending us goods. The performance of services is an equally potent way to pay debts. It is true that Europe at present is not able to perform the same amount of service for this country that she did before the war, when we depended chiefly upon her carrying trade for the transportation of our goods throughout the world. But the impairment of Europe's mercantile marine, which has greatly reduced her power to perform services of this type, is at worst temporary; and during the exigencies of war America produced a lot of shipping that will not stand the test of time. Again, as conditions right themselves, the entertainment of our tourists will once more help Europe pay her debts to us.

But aside from these considerations, the growing investment of American money in European enterprises will make it possible for Europe to perform a vast amount of service for us which she otherwise could not perform. If American money finances a factory in Europe, for instance, it is for Americans that the foreign labor employed in that factory is really working, and the result of that labor is, in effect, to earn money for Americans; that is, to pay Europe's bills to us. In other words, investment in European enterprise by Americans would make it possible for the United States to hire millions of people and to profit by the fruits of their labor without bringing either the goods thus produced into this country or that labor into this country. To bring that labor into this country would mean the destroying of our own labor market and of course would be contrary to our fundamental economic welfare. Also hiring them in factories on their own soil and keeping them at work there in the production of goods for the consumption of their own nationals, or of countries other than America, would obviate the adverse effect upon our domestic business situation which might result from sending their products in excess quantities for sale in our own markets.

Selling their American-financed products at home, and disposing of their surpluses to other countries, would in ultimate economic effect have the same force in paying Europe's bills here as would the accumulating of direct credits through selling goods in America.

In other words, dividends which European labor would earn on American money invested in Europe would give our European debtors a chance to work out their indebtedness to us in a way which would not tend to unsettle our domestic business situation. This, then, would also be as potent a measure of protection as the tariff for American industry and labor.

With our business operating on a close basis of efficiency and a narrow margin of profits, and with American money earning dividends on European labor functioning abroad, it should mean that European goods would find their way to our markets only in the quantities and of the kinds for which we have a real economic need.

The point of all which is this—that tariff manipulation is not the only way in which the problem of Europe's huge unbalanced debts to the United States can be worked out. There are economic factors deeper and broader than tariff measures, whether of the free-trade or the high-protection persuasion.

FRED L. KENT, Vice President of the Bankers Trust Company, has been elected a Director and member of the Executive Committee of the Asia Banking Corporation to succeed John F. Schmidt, resigned.

DEC 6

Finality of Settlement the Pressing Need of Tax Reform

Ex-Solicitor of Internal Revenue, Discussing Existing System, Calls Failure to Make Tax Payments a Closed Issue, the Most Damaging Phase of Present Procedure—Recommendations Include Advice to the Taxpayer to Help Himself by Proper Presentation of His Case

By ROBERT N. MILLER
Ex-Solicitor of Internal Revenue*

LONG before the first law imposing a tax based on incomes, one of the most important and difficult things a business had to do was to decide each year whether it had been run at a gain or a loss, how much the gain or loss was, and what part of the business was mainly responsible for the result. Its importance was demonstrated by pitiful business wrecks which stranded and were broken up in bankruptcy courts. Still, because of the difficulty, relatively few businesses tried hard to master the complicated technical questions involved in a true determination of income. Among the few who tried, still fewer succeeded. The task of distinguishing between those receipts which are true income and those receipts which are partly a return of capital and partly of income the task of guarding against overstatements of income by ignoring future liabilities, the proper handling of inventories, the decision as to what constitutes realization of loss or of gain, and many other fundamental problems, raised economic, accounting and legal questions of which many business men had not definitely learned the existence.

Then suddenly this knowledge as to net earnings became a matter of immediate dollars and cents. Whether or not we had previously appreciated the necessity which had always existed, the tax law forced us to do what we ought to have done years before—investigate the principles which govern the determination of income.

We all blamed the tax law and said it was complicated. And it was, but the hardest thing about it hadn't any necessary relation to taxes at all—it was this question of net earnings which we ought to have known a good deal about already.

There was an old man from the country, who drove over to the school house to vote the Australian ballot for the first time. He went with enthusiasm, but he came back disgusted. He said that the people who got up the ballot were numbskulls; that it was an awful job just to cast your vote; it had taken him half an hour and some one had to help him. And it turned out that it was hard for him, because you have to be able to read to use that ballot, and he had never learned.

We have all been floored by the income and profits taxes, and it is largely because we had paid so little attention in the past to the question of reliably ascertaining profits. We had not learned to read profits.

THE PRACTICAL EFFECT

The question as to what is income and the question whether the return is fair, considering the investment, are inherently hard. The moment Congress made taxes depend on income that moment inescapable difficulties of administration began. And hard as it is to administer, it is probably as fair as a heavy tax can be—which isn't so very fair, I admit.

The practical effect of Federal taxes on your business depends on two distinct elements—the text of the law imposing it and the actual assessment and fixing of taxes by the administrators charged with tax collections.

It is regrettably clear that the amount to be raised by taxation for 1921 is no less than for 1920. Laws can be changed at this time only by equalizing the burden, not by lightening it.

The crying present need of every business of every kind is to find out once and for all what its tax bill to date is. At the present moment there is hardly a single corporate taxpayer that is sure all its tax is paid. The suspense in some cases is destructive of opportunity and fatal to successful operation. Delayed audits make it difficult for the banks of the country to be sure of the net worth of any business, since it is not uncommon for an additional assessment to wipe out an apparent surplus, and disclose an actual impairment of capital. The department realizes these difficulties. This need cannot be supplied without Congressional action; to my mind three measures would be serviceable toward producing the necessary result:

First—Enact the provision, now ready for action in the Senate, by which settlements reached between the taxpayer and Commissioner may be

made final and binding both on the taxpayer and the Government, unless actual fraud has been practiced. Under present laws the Commissioner is required to reopen any case when he receives information tending to show a higher tax than has been assessed. New decisions of courts or information received by the Commissioner in the assessment of one corporation casting light on the income received by another corporation or by individuals may require additional assessment and examination after a case has been apparently closed. The provision for final settlement would have the virtue of making it possible for a taxpayer to be sure that his taxes for a certain year are finally and definitely paid and disposed of.

Second—Provide for the Commissioner of Internal Revenue sufficient funds to pay salaries to attract and hold an adequate number of men capable of dealing with these difficult questions with confidence and self-reliance. Decisive and broad-minded action cannot be secured in any business without paying for it. Men who have the knowledge and experience to carry such responsibility do not have to hunt for jobs. Such men are pursued by people who want to employ them. Whether you find it easy to believe or not, take my word for it there are men in the work of the department who rank favorably in ability with the ablest accountants and technical men in the United States. In the legal department there are lawyers of first-rate ability. These men are ridiculously underpaid, and are constantly receiving offers of salaries in multiples of what they earn now. Sooner or later they leave the service. They ought to be paid enough to make them stay. But what are two or three dozen such good men when there are millions of returns to audit? Some of the single returns in the Consolidated Section involve a hundred or more active subsidiary companies, each with a host of difficult theoretical problems. One able, experienced man can do five times the work—and do better work—than five inexperienced ones. The solution lies in paying enough to hold the useful men who are there and to attract others, as well as to secure and hold the services of business men and lawyers whose training and outside experience qualify them to take a sound view of great practical questions. To collect and check three or four billions in taxes each year under a law as complicated as this takes not only good men but many of them and that takes money. In my judgment this policy would be so efficient in the collection of taxes from those who ought to pay them that the present economical administration of the law—approximately 5¢ cents to collect \$100—can still be maintained.

Third—Provide a tax court of appeals, where questions of law arising under taxing acts shall be promptly decided. Under present systems there are nine courts of appeal, no one of them binding on the other, to which tax questions can go. Their views differ and there is no unified authority short of the already overburdened Supreme Court. A tax court of appeals would unify the appeals in a single court having the time and undivided attention to build up a special knowledge of business problems, and to decide the questions as they arise. Such a court should be provided with such technical assistance as will enable it adequately to study the whole field.

MANY CHANGES NEEDED

Other changes in the law which seem important—all put forward in the first instance by others than myself—will now be briefly suggested before passing to another topic:

I. The abolition of the excess profits tax conditioned on its simultaneous replacement with substitute taxes of adequate yield. The injustice, inequality, complication and uncertainty of the excess profits tax law need no emphasis here. It bears with unusual hardship on the mining industry in many ways, notably in that it allows as a standard rate of earning to this very hazardous industry the very small rate of earning which is deemed the proper figure for businesses which involve almost no risk of capital. Furthermore, while highly efficient in the past as a producer of revenue, it seems almost certain in these times to fail as a revenue producer. I will discuss later the question as to what substitute taxes seem best.

II. A provision contained in House Bill 14-198 should be enacted into law. It gives to the taxpayer who realizes in one taxable year the fruits of labor during other taxable years, or who realizes in one taxable year from the sale of property gains arising from gradual in-

crease in the value of the property since his purchase of it, the privilege of redistributing such gain over the several years to which it is properly allocable. Under the present law his entire income from this source is thrown into a single year, resulting in inequitable surtaxes.

III. In the same bill there is a wise provision that the five-year limitation upon additional assessments or suits now found in the Revenue act of 1918 shall apply also to taxes under earlier acts. As to most of these taxes under earlier acts there is now no limitation as to suit whatever.

IV. Provision should be made whereby a taxpayer who suffers a net loss in any taxable year may utilize the amount of this net loss as a deduction in adjacent taxable years. This provision means a loss of revenue, but, in my opinion, the severe injustice which is done by the present law in cases where heavy taxes resulting from a very successful year fall due in a year of utter disaster and loss makes this provision a matter of necessary relief, even though it deviates in principle from our adopted theory of taxing gains on an annual basis.

V. The tax status of personal service corporations, left somewhat in doubt by language occurring in the stock dividend case (*Macomber vs. Eisner*) should be freed from doubt. On this point I will not stop to go into detail.

VI. The taxation of insurance companies should be re-examined and modified. I will not stop on this point, either.

VII. Coming now to consider the changes which would be made necessary by the elimination of the excess profits tax, in my judgment the best plan offered in substitution appears to be an increase in the present corporation income tax (exempting from the increase certain classes of low-return business, such as public service companies) coupled with an increase in individual surtax rates, for incomes between \$10,000 and \$50,000, and increased excise taxes covering a wide field. I do not favor a general sales tax. I am afraid we might as well make up our minds that the income needs of the Government require the imposition of taxes of such a high aggregate yield that the substitute taxes for the excess profits tax, while less objectionable than that tax, cannot by any exercise of ingenuity be rendered light or agreeable. The primary and fundamental difficulty in the whole situation is the fact that Government is forced to take out of industry by taxation a larger sum than industry can conveniently or easily afford. Taxes will always be an unpleasant subject as long as the Government must raise as much money by taxation as it has to raise now.

Time does not permit discussion of the other substitute taxes which have been proposed from various well-informed sources nor of certain respects in which the law might well be amended.

TAXPAYER MAY HELP HIMSELF

Turning now from the text of the law and considering its administration I want to say that I have been inside the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and I have been outside, and I can say with emphasis and conviction that the delays and denials, the uncertainties and the harshnesses, which would test the sanity of Solomon and the temper of a tar baby, are due primarily to the unexampled difficulties of the problem. Congress has not given to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or to any one else the power to decide what tax would be fair to each taxpayer. It has given him the task of administering a law, which, with a few exceptions, is laid down unchangeably. And if Congress had given the incumbent of that office the opportunity of being a despot of that kind in the hope that the despotism would be benevolent the task of deciding what is "fair," aside from principle, would have proved almost impossible. Any one who says a desperately complicated law on a desperately complicated subject can be simply administered does not understand the problem. To train a Washington force to deal with many millions of highly involved tax returns each year is in itself a tremendous task; the task of keeping the field agents—who necessarily work in small groups all over the country—fully up to date on the thousand questions of construction is much harder, although most of them are eager students.

Taking the situation as it is, rather than as it would be under different laws and lower tax rates, the wise taxpayer will seek sympathetically to study the position of the department as well as his own case, and will succeed where others fail by presenting his own case so that his arguments fit in with the other decisions the department must make.

However well informed the department is as to general theory and the particular facts of any case,

*An address delivered at the recent annual convention of the American Mining Congress in Denver, Col.

the taxpayer in presenting his question ought to know still more about the theory of the law as applied to that particular case, and ought to know more about the facts of his own case than the department does at the outset. In a question which depends on what your statutory income is and what your statutory invested capital is, who ought to know more about it than you yourself? And the department welcomes such knowledge—just as the best qualified Judges expects the lawyers in the case to know more about it—at the beginning—than the Judge, and would be surprised at any lawyer who started out by asking the court what questions were involved and how they ought to be presented.

To make this definite let us take the case of a taxpayer whose profits tax is very high in proportion to his net income, and who seeks a lessening of his tax burden under that provisions which, in certain cases, gives relief by fixing the profits tax through comparison with other companies' taxes. The law states four general cases in which such relief from oppressive taxation will be given:

- (a) What the invested capital cannot be determined.
- (b) In the case of foreign corporations.
- (c) Where a mixed aggregate of tangible and intangible property paid in for stock or for stocks and bonds cannot be satisfactorily allocated.
- (d) Cases where there is hardship attributable to abnormalities of capital or of income.

The last case is the broadest, but it is clear that to get any relief at all, even under that provision, the burden is on the taxpayer to show the department clearly and definitely just what abnormalities there are, and just how they are responsible for the high tax.

The department in applying this to special cases has adjudicated the sufficiency or insufficiency of a number of alleged abnormalities, and has published these findings for the information of taxpayers in its bulletin, a very helpful policy on the part of the department. Some of the facts which appear to warrant such relief, if they can be proved, are as follows:

DETERMINING EXCEPTIONS

(1) Where through lack of adequate data it is impossible accurately to compute invested capital.

(2) Where capital is a material income-producing factor, but the capital employed is in very large part borrowed, so as to be excluded from statutory invested capital.

(3) Long-established businesses which by reason of ultra-conservative accounting or the manner of their organization would without relief be placed at a serious disadvantage in competing with representative concerns. An example of this is a case where assets put into the corporation in exchange for stock were of greater value than the face value of the stock, but could not be satisfactorily evaluated, so as to warrant the allowance of an adequate paid-in surplus.

(4) Where there are excluded from the invested capital intangible assets of recognized and substantial value built up or developed by the taxpayer. Examples under this head are cases where the statutory limitation as to invested capital based on tangibles results in serious hardship, and cases where a well-recognized good-will has never been capitalized by the taxpayer although existing for many years.

(5) Where a very large portion of the income is derived from sources not recognizable for invested capital purposes, as from peculiar activities and abilities of the managers of the business, not connected with the employment of capital.

(6) Abnormality of pre-war invested capital or income, where such abnormality is a direct cause of hardship.

(7) Where the net income for the taxable year is abnormally high, due to the realization in one year, of gains, profits or income, earned or accrued during the previous year, or where taxable gains are realized in the taxable year which are due in substantial degree to extensive earlier advertising or developing work, so that the realized income is in effect the dammed-up income, not accruable in earlier years but in a real sense attributable to earlier years.

(8) Where high income in the taxable year is due to the realization in one year of extraordinary gains or profits derived from the sale of capital assets, especially in case of the liquidation of a corporation.

(9) Where proper recognition or allowance cannot be made for amortization, obsolescence or exceptional depletion due to the great war, or due to the necessity in connection with the great war, of providing plant or equipment not useful for the purpose of the trade or business after the termination of the war.

(10) Possibly, where the accounting method approved for tax purposes indicates a paper profit, which for some clearly defined reason is larger than the real and ultimate profit will be. For example: The case in which there are important contingent liabilities, reasonably certain to be substantial, but indefinite in amount, or the case where approved inventory methods produce an extreme and unfair shift-

ing of income from a year of low tax rate to a year of higher rate. However, I know of no case which has been decided on this point.

There are other less well defined situations which may be recognized by the department as affording proper basis for this character of relief. But this enumeration will be enough to show that out of a thousand facts peculiar to your own business there would be, perhaps, one hundred that would be material as possibly entitling you to relief sought. To dig through the thousand facts for the hundred which may show that your income or capital is abnormal is not a task that can be performed at a single sitting. A man who understands the spirit of the provisions must work together for a considerable time in many cases to sift the facts, eliminate the immaterial and assemble the really material facts in definite and compact form. The Government honestly desires to give you what you should have; it will do all it can to dig out the facts which are favorable to you; but it is hardly reasonable to rely entirely on the Government—when the law has put the burden on you—to do this long job of finding the evidence which you need.

Certainly if you were the plaintiff in a lawsuit seeking damages from some one who has broken his contract with you you would not present to the Judge all the facts about your business, material and immaterial, and expect him to pick out for you the elements of damage which support your claim. You would be certain that the material facts were sought for with intelligence, and presented before him clean-cut and definite.

NO IMMEDIATE RELIEF

I have taken one particular kind of question as an illustration to show the close analysis involving time and hard work, which is required. The same degree of analysis is necessary along different lines in almost any case involving a large business, no matter what the particular question is. No case is exactly like any other case, nor does any case prepare itself. That our tax should require of the taxpayer so much difficult and expensive work is generally recognized as intolerable. Abandonment of the excess profits tax will remove many difficult questions for future years, yet as long as the United States must raise by taxation as much as three or four billions by taxation the determination of tax liability will involve serious and complicated problems.

In presenting his case to the bureau the taxpayer must be ready not only to show that his case is a just one, but he must be able to show also that it comes within a general rule which the department can safely follow without causing trouble in other cases, and without violating the text of the law or fundamental principles which have already been recognized by the bureau. That is, the bureau cannot afford to give any taxpayer a favorable answer unless such favorable answer harmonizes in principle with the rulings that are being applied to other taxpayers. Every principle consistently carried out operates favorably to some taxpayers and unfavorably to others, but the department, of course, can have only one rule on the same principle. Thus in a certain class of expenditures which are in the twilight zone between capital expenditures and business expenses, one group of taxpayers, who are not interested in excess profits taxes, are likely to contend that they are deductible expenses, diminishing income, while another class of taxpayers who need a substantial invested capital will contend that such expenditures should only be regarded as of a capital nature. The ultimate decision as to the deductibility of the items will work unfavorably to one of these taxpayers or another, and that taxpayer who succeeds will do so not on the ground of what is fair to him, but because he has brought his case within the general principle which the Government has adopted as correct in that class of items. The others, no matter how strong their equity, will lose, because they have not found a general principle under which their claims can be sustained. Other examples where taxpayers' claims conflict could be indefinitely multiplied.

This has a bearing on the often repeated question: "Isn't there a prospect that a change in Administration will bring broader views into the department, and more generous treatment of taxpayers?" My answer is, "Probably not." Whether an Administration is Democratic or Republican, it is faced with disaster if it has insufficient funds. I assume that a Republican Commissioner of Internal Revenue will come in. I also assume that he will be—what he must be to succeed—an experienced administrator and a broad-minded man. If he is that, he will see that he must adhere to some principles, and that when two classes of taxpayers

UNITED STATES SHIPPING BOARD

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Bids will be received on a private competitive basis, in accordance with the Merchant Marine Act, at the office of the United States Shipping Board, 1319 F Street N. W., Washington, D. C.

The ships offered for sale include steel vessels and wooden steamers.

The steel steamers are both oil and coal burners. The Board has established a minimum price on these vessels.

Terms on Steel Steamers

10% of the purchase price in cash upon delivery of the vessel; 5% in 6 months thereafter; 5% in 12 months thereafter; 5% in 18 months thereafter; 5% in 24 months thereafter; balance of 70% in equal semi-annual installments over a period of ten years; deferred payments to carry interest at the rate of 5% per annum.

The two hundred and eighty-five wooden steamers for sale are of ten different types, as follows: Nine Daugherty Type; Seventeen Ballen Type; Ten Peninsula Type; Six Pacific American Fisheries Type; One Allen Type; One Lake and Ocean Navigation Company Type; Thirteen McClelland Type; One Hundred and Eighty-six Ferris Type; Thirty-one Hough Type; Eleven Grays Harbor Type. Also have a number of wooden hulls of various types.

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Further information may be obtained by request sent to the Ship Sales Division, 1319 F Street N. W., Washington, D. C.

The Board reserves the right to reject any and all bids.

Bids should be addressed to the UNITED STATES SHIPPING BOARD, WASHINGTON, D. C., and indorsed "BID FOR STEAMSHIP (name of ship.)"

United States Displacing England as Purveyor to Canada

**Balance in Our Favor Has Increased in Current Year Despite Preferential British Tariff and Premium on the Dollar—Empire's Field of Competition Is Limited—Dominion's Finances Must Stand
Severe Strain Under New Plan of Settlement Without Refunding**

Special Correspondence to The Annalist

OTTAWA, Dec. 4, 1920.

THE surprising manner in which Canadian trade has swung to the United States is the most outstanding feature of the commercial life of the Dominion since the signing of the armistice. This development is of more than ordinary importance, because in many respects the world has entered upon a new trade epoch. To a very considerable extent America has replaced Europe as a money lender and international trader. Certainly, Canada has entered upon a new epoch, new in respect to the chief source from which she draws her capital; new also in respect to her export trade, which this year is three times greater in value than it was in 1914, and based not on wartime but on peacetime products.

In 1918 the United States exported to Canada commodities to the value of \$741,330,427. This year up to Oct. 1 she had exported \$782,402,627 worth of commodities, while Canada drew from all other sources only \$369,953,000 worth. In other words, in the first ten months of the present year the Republic exported to Canada \$41,000,000 more of commodities than she did in the whole twelve months of 1918, when millions of dollars' worth of raw or semi-manufactured materials were being brought in for the making of munitions. As these imports are now averaging \$78,000,000 a month, it is evident that for the year they will exceed the 1918 total by nearly \$200,000,000.

CANADA RECIPROCATING

Canada's export trade has also exhibited a marked southern trend. In 1918 the total exports to the United States were valued at \$451,893,470. For the first ten months of the present year they were \$459,290,000. Thus, while in 1918 they averaged \$37,600,000 a month, this year the average has been \$46,000,000, and from present indications will average about \$50,000,000 for the whole twelve.

It is true that in this period the United Kingdom increased her exports to Canada in a remarkable manner, for while in 1918 they were but \$72,906,000, up to the end of October this year they were \$205,043,000. But it must be remembered that two factors which do not operate to promote trade with the United States have contributed very largely to help the United Kingdom. One is the British preferential tariff rate of 33 1-3 per cent.; the other is the rate of exchange, which at the present time is bringing goods into Canada from Britain at a valuation about 25 per cent. below that of the native product. On the other hand, American goods entering Canada have been hampered by the rate of exchange, which has ranged as high as 16 per cent. against the Dominion, and has operated as a very considerable additional duty.

In this connection it is but due to say that the United States has benefited very greatly through the removal of the 7½ per cent. customs war tax. When this was removed in May it was predicted in these columns that the concession would mean \$100,000,000 in new business to American exporters, a prediction that has been fulfilled.

To obtain a just conception of the importance of the new development in the trade between the two countries it is desirable to take a glance at the situation in pre-war years. In 1880 the United Kingdom supplied approximately 50 per cent. of the \$69,900,000 of commodities that Canada imported, while the United States supplied but 39 per cent. In 1883 the United States permanently passed the United Kingdom as an exporter to this market, her margin that year being \$3,500,000. In 1890 the United Kingdom supplied only 38 per cent. of the imports, and the United States 46 per cent. At the time that the British preferential tariff was introduced in 1897 the British imports had declined to 27 per cent., while those from the Republic were equal to 56 per cent. of the whole. With the benefit of the preference of 33 1-3 per cent. imports from Britain at once increased, but the percentage, as compared with the total, continued to fall, being in 1900 but 25, as compared with 60 from the United States. In 1910 the percentage of imports supplied by Britain still remained at 25, while that of the United States stood at 58. In 1913 64 per cent. of the imports came from the United States and 33 per cent. from Britain. For the present year the percentage will be approximately

17 per cent. from Britain and 68 per cent. from the United States.

It is to be observed that while the proportion of British imports to the total declined rather rapidly until the incoming of the British preference, still the latter did not arrest it. On the other hand, while the proportion of such imports into Canada has declined from 50 to 17 per cent. during the last forty years, the proportion of American imports has increased from 39 to 68 per cent.

The question naturally arises, Will this rate of increase be maintained? To predict with any degree of certainty is impossible, but there are facts that enable one to form a fairly accurate conclusion. To expect that for some time to come the United States will continue to get as large a share of Canada's trade as she got when commerce with other countries was very much interrupted is out of the question. Besides, the rate of exchange, which may go as high as from 18 to 20 per cent. against Canada before the Winter is over, is a restraining influence. In addition the heavy depreciation of sterling should in a few lines give British exporters a decided advantage in the Canadian market.

BRITISH OUTLOOK NOT BRIGHT

But even with the preferential tariff and the rate of exchange working in his favor, the British exporter will not have things all his own way in Canada. In considering the possibilities of British trade with the Dominion it must be taken into account that the range of products which the United Kingdom can sell is limited. Of the \$220,000,000 worth of imports from the British Isles in the year ended October no less than \$133,000,000 was in textiles and fibre products, another \$31,000,000 being represented by vegetable products. So that \$62,000,000 represents the whole range of imports from the United Kingdom outside of these two classifications. Now, it is impossible that these huge importations of textiles, which have gone as high as \$14,000,000 a month, should be maintained; indeed, they have already dropped to less than \$9,500,000 a month. Even after making due allowance for the lower valuation on British goods, it is obvious that Canada is not importing nearly as much from Britain as in June, for example, when \$24,119,000 was reached, compared with \$17,431,000 in October.

The United Kingdom cannot hope to compete with the United States in supplying the Canadian market with those lines of goods imported most heavily from across the border. Take iron and its products, the imports of which for the year ended October totaled \$229,000,000; considerable of this is raw material, while in respect to the imports of agricultural machinery, which forms a very large part of the classification, the United States does not pretend to be a competitor. The same is true of the imports of non-metallic products, including coal and oil, which amounted to \$154,000,000; also true very largely of the \$144,000,000 of vegetable products, and altogether true of the very large imports of raw cotton. It is the limited range of products in which the British exporter can hope to compete successfully in the Canadian market that explains why the British preference has not imparted a stronger stimulus to imports from Britain.

Aside from these considerations the British have not anything like the selling force in Canada that the Americans have. Nor would the amount of business that they would probably get today warrant them in incurring the expense that a large selling force entails, since much of what they might hope to get would have to be taken away from others already in the field—not an easy matter. A considerable portion of British goods sold in Canada is handled by American firms, which in taking care of the demand in the United States can easily handle the Canadian end also. This economical method of handling business will always strongly appeal to a large number of British firms.

American newspapers and magazines are another tremendous selling force working in Canada for the exporter in the United States. At least one of these magazines has a circulation much larger than that of any Canadian publication, and there are several more whose Canadian circulation runs well up into the tens of thousands. The advertising done by American firms in these publications

is a factor against which even large Canadian firms find it difficult to compete, and if this is true of the latter, one can readily realize the handicap under which British houses labor. This is strongly borne out by the September trade returns, which show that Canada imported \$204,000 worth of newspapers and periodicals from the United States in that month and only \$2,234 worth from the United Kingdom and \$36 worth from all other countries. Very nearly the same state of affairs exists with respect to advertising pamphlets, show-cards, catalogues and price lists. Nor must it be forgotten that nearly 50,000 users of American goods emigrate from the United States to Canada every year.

The rapidly increasing investments of Americans in Canada are also stimulating imports, for a portion of this new capital comes in the form of commodities. The spending in the United States of the proceeds of two loans aggregating \$30,000,000 made for railway equipment this year are an example of this, and other examples of a similar kind might be mentioned. Canadian branches of American firms which must draw certain raw materials from abroad naturally go to the parent branch as much as possible for these. Never before did finance and commerce co-operate so closely to promote trade between the two countries.

But, after all, the possibilities for the extension of American trade in Canada are limited not so much by the demand for American products as by the extent to which Canada can sell her commodities in the United States, and thus obtain the wherewithal to pay for what she buys. The decline in Canada's exports to Europe have driven this home. She cannot on her trade with other countries obtain a large enough balance to meet the balance which on the year's trading operations she must pay the United States. Increased American investments by thus keeping in check the rate of exchange would do much to offset this naturally contracting influence. The situation is largely in American hands.

DURING the delivery of his budget speech in the House of Commons in May last the Minister of Finance announced that the time had arrived when the Government of the Dominion must cease borrowing. The inference drawn from this was that it was the purpose of the Government to meet its obligations as they matured without resorting to refinancing. This inference has been strengthened by recent statements issued from Government sources here.

Whether the Government will be able to persist in its purpose remains to be seen. Among bankers and financiers in general opinion is somewhat skeptical as to the ability of the Government to avoid additional financing, while business men fear that, should the Minister of Finance persist in his present policy, the taxation involved would impose a serious burden on the country's industry.

That the task with which the Minister of Finance is faced is a heavy one there can be no doubt. The total Federal indebtedness amounts to \$2,523,062,178, all of which matures between 1921 and 1960, a period of thirty-eight years. These maturities are as follows:

1921.....\$40,000,000	1934.....\$481,741,850
1922.....194,867,100	1935.....873,000
1923.....194,881,800	1937.....345,473,000
1924.....105,289,550	1938.....52,327,296
1925.....43,310,600	1945.....65,207,351
1926.....25,000,000	1947.....4,888,185
1927.....65,936,450	Serial—
1928.....2,000,000	1920-25..24,333,333
1929.....60,000,000	1909-34..23,467,206
1931.....79,398,700	1930-50..137,058,841
1933.....483,081,250	1940-60..93,926,666

Total\$2,523,062,178

From the above it will be seen that, while the 1921 maturity is not of sufficient importance to create concern, the situation is somewhat the opposite in respect to the payment of the indebtedness maturing on each of the three following years, amounting as they do in the aggregate to \$495,038,450, obviously a large sum for the Dominion to liquidate with the surplus obtained from taxation and ordinary revenue. This sum entails payment on domestic war loans. Fortunately, the next heavy payments do not fall due until 1933 and 1934, the total of which amounts to \$964,823,100. By then

Continued on Page 734

Forces Swaying Stocks and Bonds

Stocks

THE improved sentiment which held sway in the financial district last week brought about an upturn in the stock market, due mainly to the fact that the shorts were inclined to cover their commitments. In the more volatile issues some marked advances were recorded, notably in such stocks as Mexican Petroleum, Crucible Steel, Baldwin Locomotive and Atlantic, Gulf and West Indies. The result was a natural follow to the overselling which had prevailed. In certain issues the shorts found that the stock was not in anything like abundant supply around the low levels.

In the copper group dividends were passed by Nevada Consolidated and by Chino. This action served only to emphasize the thoroughly liquidated condition of the copper stocks, since the two directly affected eased off only fractionally on the unfavorable announcements.

There is little evidence of buying for long account, except on the part of a small market following. Apparently most people are content to wait a bit and see whether the selling wave has completely passed.

American Beet Sugar Gains 3—A moderate volume of buying to cover short commitments moved the stock up easily.

Allis-Chalmers Up 1½—Favorable reports are in circulation as to the company's earnings.

Allied Chemical and Dye Down 1—The stock eased off a bit, despite announcements that the merger plan would become effective Jan. 1.

American Car and Foundry Advances 3¼—There has been a steady investment demand for this issue.

American Linseed Down ¼—There was heaviness in the shares, even though reports were to the effect that plans for a sale of the company were progressing favorably.

American Locomotive Up 3—The company is expected to show good earnings for this year and excellent business is in prospect for 1921.

American Smelting and Refining Gains 1½—While the copper market reflects no favorable sign, there has recently been a quiet picking up of copper stocks in anticipation of decidedly better conditions next year.

American Steel Foundries Up 3½—The company declared a 12 per cent. stock dividend.

Atlantic, Gulf and West Indies Gains 10½—The advance was directly attributable to short covering.

Baldwin Locomotive Up 5%—The shorts became a bit timid and covering carried the stock forward easily.

Bethlehem Steel B Up 1¼—The company has good forward bookings, the volume being heavier than with most of the independent steel companies.

Chile Copper Down 3½—There was heavy selling of the stock from Boston.

Crucible Steel Gains 8½—Extensive short covering carried the issue forward.

Greene Cananea Copper Off 2½—The company has closed down operations.

Houston Oil Up 5½—A short interest was punished in this issue.

Invincible Oil Gains 3½—The elimination of weak holdings overhanging the market gave stability to the issue.

Lackawanna Steel Up 5¼—It is reported that the earnings for the current quarter will be decidedly favorable.

Mexican Petroleum Advances 24—The floating supply of the stock is small and a big short interest found difficulty in covering.

Missouri Pacific Off 1½—Speculation for the decline was responsible for the recession.

New York Air Brake Up 2½—There has been some good buying in the issue recently on the strength of reports that earnings were good.

New York, New Haven & Hartford Down 2½

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The muddled situation in New Haven resulted in a great deal of liquidation.

Pacific Oil Up ½—The stock was listed at the close of the week on a when issued basis. The shares represent the new company which is to take over the Southern Pacific oil lands.

Pan American Petroleum Gains 9—There were reports that the dividend rate on the shares might be increased.

Pressed Steel Car Gains 1½—Better business is expected to fall to the equipment companies after the turn of the year.

Reading Gains 3½—Short covering helped to move the issue forward.

Republic Iron and Steel Up 2½—There was better buying of the issue, even though independent steel prices were falling. It is expected that the slump in the steel business will not be of long duration.

Southern Pacific Off 5½—With the announcement of the anticipated melon there was the usual Wall Street custom of selling on the good news.

Studebaker Up 2½—There was a moderate amount of short covering.

United States Rubber Gains 3½—Covering by the shorts brought about the upturn.

United States Steel Advances 2½—It is expected that the current quarter earnings will measure up well with those of the third quarter.

Willys-Overland Preferred Down 8½—The company is understood to be doing a considerable amount of bank financing.

Acceptances

BUSINESS in the bankers' acceptance market continued in fairly good volume during the last week. There was the usual out-of-town inquiry and some of the local commercial banks bought in rather good quantity at times. The savings banks also did their part, taking, of course, nothing but prime New York bills. But there was not the aggressive buying that was noted on some of the days of the preceding week, and at the close of the period dealers probably had more bills on hand than they had had in their possession at the close of the week before.

A somewhat tighter money market, with call money most of the time at 7 per cent. and with a slightly better demand for time funds, served to detract interest from the bill market. An increase of nearly \$12,000,000 in the bill purchases of the Federal Reserve Bank indicates that dealers were more inclined to lean on the central institution, and this is not a particularly gratifying sign. For some weeks the Reserve Bank had been displaying an irregular but nevertheless downward tendency in its bill dealings, and there were hopes that the market would continue good sufficiently long to allow the central bank to liquidate a good part of its accumulation.

One development of the week, however, may be regarded as mildly favorable. Following the previous week's decline in rates to the basis of 6½@6½ per cent. for prime ninety-day paper, last week several of the dealers went back to the old rates, at levels about one-eighth of 1 per cent. higher than the new level. It was not a general return to the old prices, but it was made by enough of the dealers to warrant what the trade calls a "split quotation," for there probably were as many quoting the 6½@6½ per cent. rate as there were quoting the higher scale.

The action in again advancing rates may be interpreted in two ways; it may be contended that the dealers were forced to advance in order to attract buyers, which would explain their putting up their selling rate from 6½ to 6¾ per cent., and, at the same time, would warrant them in advancing their buying rate correspondingly. On the other hand, it could be argued that they had put prices up because of the better movement of bills. This latter, though, is the more difficult position to defend.

Those who held to the lower level say that they noted no bad influence as a result of the previous week's change and now can see no reason for following the movement back to higher scales. They maintain that their bills are moving well and that no piling up has been experienced, and so long as this condition obtains they are not inclined to put rates any higher than they now are being quoted.

What the next turn is to be remains to be seen. In most places the idea that all money rates are to come down prevails and after the first of the year it is likely that this hope will be realized. If this is so, then the downward trend of acceptances will come as a matter of course, for bill rates, although usually slower moving than other money rates, must, in the end, follow the market.

Bonds

THE bond market as a whole last week was much quieter than during the preceding week and the trading was confined mostly to the usually speculative issues. Prices fluctuated considerably and a great deal of the selling again gave evidence of a continuation of profit-taking and a disposition to establish losses for the purpose of making next year's income tax returns.

Over-the-counter business in bonds also was in smaller volume, although a good demand was again reported for municipal securities which of late have been unusually active and at the same time have been moving toward much higher prices. For instance, bonds of the larger cities which have been offered in good-sized amounts for several months at prices yielding from 5 to 5.30 per cent. are now retailing on an income basis of from 4.60 to 5 per cent. Unsettled business conditions, the slump in stocks and likewise in commodities, and the rather sharp decline in money rates, are held attributable for the attractiveness of high-grade municipals, which have also benefited because of their being free from all Federal income taxes and in a great many cases from taxes in the States in which they are issued.

The amount of new financing last week, too, was very light. One noteworthy offering was by a banking group headed by Blair & Co., Inc., and Hallgarten & Co., which also included The Equitable Trust Company of New York, the Chase Securities Corporation of New York and the Illinois Trust and Savings Bank and the First Trust and Savings Bank of Chicago. The loan consisted of \$12,500,000 twelve-year 7½ per cent. sinking fund gold debentures of the Virginia-Carolina Chemical Company, which were offered to the public at 96½ and interest, to yield about 8 per cent. The loan was heavily oversubscribed. This is the first financing the company has done since 1914, when it sold an issue of convertible 6 per cent. debentures, which were largely exchanged subsequently for the company's preferred stock. The new debentures will have a sinking fund sufficient to retire over 50 per cent. of the issue by maturity. The company's business has shown a substantial and steady growth from \$62,218,078 for the fiscal year 1916 to \$138,918,234 for the fiscal year 1920. Upon completion of this new financing the company's total funded debt will, it is said, amount to approximately \$26,900,000, which is about one-third of its securities. Among the other issues floated were \$4,000,000 thirty-year first and consolidated mortgage series "AA" 6 per cent. gold bonds of the Niagara Falls Power Company, which were brought out by New York and Buffalo bankers, at 87½ and interest, to yield over 7 per cent., and \$1,296,000 serial 8 per cent. equipment trust gold certificates of the Marland Tank Line Company, offered at par and interest. Other new financing, aggregating approximately \$90,000,000, is being considered, it is said, and is likely to be formally announced very shortly.

Liberty Bonds Decline—The Liberty bonds and notes did not display their usual activity last week.

Continued on Page 719



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Money

THE money market was somewhat tighter during the last week than it was in the two preceding weeks, and those who were maintaining a fortnight ago that the ease then noted was merely temporary and that the claims of others that enduring relief had at last come were premature found what they insisted was substantiation of their position. However, unless the signs are all wrong last week's tightness, which, as a matter of fact, was little more than relative, was the temporary thing, for it is simplicity itself to point to reasons why the money market should have been tight last week and why, also, it should be tight this week and for a part of next.

On Wednesday of next week the final instalment of income and profits taxes will be due. For some days past there have been preparations going on for this date, preparations which have been manifest in several markets other than that for money. Liberty bonds, for example, were under much pressure last week, and only the operations of the sinking fund kept them from going to levels considerably below those actually touched, for the selling pressure was heavy. Probably there was much liquidation elsewhere, too, and while this would have the tendency of reducing loans and easing money, the banks themselves were making preparations to put their own houses in order against the heavy demand which is sure to come before the 15th.

Under the circumstances it was natural for money to harden. The process of liquefaction in the banks never is carried out without some upheaval in rates, and this seems to have been what was going on last week. As it was, however, rates did not advance very much, and the tightness in the market was more easily discernible in conditions than in rates. Call money on the Stock Exchange opened and renewed on Monday at 6 per cent., and did the same the following day, although on both occasions 7 per cent. was charged for new loans in the afternoons. But by Wednesday the call market was definitely established at 7 per cent., and it remained there thereafter. On Thursday there were reports that some odd lots of money had been put out on call at 7½ per cent., but the transactions were small and had no significance.

In time money the business was not much more than nominal and rates, while fractionally higher by the end of the week, were not sufficiently changed to cause any comment. Borrowers, ever since the time rates started to come down and funds became available, have shown a marked disposition

to get out of the market, obviously on the theory that they can fill their requirements for the time being out of call money, and that later they will be offered time funds at substantial concessions from current quotations. The banks, actuated by the same idea, have given indications that they are anxious to get as much long-time money placed as possible. With two such groups of money dealers acting in what appears to be entire harmony of opinion, it seems rather brash to predict that both are in error.

The operations over Dec. 15 are likely to be large. The Government has anticipated collections of something like \$800,000,000 for that date. It has sold Treasury certificates amounting to \$703,000,000, of which \$324,000,000 were sold in this district, and the Secretary of the Treasury has protested vigorously against any "relief" being granted to taxpayers, on the ground that the Treasury will be embarrassed if the full collections are not forthcoming at this time. As it is, he will be compelled to sell a large issue of Treasury certificates, and naturally he is not anxious to make this any larger than necessary.

But when those operations once are out of the way, the market should again become easier. Whether this will be immediate, that is directly after the 15th, or will take a week or two, cannot be said with safety now, but there is every reason to expect that it will follow, soon or later.

Liquidation in all lines seems to be progressing as well as could be expected. The farmers continue to hold out and recent advices from Washington and from the abodes of politicians certainly may be construed to encourage the farmers to hold out longer. The recreation of the War Finance Corporation is proposed by an aggressive and presumably numerous body of politicians and agriculturists and other methods are being talked of, all designed to "let the farmer get a fair price for his product." Little is said of the consumer, who, if natural economic law were allowed to work its will, would now be coming into his own after several years of very great prosperity for the farmer.

New York City loans and deposits are coming down fast. Since Oct. 16, just four weeks ago, loans in the Clearing House banks have contracted \$308,521,000, or from \$5,495,865,000, the high record for all time, to \$5,187,344,000 on Saturday. Demand deposits in the same time have shrunk \$285,260,000, from \$4,254,508,000 to \$3,969,248,000, and time deposits have come down \$29,876,000, for a total of the two deposit items of \$315,136,000. That is a good contraction for a four-week period and if continued probably would help the situation considerably.

Government deposits, which were \$180,390,000 on Sept. 18, were down last week to \$8,289,000. Four weeks ago they were \$8,599,000, but in the following week they rose to \$68,056,000, falling the next week to \$35,447,000. Last week's total was the low record for the whole war period. These deposits of Government funds thus have become so irregular as to be unreliable for purposes of forecasting the money market. They hardly will diminish much this week, but next week, with the tax payments coming in and a new Treasury certificate issue to be floated, they will mount considerably, unless the Government does the unexpected and changes its system. What is evident, though, is that the day of hundreds of millions of Government money on deposit with local banks has passed, and is not likely to return.

The Federal Reserve Bank's weekly statement presented a very bad superficial appearance, with the ratio of cash reserve to deposit and note liabilities down three full points to 37.8 per cent., the lowest, with two exceptions, of any week of the year. On Feb. 27 the ratio was down to 37.6, and the week before that it was 37.1, the latter being the low record. On last week's statement the bank just missed showing a deficit. It was at exactly the legal limit of 40 per cent. gold to note liabilities and 35 per cent. gold and legals to net deposits.

But the statement was not so unfavorable as it appeared. There was a loss of \$33,698,000 in total reserve, but this was occasioned by a loss of \$44,000,000 in the gold settlement fund, which offset a gain of \$10,066,000 in gold and gold certificates and of some minor gains in other reserve items. The net deposits were up \$31,840,000, due chiefly to an increase in members' reserve deposits of \$36,369,000, made to overcome the deficit of the week before. Outstanding Federal Reserve notes contracted \$2,961,000.

On "earning assets"—loans to others—the bank increased \$65,194,000. Member banks increased their borrowings \$58,859,000 on balance and the bank paid off \$3,450,000 of its borrowings from other Reserve Banks. It increased its bill purchases by \$11,934,000, but the Treasury reduced its debt by \$9,049,000.

Stocks—Averages—Bonds**TWENTY-FIVE RAILROADS**

	High.	Low.	Last.	Chgs.	Last. Yr.	Net Same Day
Nov. 29	57.45	56.76	56.92		56.13	
Nov. 30	56.98	55.71	55.87	-1.05	56.30	
Dec. 1	56.18	54.44	55.89	+ .02	56.66	
Dec. 2	56.76	55.27	56.00	+ .11	56.80	
Dec. 3	55.96	55.24	55.54	- .46	57.28	
Dec. 4	56.26	55.88	55.98	+ .44	57.52	

TWENTY-FIVE INDUSTRIALS

Nov. 29	88.38	86.55	87.67	+ .82	114.93
Nov. 30	88.30	87.00	87.39	- .28	115.42
Dec. 1	88.45	85.91	88.18	+ .79	116.49
Dec. 2	90.06	87.42	89.41	+1.23	119.26
Dec. 3	89.76	88.56	89.38	- .03	119.29
Dec. 4	91.18	89.76	90.96	+1.58	119.30

COMBINED AVERAGE—FIFTY STOCKS

Nov. 29	72.91	71.65	72.29	+ .41	85.53
Nov. 30	72.64	71.35	71.63	- .06	85.86
Dec. 1	72.31	70.17	72.03	+ .40	86.57
Dec. 2	73.41	71.34	72.70	+ .67	88.07
Dec. 3	72.86	71.90	72.46	- .24	88.28
Dec. 4	73.72	72.79	73.47	+1.01	88.41

Bonds—Forty Issues

	Close.	Change.	Net	Day	1919.
Nov. 29	70.19	+ .06	71.84		
Nov. 30	70.12	- .07	71.80		
Dec. 1	69.90	- .22	71.60		
Dec. 2	69.75	- .15	71.72		
Dec. 3	69.69	- .06	71.74		
Dec. 4	69.74	+ .05	71.82		

STOCKS—YEARLY HIGHS AND LOWS—BONDS

	50 STOCKS.		40 BONDS.					
	High.	Low.	High.	Low.				
*1920	94.07	Apr.	68.85	Nov.	73.14	Oct.	65.57	May
1919	99.50	Nov.	69.73	Jan.	70.06	June	71.06	Dec.
1918	80.16	Nov.	64.12	Jan.	82.36	Nov.	75.65	Sep.
1917	90.46	Jan.	57.43	Dec.	80.48	Jan.	74.24	Dec.
1916	101.51	Apr.	80.91	Apr.	80.48	Nov.	86.19	Apr.
1915	94.13	Oct.	58.90	Feb.	87.62	Nov.	81.51	Jan.
1914	73.30	Jan.	57.41	July	80.42	Feb.	81.42	Dec.
1913	79.10	Jan.	63.00	June	92.31	Jan.	85.45	Dec.
1912	85.83	Sep.	75.24	Feb.				
1911	84.41	June	69.57	Sep.				

*To date.

Textiles

ALTHOUGH nothing approaching a startling improvement in business marked the last week in the cloth trades, indications were visible here and there that a turn for the better was not so far distant as many had supposed. Jobbers in some of the far Western and Southwestern markets sent in orders for prompt deliveries of Spring goods, more especially colored cottons. These orders were not large, and they were placed with every evidence of careful buying. Yet the mere fact that they were placed gave considerable encouragement in quarters that needed it. Like a surgical patient who has just thrown off the effects of the ether used in the operation and who is surprised to find himself alive, many jobbers have come through the taking of their inventories with more or less amazement that they are not dead financially. Having discovered they had not "gone West" in a commercial sense, they have set about getting back into their business stride.

Other than the transactions hinted at above, not a great deal was done in the finished cottons during the week. In the gray goods a sudden and rather unexpected turn for the better occurred. On Tuesday and Wednesday buying was larger and more active than it had been for some time, with the leading printers the principal traders. Under the influence of this business, standard printcloths gained from half to three-fourths of a cent a yard, and similar increases were seen in the staple constructions of sheetings. At the advance some sales were made for deliveries running up to the first of next March. A small part of the business was admittedly speculative, but the great bulk of the cloths bought were for consumption.

Despite the fiasco of the current Fall season, the slackness of Spring buying and the continued unsettled market for wool, preparations have been made in several quarters of the woolens and worsteds trade for next Fall. Several lines of overcoatings have been assembled for the next heavyweight season, but so far as known nothing has been done with them to date. In the suitings the manufacturers appear to be making haste more slowly. Nothing out of the ordinary has transpired in the dress goods end of the trade as yet.

A rather mixed situation prevails in the silk field at the moment. Some firms have not yet offered their Spring goods to the retailers on the road, but will do so later. Others intend to wait for the retailers to come to this market. Still others have sent their men out, and in the last week they have been reporting a greater show of interest on the part of the retail buyers. As yet, however, the results are more sentimental than actual. As for the raw material, it begins to look as if the Silk Syndicate recently formed at Yokohama may fail as a cure-all for low prices after all. It is apparently operating very cautiously, and is insisting upon such high quality in the silks it buys that the reelers are beginning to get restless. The upshot of it all is that some of them may soon sell silk at prices less than the "pegging point" set some time ago. Should this be done to any large extent, the silk manufacturers are liable to have their troubles to face all over again.

Heavy shipments of linens continue to arrive here, and it begins to look as if the Irish and Scottish mills are intending to dump into this market all the goods they can turn out.

Stocks—Transactions—Bonds**STOCKS, SHARES**

Week Ended Dec. 4.

	1920	1919	1918
Monday	565,355	1,088,760	464,720
Tuesday	781,972	851,017	573,900
Wednesday	1,052,391	789,347	416,100
Thursday	974,263	1,039,720	433,550
Friday	714,835	1,025,913	279,780
Saturday	408,935	482,614	181,104

Total week.	4,497,751	5,277,371	2,349,214
Year to date.	203,252,671½	293,890,416	133,749,068

BONDS, PAR VALUE

Monday	\$14,061,750	\$23,929,000	\$12,570,500
Tuesday	13,824,100	29,525,500	10,202,500
Wednesday	17,323,900	21,027,200	13,665,000
Thursday	12,420,000	24,940,600	12,386,000
Friday	14,578,700	21,890,775	11,804,000
Saturday	7,961,200	13,317,500	5,700,000

Total week.	\$89,769,650	\$135,530,575	\$66,427,000

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The Annalist Barometer of Business Conditions

UNQUESTIONABLY it is too early to say that the readjustment of business has been completed, but, on the other hand, there is no reason in ignoring any betterment which may come to light. Here and there are to be found factors making for greater confidence, some degree of stabilization having been attained. In short, sentiment has improved to a very large degree, in part, perhaps, because the dire predictions of some time ago have failed of realization. In the more cheerful mood which prevails there is danger of overestimating the force of the favorable features. It must be remembered that an increase of business in the retail line was to be expected at this time purely as a result of seasonal conditions. This activity, while perhaps not quite so marked as last year, will nevertheless aid in liquidating stocks and thereby create a situation where retail prices may more nearly reflect the reductions that have already taken place in the primary markets. It is perfectly true that price reductions in themselves are no stimulus to buying where the reduction has been from an abnormally high level, but a point must ultimately be reached at which prices will prove so attractive that they cannot be ignored, and in some instances this is already coming to pass.

There are cross currents in the general situation, however, which make for uncertainty. The increase in unemployment is becoming steadily a more important influence, and as it proceeds buying power is curtailed. There are further reports coming to light of curtailment in operations of big plants, the step being a necessary one if the part of conservatism is to be played. Also wage cuts are developing, and for the most part they are being accepted with a better grace than might have been expected. This would seem to indicate that labor, no matter what may be the public statements, is appreciative of the situation created by falling prices and decreased business.

Several disconcerting factors developed during the last week, notably the passing of dividends by two of the porphyry group of copper companies. It was plain that with the copper market in the position of dullness which has been acute during the last half of this year, and with the price of the metal steadily falling, there could not be any very large earnings applicable for dividend purposes. Still it was something of a shock to have this visible justification of predictions. With relation to the industrial companies there may also be some attempt to conserve cash if earnings during the final quarter of this year are no better than appears on the surface. Against earnings there will have to be marked off considerable, probably, to account for depreciation in inventory.

Foreign Exchange

THE chief characteristic of the foreign exchange market last week was its dullness and the extremely narrow range in which rates moved. Sterling, usually active and with swings of 8 to 10 cents, was confined to a limit of only a shade more than 2 cents, and the Continental rates, for the most part, were no more active. The undertone of the market was not especially firm; as a matter of fact there was plenty of evidence that any great volume of offerings would have as markedly a depressing influence as ever. But the offerings in quantity were not forthcoming and as a result the market maintained a reasonably even keel all week.

Sterling started at \$3.48½, down fractionally from the close of the previous week, and then held very close to that rate thereafter. On some days of the period, notably on Thursday, when the market moved within a range of only one-quarter of 1 cent in the pound, the market was about as dull as it has been at any time within the past year.

The Continental belligerents were almost equally dull and the Continental neutrals were probably quieter, if there was any distinction to be noted. There was a slight downward trend toward the close, but the movement was hardly of the proportions which could be referred to accurately as a "break."

London again dominated the market, most of our movements, slight as they were, being in response to rates cabled over. This situation has been in force for some little time now, and it is becoming more patent each succeeding week that New York is losing its fore rank in the control of foreign exchange. After the outbreak of the war, and particularly after the removal of exchange control, in March, 1919, it looked for a time as if New York would exchange places with London as the dominating centre, but the element of time, which allows the London market several hours start on the New York market, as well as that of

geography and of tradition, seems to have restored London to her former place.

It was learned during the week that the amount of British Treasury certificates afloat in this market has been cut to about a fifth of its maximum, and there is belief that within a short time the bills will disappear from the market entirely. Also the outstanding volume of United Kingdom notes is being reduced. The United Kingdom notes due next year are secured collateral obligations, secured mostly by bonds, and with the unmistakable improvement in the bond market, together with the low current rate for sterling, there is the opportunity of a fairly attractive profit to the British in canceling the United Kingdom notes, with consequent release and sale of the collateral.


The clearing of this market of outstanding foreign issues may have no further significance than the mere desire of the British to reduce their foreign indebtedness. But, on the other hand, it may have great significance if the reduction of present debt volume is designed to prepare the way for the sale here of other securities. It is not probable that the British Government is contemplating the issuance of a new loan here, but it is

entirely possible that the sale of old bonds held abroad or lodged with Trustees in this country is being considered and the market "sweetened" to accommodate them.

In this connection it should be borne in mind that a great amount of refinancing will have to be considered by British interests, Colonial and home, within the next few years. Canada, between now and 1925, will have maturing something like \$600,000,000 in war debt, to say nothing of the maturities of Provinces, municipalities and private enterprises. Ordinarily this refinancing would be undertaken in London, but at the present time it is more likely to be transferred to New York. This business may be expected con-

sequently. Then there is South America. In the past the South American countries did most of their financing in Europe, chiefly in London and Paris, but that is not apt to be the story of the future. Already the financial district is full of reports of tremendous South American financing about to be announced, and there is a growing belief that this will not represent entirely new business, but will reflect many maturities in Europe. The

Business Index Line



September Index Number 40.02.

Number required for October to constitute a forecast 44.

Actual October Index Number 45.95.

THE October Index Number completes the forecast begun by the July Index Number, which was explained in detail in THE ANNALIST of last week. Briefly the indications given were that the December averages of security prices would show an upward movement, that there would be a reaction in February, and that then the list would start up for a long bull movement with business responding more slowly to the influences now beginning to bear on the security and commodity markets and beginning its revival in August.

In general the prices of investment stocks on the New York Stock Exchange and of the condition of business throughout the country will follow the trend of the Business Index Line, stock prices responding first to the influences which direct the index line and business feeling the effect of these influences some four to ten months later.

However, a change in direction of the line is not, alone, an indication that a falling stock market will rally or that a rising market has reached its peak. Such changes in direction of the index line may mark only momentary fluctuations which will presently cease to exert an influence and the line will resume its former trend.

In the case of a low level in the stock market and of unsettled business conditions, such as exist at present, an upward turn of the line can be considered as indicative of an impending change in conditions only when the index number of the second month following the turn shall be greater than 110 per cent. of the index number marking the turn and also greater than 108 per cent. of the index number of the first month after the turn and when the index number of the third month after the turn shall be greater than 110 per cent. of the index number of the third month. As exemplified in the present instance a forecast can be considered to have been given only if the October index number shall be greater than 110 per cent. of the September index number, or approximately 44.

In the case of a high level of the stock market, accompanied by great activity and prosperity in the business field, a downward turn of the line can be considered as indicative of an impending change for the worse only when the drop in per cent. from the index number of the preceding month is equal to an amount at least as many times .71 as the second index number is numerically greater than 83. For example, a drop in the index number from 92 to 88 would constitute a forecast, for 88 is 95.6 per cent. of 92 and so has fallen 4.4 per cent. But 88, being numerically greater than 83 by five, is required to fall only five times .71, or 3.55 per cent. A drop to 88 from 91 would not constitute a forecast, for 88 is only 3.3 per cent. less than 91 and the fall to 88 must be at least 3.55 per cent.

South American exchanges, after their months of decline, were somewhat steadier last week, probably because of the belief that financial assistance is to be extended to the countries by this market. Chile, it is expected, will receive a loan for railroad improvement purposes, and Brazil, through the medium of the State of San Paulo, not the City of Sao Paulo, is likely to receive \$30,000,000 within the next few weeks. The Argentine also is known to be negotiating with local bankers, and there is the belief that her requirements, at least in part, will be satisfied.

The Oriental situation remains the bad spot. China apparently is going through an unhappy economic period, and the fall in the price of silver the last week to the lowest point reached in several years is plain indication of the trouble there. Just what is going on in Japan remains a mystery, but the mystery is more political than economic. There is a new crop of Japanese political rumors and apprehensions about, and these have reached into certain banking circles, where there is frank uneasiness.

Iron and Steel

SO far as the independents are concerned steel prices are practically down to the level of the United States Steel Corporation. Demand continues to be negligible, and further curtailment of operations will be the probable outcome. It is hardly to be expected, however, that the independents will endeavor to cut prices below the Steel Corporation level while wages and other costs of production are so high. The majority of the steel companies could hardly hope to compete against the Steel Corporation at current levels. It seems, therefore, that further curtailment will take place until conditions right themselves and the big underlying demand for steel becomes assertive.

There is considerable interest as to rail prices. There is no denying that the railroads will be in the market for large tonnages of rails during the coming year and even now orders are being placed on a tentative basis as regards price, this to be determined in the near future. The Steel Corporation price on rails is unchanged from that which has ruled for more than a year and a half, and it is considered more than likely that if there is any change whatsoever in rail prices it will be toward higher levels. Some of the independent companies which are large rollers of rails could hardly offer tonnages as low as the Steel Corporation level and hope to make much of a profit. It is possible that the independent scale may be as much as \$10 a ton higher than that of the Steel Corporation. The reason why such a spread could exist lies in the fact that 1921 will probably be the heaviest in point of rail orders in many years. It has been estimated that the rail requirements will total some 3,500,000 tons. This would give a goodly volume of business for all of those companies which are in a position to supply rail requirements.

Shipping

THE announcement that the House of Representatives Committee on Immigration would recommend a two-year ban on immigration had a further depressing effect upon American shipping. The plans of the United States Mail Steamship Company and the United American Lines for the establishment of passenger services upon the Atlantic centre around steerage movements, and if the influx of aliens were materially checked it would seriously handicap them in their operations.

The American lines will have rather keen competition for the traffic on the Atlantic. The Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, one of the oldest and most powerful of the British steamship lines, announced last week that it would enter the transatlantic passenger business in the Spring with the inauguration of regular services from Southampton, Cherbourg and Hamburg to New York. Three intermediate size liners—the Orepesa, Orduna and Orbita—will be available at the outset.

The outstanding development of the week was the deal through which the Cosmopolitan Shipping Company discontinued its connection with the Green Star Steamship Corporation. There was a consolidation of the Cosmopolitan with the Green Star last Winter, at the same time that Struthers & Dixon, Pacific Coast operators, entered the combination. The stock in the Cosmopolitan Company was sold back to its original holders, the consideration being \$925,000. The Green Star Line will centre its business efforts around the operation of its own fleet of eighteen freighters.

The depression in shipping is reflected in the estimate that fully 10,000 marine officers and men are out of employment in Atlantic and Gulf ports. It is reported that more than 100 steel ships owned

by the Shipping Board are tied up, in addition to the 350 wooden steamers which have been withdrawn from active operations. Privately owned steamers are being retired also, the Merchants and Miners' Transportation Company having tied up the Ontario and Quantico.

The first meeting of the new Commissioners on the Shipping Board was held on Dec. 1. At this session the seven members who hold recess appointments discussed in a general way the problems confronting the Shipping Board. In view of the fact that Senator Jones of Washington, the Republican leader on maritime affairs in the upper house, has announced that he will fight their confirmation, the new Commissioners assume their duties under a handicap. For the first time in nearly a year the board is in a position to authorize the sale of its ships to foreigners. Admiral Benson, making a statement of policies to his conferees, urged that American business men ship their good in United States vessels.

It is reported that Congress will be asked to take steps to authorize a reduction in the sale price of its tonnage shortly after it has reconvened. It is understood that if a reduction is determined upon the policy of the Government will be to apply this to all vessels previously purchased by American steamship companies, in order that these pioneers may not be penalized for enterprise and daring.

The Moore & McCormack Steamship Company

has announced that it will represent the Svenska Lloyd, the Swedish steamship line, in the United States, and has advertised the inauguration of three new freight services. One route will run to Spanish ports, another to Black Sea ports, while the third service will be maintained to North Africa.

The newly formed Roosevelt Steamship Company, of which Kermit Roosevelt is President, is reported to have determined upon the starting of a freight service from New York to the Far East. No definite announcement has been made as to the scope of operations, other than that the company proposes to engage in business on a world scale.

Indication that shipping is returning to a more normal level is afforded in the report that the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, the largest Japanese steamship company, has declared a 30 per cent. dividend for the last fiscal year. Last year the Japan mail line paid 100 per cent. to its shareholders. Its original building program has been cut in half, but inasmuch as the value of the 103 ships in its fleet has been written down to \$40 a gross ton, the outlook is satisfactory.

Freight rates are still dropping. Vessels may be chartered for the movement of coal to Rotterdam for \$6.75 and \$7 a ton. This is the lowest level since the outbreak of the war. The shipbuilding industry reports no new orders for ocean-going construction, and there are no indications that there will be an early revival.

Bonds

Continued from Page 716

and prices for a great many of the issues showed substantial losses. As was the case during the previous week, a good deal of selling came from individuals and corporations, apparently for the purpose of raising ready cash with which to meet the last instalment of income profit taxes due Dec. 15. The 3½s started the week around 92.28, but on Friday touched a low of 90.26. Among the 4½s the price trend also was very irregular, with the first 4½s going down from 87.10 to 86; the second 4½s from 85.98 to 85, later advancing to 85.50, then falling off again to around 85.26; the third 4½s from 88.90 to 88, and the fourth 4½s from 86.38 to 85.42, later moving up to 85.94, then declining to 85.62. The Victory 4½s and 3¾s likewise were headed downward and sold off from 96.06 to around 95.48, respectively.

Railroad Bonds Reactionary—There was a continuation during the week of the declines in the bonds of this group, and at the same time there were a number of instances where toward the latter part of the week slight recoveries were recorded. Publication on Thursday of the segregation plan of the Southern Pacific road naturally had quite an effect on the convertible 5 per cent. bonds of this company. The bonds on Monday sold up to 112½, later declined to 105½, and on Thursday opened at 108¾, quickly dropped to 107, moved up a point to 108, and then on Friday fell off to around 104½. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fé general 4s sold down irregularly from Monday's high of 76½ to 75¼. Baltimore & Ohio convertible 4½s finished the week around 67½ after selling up on Monday to 70¼. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy joint 4s were a little steadier and fluctuated between 96¼ and 96¾. Chesapeake & Ohio convertible 5s started the week at 85, later dropped over a point to 83¾, moved up almost two points to 85¾ and then declined to around 84¾. Chicago & Alton 3s the first of the week broke two points to 44¾, and later advanced to around 46. The 3½s early sold at 35, advanced over a point to 36½ and later fell off again to 35. Other similar fluctuations during the week were very much in evidence. Chicago, Rock Is'nd & Pacific refunding 4s were traded in at prices ranging between 66 and 67; Erie convertible 4s (Series "D") between 46 and 49; Kansas City Southern 5s between 71 and 72½ and the 3s between 52¾ and 53¾; New York Central debenture 6s between 91½ and 92¾ and the debenture 7s between 101½ and 102; Pennsylvania general 4½s between 79¾ and 81¾; Rock Island, Arkansas & Louisiana 4½s between 64¾ and 65½; St. Louis & San Francisco adjustment 6s between 63¾ and 64¾, the prior 6s between 60 and 61 and the income 6s between 49 and 50¾, and the Union Pacific first 4s between 80½ and 81.

Tractions Only Fairly Active—Traction issues were only fairly active last week, with most of the interest centred in the Interborough Rapid Transit first and refunding 5s, which on Monday advanced fractionally to 52¾ from a low at the opening of 52½. Later they dropped to 52, moved up again to 52½, and finished the week at around 51½. Interborough-Metropolitan 4½s were less active and started the week at 18%, on Wednesday sold off to 16%, later gained a small fraction to 17½ and then fell off to around 16. The Hudson & Manhattan issues were only moderately active, with the first and refunding 5s (Series "A") early advancing to 61%, later falling off to 61, moving up a half point to 61½, and then declining again to 61, while the adjustment income 5s reached 22%, later selling off to 21%, finally closing the week a small fraction higher to 22. Third Avenue adjustment 5s were very dull, and what few transactions were recorded were at prices fluctuating between 28% and 30%. The rest of the bonds of this section were practically neglected.

Industrials Mostly Down—While dealings in quite a few of the industrial issues were in good-size volume, prices generally were inclined to seek

lower levels. American Smelting and Refining first 5s attracted quite a few buyers, but the bonds at one time sold off irregularly from a high of 75½ to 74 toward the latter part of the week, then moved up a point to 75. American Telephone and Telegraph collateral trust 5s of 1946, another active issue, early reached 80, then dropped to 79, with a later advance to around 79¾. Atlantic Fruit 7s of 1934 on Monday were dealt in at 75, later fell off five points to 70, finally finishing the week around 70½. Bell Telephone of Pennsylvania 7s were unusually quiet for this issue, but after fluctuating most of the week between 101¾ and 102½, on Thursday moved up to around 102½, but the following day dropped to 101¾. Braden Copper 6s, which were not traded in until Thursday, lost fractionally to 86, while Chile Copper collateral trust 6s were more active and opened Monday at 68, lost five points the following day to 63, later advanced over three points to 66½ and then sold off to around 65¾. The collateral trust 7s of the same company, too, were very weak, and sold down from 93½ on Monday to 90 the following day. They later advanced to around 92, and then sold off fractionally to 91¾. The Consolidated Gas convertible 7s dropped from 100% to 98¾, and the Cuba Cane Sugar convertible 7s, which began the week at 86, declined to 84¾, later gained fractionally to 85, and then slumped to around 84. Other price movements, which were more or less irregular, were in the International Mercantile Marine sinking fund 6s, which fluctuated between 79½ and 80; Midvale Steel collateral trust 5s between 71½ and 73; United States Rubber first and refunding 5s between 75½ and 76½, and the 7½s between 95 and 98; United States Steel sinking fund 5s between 90% and 92%; Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company 7s between 94½ and 95 and Wilson & Co. convertible sinking fund 6s between 82 and 83½.


Foreign Bonds Quiet—The foreign section during the week did not display any great activity. French Government 8s, which were probably the leaders as regards activity, early advanced from 100% to 101, later sold down to around 100¾, and then advanced again to 100%. The United States of Mexico 5s became quite lively toward the end of the week, and from a low of 44 established on Wednesday later gained almost two points to 45¾. Government of Switzerland 8s and the Kingdom of Belgium 7½s seemed content to fluctuate between 102 and 102½ and 97½ and 98 respectively. Other issues that moved along very irregularly during the week were the Berne, Switzerland, 8s at prices ranging between 95% and 98; Christiania, Norway, 8s between 98 and 98½; City of Paris 6s between 94% and 94¾, and the Zurich, Switzerland, 8s between 94% and 97%. The remainder of the bonds of this group, particularly the Japanese and United Kingdom issues, moved along in about the same manner as those mentioned above.

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Curve of the Food Cost of Living



An index number is a means of showing fluctuations in the average price of a group of commodities. The Annalist Index Number shows the fluctuations in the average wholesale price of twenty-five food commodities selected and arranged to represent a theoretical family's food budget.

Financial Transactions

BAROMETRICS

The State of Credit

	Same Week	Year	Same Period
Last Week.	Last Year.	to Date.	Last Year.
Sales of stocks, shares.....	4,497,751	5,277,371	203,232,671% 293,890,416
Sales of bonds, par value.....	\$80,769,650	\$135,530,575	\$3,445,101,200 \$3,217,568,325
High 73.72	High 89.01	High 94.07	High 99.59
Low 70.17	Low 84.51	Low 88.85	Low 93.73
High 70.19	High 71.84	High 73.14	High 79.05
Low 69.69	Low 71.60	Low 65.57	Low 71.60
Average price of 40 bonds.....	5.304%	5.147%	5.386% 4.961%
Average net yield of ten high-priced bonds.....	\$24,196,000	\$38,800,000	\$1,488,539,000 \$1,002,305,000
New security issues.....	2,500,000	139,825,210	202,003,000
Refunding.....			

*Month of October. †Month of September.

POTENTIALS OF PRODUCTIVITY

The Metal Barometer

—End of October— —End of September—

United States Steel orders, tons.....	9,859,822	6,472,668	10,374,804	6,284,638
Daily pig iron capacity, tons.....	105,745	81,385	104,310	82,932
Pig iron production, tons.....	*278,104	*1,863,558	13,125,323	*2,487,963

*Month of October. †Month of September.

Alien Migration

	June,	May,	April,	March,	Feb.,	Jan.,
Inbound	1920.	1920.	1920.	1920.	1920.	1920.
Outbound	62,692	53,772	48,219	39,971	30,606	31,858
Balance	24,543	17,121	19,107	22,639	11,607	27,066

Building Permits (Bradstreet's)

	October	September	August
1920.	1919.	1920.	1919.
156 Cities.	156 Cities.	156 Cities.	156 Cities.
\$82,592,049	\$146,348,703	\$93,919,607	\$131,946,984

MEASURES OF BUSINESS ACTIVITY

Bank Clearings

	The Last Week, P.C.	The Week Before, P.C.	Year to Date, P.C.
1920.	\$5,872,000,000 — 7.2	\$7,122,000,000 — 8.8	\$417,403,000,000 +10.3
1919.	8,568,000,000 +32.2	7,950,000,000 +31.1	378,101,000,000 +23.1

Gross Railroad Earnings

	Third Week in November.	Second Week in November.	First Week in November.	Month of September.	From Jan. 1 to Sept. 30.
1920.	20 Roads.	19 Roads.	20 Roads.	187 Roads.	187 Roads.
1919.	\$18,862,044	\$18,754,798	\$19,138,392	\$616,200,796	\$4,438,151,873

Gain or loss..... +\$3,942,723 +\$4,490,388 +\$4,908,173 +\$117,588,879 +\$657,370,728

+26.43% +31.49% +34.49% +23.5% +17.3%

WEEK'S PRICES OF BASIC COMMODITIES

	Current Minimum	Range	Mean Price	Mean Price of Other Years.
Copper: Lake, spot, per lb.....	\$0.1630	\$0.1914	\$0.1350	\$0.1250 \$0.1275
Cotton: Spot, middling upland, lb.....	5.16	.4375	.1550	.29025 .3250
Pine: Nor. Car. Hoofers 6 in., per 1,000 feet.....	40.00	62.00	40.00	51.00 44.00
Hides: Packer, No. 1, native, lb.....	20	.41	.20	.3050 .40 .295
Petroleum: Pennsylvania crude at well, bbl.....	6.10	6.10	5.00	5.55 4.50 3.875
Pig iron: Bessemer, at Pittsburgh, per ton.....	36.96	50.40	36.96	43.71 33.875 35.95
Rubber: Up river, fine, per lb.....	21	.49	.2600	.3475 .54 .6250
Silk: Japan, Shinsho No. 1, per lb.....	5.50	17.85%	5.00	11.4275 ..

Comparison of Week's Commercial Failures (Dun's)

	Week Ended Dec. 2, 1920.	Week Ended Dec. 4, 1919.	Week Ended Dec. 5, 1918.	Week Ended Dec. 6, 1917.	Week Ended Dec. 7, 1916.
To — Over \$5,000.	122	80	58	28	49
Total.....	115	50	36	9	30
West.....	72	45	29	11	50
Pacific.....	30	15	30	9	30

United States..... 339 190 143 57 159 66

Canada..... 139 16 16 8 16. 6 22 13 21 9

Failures by Months

	November 1920.	1919.	December 1920.	1919.	January 1918.
Number Liabilities.....	1,050	551	7,356	5,870	9,290

\$30,758,130 \$31,177,321 \$236,250,390 \$104,900,695 \$150,770,490

OUR FOREIGN TRADE


	October 1920.	1919.	Ten Months 1920.	1919.
Exports.....	\$751,729,488	\$631,618,440	\$6,832,324,338	\$6,496,996,406
Imports.....	334,675,831	401,845,150	4,692,695,065	3,098,844,337
Excess of exports.....	\$417,053,657	\$229,773,299	\$2,139,629,273	\$3,400,152,069

Foreign and Domestic Exchange Rates

New York funds in Montreal were quoted at \$145 to \$133.75 premium. The discount of Montreal funds in New York was from \$126.64 to \$117.97. The week's range of exchange on the principal foreign centres last week compared as follows:

Normal Rates of Exchange. Demand.	—Last Week.—	—Prev. Week.—	—Yr. to Date.—	Same Wk.
4.8065—London.....	3.48%	3.45%	3.53%	3.47% 4.00% 3.19% 3.84%
5.1813—Paris.....	16.44	16.74	15.97	16.61 10.74 17.54 9.86 10.75
5.1813—Belgium.....	15.54	15.84	15.06	15.60 5.62 17.54 9.40 10.28
5.1813—Switzerland.....	6.37	6.40	6.30	6.34 5.46 6.64 5.39 5.47
5.1813—Italy.....	27.17	28.00	25.77	27.47 13.20 29.67 12.34 12.77
40.20—Holland.....	30.50	30.35	30.65	30.375 39.00 39.35 38.125 37.9375
19.30—Spain.....	8.35	8.25	9.05	8.55 15.15 8.25 16.50 16.17
19.30—Copenhagen.....	13.18	13.05	13.50	13.13 19.30 11.84 19.80 19.65
26.80—Stockholm.....	13.85	13.50	13.80	13.50 19.15 13.00 19.90 19.00
26.80—Christiania.....	13.95	13.50	13.75	13.50 20.40 13.00 21.50 20.75
48.66—Bombay.....	28.50	28.50	29.00	28.50 49.00 28.50 46.00 44.75
48.66—Calcutta.....	28.50	28.50	29.00	28.50 49.00 28.50 46.00 44.75
78.00—Hongkong.....	65.00	60.75	66.25	64.00 106.25 60.75 103.00 101.75
19.30—Peking.....	91.50	86.00	93.50	91.00 179.00 86.00 167.00 162.00
26.80—Copenhagen.....	85.50	80.00	87.50	85.00 167.50 80.00 150.50 150.50
49.83—Kobe.....	50.625	50.625	50.625	50.50 47.35 50.75 50.75 50.75
49.83—Yokohama.....	50.625	50.625	50.625	50.50 47.25 50.75 50.75 50.75
50.00—Manila.....	46.50	46.50	46.50	46.50 46.25 46.50 46.25 46.25
42.22—Buenos Aires.....	34.875	34.375	33.625	33.50 43.50 33.00 43.35 43.35
33.55—Rio.....	17.125	16.375	16.25	15.50 28.25 15.50 30.875 30.875
23.83—Germany.....	1.46	1.40	1.58	1.44 3.05 1.01 2.46 2.10
20.26—Austria.....	.33	.32%	.34	.33 .29 .76 .05
20.26—Czechoslovakia				

Federal Reserve Gold Holdings and Total Stock of Gold



The space between the base line and the broken line represents the cash reserves required, that between the broken line and the light line the excess reserves, or free gold, and the whole space between the base line and the heavy line represents the total stock of gold. The supply is computed monthly so that the record can never be brought to the date of publication. The chart records the last figures published.

Central Reserve Cities		Last Week		Year to Date		Bank Clearings		By Telegraph to The Annalist		Year to Date	
		1920	1919	1920	1919			1920	1919	1920	1919
New York	\$4,943,302,700	\$5,500,905,865	\$228,641,176,308	\$218,929,304,321		Other Cities		\$102,045,229	\$93,801,521	\$4,604,539,210	\$4,056,275,151
Chicago	629,965,319	644,453,086	30,788,565,932	27,694,417,494		Baltimore		44,512,961	41,780,402	2,143,814,301	1,524,722,026
St. Louis	148,416,613	172,220,707	7,833,020,312	6,577,065,075		Buffalo		66,457,116	67,382,935	3,370,663,749	2,911,615,999
Total, 3 C. R. cities.	\$5,721,704,641	\$6,326,550,638	\$267,262,700,552	\$253,200,786,800		Cincinnati		14,377,800	14,281,500	691,281,200	629,151,000
Increase	*9.5%			5.5%		Columbus, Ohio		24,169,057	25,001,349	1,031,520,240	1,001,774,033
Other Federal Reserve cities:						Denver		102,348,270	106,000,000	5,762,958,822	5,180,766,688
Atlanta	\$53,215,137	\$87,460,707	\$3,015,284,164	\$2,968,417,708		Detroit		86,444,000	82,143,000	3,093,125,000	2,223,670,000
Boston	337,062,343	433,754,971	17,913,500,207	16,544,474,628		Los Angeles		26,357,388	18,569,091	2,201,560,595	872,168,384
Cleveland	128,803,721	122,512,375	6,177,742,214	5,041,632,173		Louisville		32,723,950	31,375,081	1,634,670,165	1,464,013,726
Kansas City, Mo.	181,503,431	252,391,868	11,165,268,179	8,627,167,342		Milwaukee		62,329,009	58,485,062	3,143,118,476	2,867,832,301
Minneapolis	91,380,428	57,583,963	3,707,402,424	2,107,230,348		New Orleans		106,053,734	153,044,787	8,246,575,568	6,746,265,121
Philadelphia	497,583,791	503,204,880	23,346,627,535	20,527,440,222		Pittsburgh		12,094,400	15,348,700	666,044,318	448,047,300
San Francisco	158,000,000	175,652,271	7,549,682,000	6,596,066,721		Providence		46,679,305	23,068,837	1,477,239,654	894,035,431
Total, 7 cities.	\$1,447,548,851	\$1,632,570,134	\$72,875,506,723	\$60,612,449,142		St. Paul		36,060,534	45,008,098	1,968,805,344	1,909,979,191
Increase	*10.7%			20.2%		Seattle		18,662,046	20,224,870	827,002,144	746,934,722
Total, 10 cities.	\$7,169,253,492	\$7,959,129,702	\$340,138,297,275	\$313,813,236,032		Washington					
Increase	*0.9%			8.3%		Total, 15 cities.		\$871,394,709	\$815,606,233	\$40,469,042,786	\$33,657,254,153
*Decrease.						Increase			6.8%		20.2%
						Total, 25 cities.		\$8,040,538,291	\$8,774,736,025	\$380,607,340,061	\$347,470,400,181
						Increase			*8.3%		9.5%

Actual Condition	Statements of the Federal Reserve Banks										Dec. 3	
	Dist. 1. Boston.	Dist. 2. New York.	Dist. 3. Philadelphia.	Dist. 4. Cleveland.	Dist. 5. Richmond.	Dist. 6. Atlanta.	Dist. 7. Chicago.	Dist. 8. St. Louis.	Dist. 9. Minneapolis.	Dist. 10. Kansas City.	Dist. 11. Dallas.	Dist. 12. San Fran'c.
Gold reserve	\$189,037,000	\$450,597,000	\$213,283,000	\$274,549,000	\$85,074,000	\$85,421,000	\$299,311,000	\$76,009,000	\$52,519,000	\$74,256,000	\$44,919,000	\$177,700,000
Bills on hand.....	193,687,000	1,054,020,000	177,582,000	230,875,000	118,380,000	137,893,000	491,364,000	123,095,000	81,387,000	114,249,000	73,312,000	223,830,000
Total resources....	495,154,000	1,863,535,000	488,307,000	607,224,000	285,072,000	270,889,000	944,923,000	265,991,000	167,937,000	271,147,000	183,415,000	460,285,000
Due Members.....	113,963,000	696,393,000	109,218,000	147,258,000	57,964,000	45,749,000	240,163,000	65,643,000	42,499,000	78,777,000	47,419,000	118,746,000
Notes in circulat'n	290,251,000	873,300,000	272,128,000	341,873,000	146,184,000	172,230,000	543,176,000	136,081,000	82,036,000	108,002,000	83,780,000	262,034,000

Federal Reserve Bank Statement

Consolidated statement of the twelve Federal Reserve Banks compares as follows:

RESOURCES—	Last Week.	Previous Week.	Year Ago
Gold coin and certificates.....	\$201,131,000	\$182,647,000	\$234,622,000
Gold settlement fund, Federal Reserve Board.....	388,743,000	411,197,000	428,812,000
Gold with foreign agencies.....	67,864,000	70,210,000	132,935,000
 Total gold held by banks.....	 \$657,738,000	 \$664,054,000	 \$796,369,000
Gold with Federal Reserve agents.....	1,194,204,000	1,197,681,000	1,172,191,000
Gold redemption fund.....	170,733,000	162,181,000	118,704,000
 Total gold reserves.....	 \$2,022,675,000	 \$2,023,916,000	 \$2,067,264,000
Legal tender notes, silver, &c.....	175,520,000	171,364,000	66,831,000
 Total reserves.....	 \$2,198,195,000	 \$2,195,280,000	 \$2,154,065,000
Bills discounted: Secured by Government war obligations.....	1,160,685,000	1,192,200,000	1,603,313,000
All other.....	1,616,116,000	1,543,230,000	504,795,000
Bills bought in open market.....	243,055,000	247,703,000	514,219,000
 Total bills on hand.....	 \$3,019,856,000	 \$2,983,133,000	 \$2,622,327,000
United States Government bonds.....	26,857,000	26,869,000	26,848,000
United States Victory notes.....	60,000	60,000	54,000
United States certificates of indebtedness.....	287,010,000	293,676,000	283,833,000
 Total earning assets.....	 \$3,333,792,000	 \$3,303,747,000	 \$2,933,082,000
Bank premises.....	17,456,000	17,333,000	12,896,000
Uncollected items and other deductions from gross deposits.....	734,523,000	709,401,000	920,269,000
Five p. c. redemption fund against Federal Reserve Bank notes.....	12,197,000	11,541,000	12,666,000
All other resources.....	7,716,000	7,278,000	8,328,000
 Total resources.....	 \$6,303,879,000	 \$6,244,580,000	 \$6,041,396,000
LIABILITIES—	Last Week.	Previous Week.	Year Ago
Capital paid in.....	\$99,140,000	\$99,020,000	\$86,973,000
Surplus.....	164,745,000	164,745,000	81,087,000
Government-deposits.....	60,088,000	15,900,000	39,798,000
Due to members—reserve account.....	1,763,822,000	1,711,764,000	1,830,037,000
Deferred availability items.....	551,529,000	582,442,000	717,852,000
Other deposits included for Govt. credits.....	25,742,000	22,927,000	94,133,000
 Total gross deposits.....	 \$2,401,781,000	 \$2,333,042,000	 \$2,681,820,000
Federal Reserve notes in actual circulation.....	3,312,039,000	3,325,629,000	2,881,359,000
Fed. Res. Bank notes in circulation, net liab.	214,939,000	214,610,000	257,480,000
All other liabilities.....	11,235,000	107,534,000	52,677,000
 Total liabilities.....	 \$6,303,879,000	 \$6,244,580,000	 \$6,041,396,000
Ratio of total reserves to net deposit and F. R. note liabilities combined.....	44.1%	44.4%	46.4%
Ratio of gold reserves to F. R. notes in circulation after setting aside 35 per cent. against net deposit liabilities.....	48.8%	48.9%	53.7%

Statement of Member Banks

Data for Federal Reserve Cities and in Federal Reserve Branch Cities.

	New York	Chicago		
	Nov. 26.	Nov. 19.	Nov. 26.	Nov. 19.
Number of reporting banks	72	72	51	5
U. S. bonds to secure circulation	\$57,862,000	\$37,482,000	\$1,439,000	\$1,438,000
U. S. bonds, incl. Liberty bonds	218,358,000	217,309,000	17,707,000	18,023,000
U. S. Victory notes	74,806,000	74,528,000	12,039,000	11,807,000
U. S. cts. of indebtedness	137,221,000	163,286,000	18,050,000	19,029,000
Total U. S. securities	468,247,000	493,175,000	49,244,000	50,297,000
Loans secured by U. S. war obligations	397,678,000	394,723,000	66,244,000	65,076,000
Loans sec. by stocks and bonds	1,123,224,000	1,061,195,000	334,531,000	340,500,000
All other loans and investments	3,539,739,000	3,563,401,000	1,037,274,000	1,041,162,000
Total loans, investments, &c.	5,528,898,000	5,542,494,000	1,490,293,000	1,497,125,000
Reserve with Fed. Res. Banks	561,804,000	589,453,000	127,106,000	131,392,000
Cash in vault	116,409,000	110,443,000	39,109,000	38,591,000
Net demand deposits	4,399,615,000	4,392,760,000	909,917,000	932,126,000
Time deposits	310,181,000	312,137,000	206,592,000	297,165,000
Government deposits	36,526,000	72,744,000	5,382,000	10,682,000
Bills payable with F. R. Bank	265,205,000	275,092,000	25,382,000	25,340,000
Bills redisc't'd with F. R. Bank	538,061,000	531,007,000	182,889,000	180,926,000
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All Reserve Cities				
	Nov. 26.	Nov. 19.	Nov. 26.	Nov. 19.
Number of reporting banks	287	287	208	208
U. S. bonds to secure circulation	\$96,335,000	\$96,534,000	\$72,362,000	\$72,362,000
U. S. bonds, incl. Liberty bonds	342,066,000	342,777,000	151,070,000	150,933,000
U. S. Victory notes	106,994,000	107,076,000	52,930,000	52,685,000
U. S. cts. of indebtedness	204,495,000	233,261,000	66,011,000	67,900,000
Total U. S. securities	750,520,000	779,648,000	342,353,000	343,880,000
Loans secured by U. S. war obligations	671,076,000	662,434,000	137,248,000	135,732,000
Loans sec. by stocks and bonds	2,145,752,000	2,134,242,000	489,664,000	493,497,000
All other loans and investments	7,261,324,000	7,303,322,000	2,262,258,000	2,262,311,000
Total loans, investments, &c.	10,828,672,000	10,879,646,000	3,231,523,000	3,235,420,000
Reserve with Fed. Res. Banks	941,070,000	967,760,000	192,937,000	203,109,000
Cash in vault	226,985,000	217,194,000	73,922,000	74,561,000
Net demand deposits	7,621,141,000	7,670,753,000	1,707,165,000	1,752,810,000
Time deposits	1,290,408,000	1,287,948,000	910,516,000	913,469,000
Government deposits	66,483,000	132,015,000	15,120,000	29,245,000
Bills payable with F. R. Bank	418,194,000	416,867,000	152,699,000	130,607,000
Bills redisc't'd with F. R. Bank	1,126,805,000	1,105,772,000	206,348,000	202,797,000
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All Other Reporting Banks				
	Nov. 26.	Nov. 19.	Nov. 26.	Nov. 19.
Number of reporting banks			329	328
United States bonds to secure circulation			\$101,010,000	\$100,811,000
United States bonds, including Liberty bonds			120,707,000	121,032,000
United States Victory notes			34,157,000	35,735,000
United States certificates of indebtedness			42,673,000	41,241,000
Total United States securities			208,547,000	301,819,000
Loans secured by United States war obligations			97,353,000	95,746,000
Loans secured by stocks and bonds			409,373,000	414,272,000
All other loans and investments			1,866,544,000	1,866,671,000
Total loans, investments, &c.			2,671,817,000	2,678,508,000
Reserve with Federal Reserve Banks			152,039,000	153,082,000
Cash in vault			87,158,000	86,469,000
Net demand deposits			1,563,816,000	1,568,710,000
Time deposits			610,199,000	584,628,000
Government deposits			6,196,000	11,956,000
Bills payable with Federal Reserve Bank			90,646,000	88,296,000
Bills rediscounted with Federal Reserve Bank			176,034,000	174,915,000

New York Stock Exchange Transactions

Highest and lowest prices of the year are based on sales of 100 shares. Where prices are used for less than that amount they are marked with an asterisk (*).

Week Ended December 4

Total Sales 4,497,751 Shares

1918.	High.	Low.	Yearly Price Ranges	This Year to Date.	Date.	STOCKS.	Amount Capital Stock Listed.	Last Dividend		Last Week's Transactions		Sales.				
								Date Paid.	Per Cent.	Per cent. paid.	First.	High.	Low.	Last.	Change.	
80	80	84	84	Mar. 31	25	ACM&B TEA 1st pf.	\$2,750,000	Dec. 1, '20	1%	Q	84	-	-	310
80	42	64	29%	46 Mar. 31	25	Adams Express	12,000,000	Dec. 1, '17	1	..	28%	28%	27	- 2%	- 2%	2,400
26%	11	54	21	40% Mar. 30	14	Advance Rumely	13,100,400	Dec. 1, '20	19	19	14	- 15%	- 2%	1,500
62%	25%	76	56%	72 Jan. 12	50	Advanced Rumely pf.	11,948,500	Oct. 1, '20	1%	Q	51	52	50	- 50%	-	700
72%	49	113	66	88% Jan. 5	31	Ajax Rubber (\$50)	10,000,000	Sep. 19, '20	\$1.50	Q	33%	33%	32	- 32%	-	6,000
58%	18	48	18%	2% Mar. 24	1	Alaska Gold Mines (\$10)	7,500,000	Aug. 9	14	14	11	- 14%	-	2,900
34%	18	38	18%	3 Mar. 31	14	Alcoa 1st pf.	13,367,440	Dec. 1, '20	18	18	14	- 14%	- 14%	2,900
*18%	*130	*185	*150	100% Mar. 31	31	Albany & Susquehanna	5,569,000	July 1, '20	4%	SA	*160	-	-	..
..	100%	100% Nov. 4	75	Albany American Cables	22,991,400	Oct. 14, '20	1%	Q	75	-	-	..
..	62%	62% Sept. 17	46	Allied Realty	2,000,000	53%	53%	51%	- 52%	- 1	12,616
..	92%	90% Nov. 9	88	Allied Chemical & Dye w. i.	89%	88%	89	+ 1%	+ 1%	1,500	
..	90%	90% Nov. 24	..	Allied Chem. & Dye pf. w. i.	
37	17%	51%	30	53% Jan. 3	28	Allis-Chalmers Mfg.	24,454,700	Nov. 15, '20	1	Q	30%	31%	30%	+ 1%	+ 1%	5,200
86%	72%	95	81%	92 Jan. 3	69	Allis-Chalmers Mfg. pf.	15,719,100	Oct. 15, '20	1%	Q	73	73	73	-	-	100
26%	11	54	21	40% Mar. 20	14	Amal Sugar 1st pf.	5,000,000	Nov. 1, '20	2	Q	100	-	-	..
100%	78	113%	87	95 Jan. 28	60	Am. Agricultural Chemical	31,978,800	Oct. 15, '20	2	Q	65%	68	60	- 5%	- 5%	6,100
101%	80%	103	102	90% Jan. 18	80%	Am. Agricultural Chem. pf.	28,455,200	Oct. 15, '20	1%	Q	82	82	81%	+ 1%	+ 1%	400
35%	31%	55	33	48% Apr. 1	39	Am. Bank Note (\$50)	4,495,700	Nov. 15, '20	31	Q	42%	42%	42%	- 2%	- 2%	100
42%	41%	51%	42	45% Jan. 29	40	Am. Bank Note pf. (\$50)	4,495,650	Oct. 1, '20	75%	Q	-	-	..
84%	48	101%	62	103% Apr. 16	49	Am. Beet Sugar Co.	15,000,000	Oct. 30, '20	2	Q	55%	55	53	+ 3%	+ 3%	2,000
91%	82	95	84%	93 Jan. 5	75	Am. Beet Sugar pf.	5,500,000	Oct. 2, '20	1%	Q	75	75	75	-	-	10
..	..	143%	84%	128% Jan. 2	63	Am. Bosch Magneto (ph.)	150,000	Sep. 30, '20	\$2.50	Q	65%	65%	65%	+ 1%	+ 1%	2,000
..	90	90% July 20	86	Am. Brake Shoe & Fly. new. (ch.)	9,600,000	Sep. 30, '20	1%	Q	87%	87%	87%	-	-	100
50%	34%	68%	42%	47% Jan. 3	22	Am. Can Co.	41,233,500	Nov. 22	1	Q	25%	26%	25%	+ 1%	+ 1%	13,100
90%	80%	107%	91	101 Jan. 2	77	Am. Can. Co. pf.	30,000,000	Oct. 1, '20	1%	Q	75%	75%	74%	+ 1%	+ 1%	2,500
12%	6%	148%	84%	147% Apr. 9	9	Am. Car & Foundry	30,000,000	Oct. 1, '20	1%	Q	125%	125%	125%	+ 3%	+ 3%	8,900
115%	100%	115	115	115 Jan. 5	65	Am. Cotton Oil Co. pf.	10,000,000	Oct. 1, '20	1%	Q	100	100	100	+ 1%	+ 1%	300
44%	25	67%	50	50% Mar. 20	61	Am. Cotton Oil Co. pf.	20,267,160	June 1, '20	20%	21%	20%	20%	20%	-	-	1,800
88%	78	93	88%	88% Mar. 27	84	Am. Drug Syndicate (\$10)	10,198,600	Dec. 1, '20	3	SA	68	65	65	- 3%	- 3%	200
95%	77%	103	103	103 Jan. 11	78	Am. Express	18,000,000	Oct. 1, '20	\$1.50	Q	112%	116%	113	+ 3%	+ 3%	300
22%	12	43%	33%	33% Mar. 21	85	Am. Hide & Leather Co.	11,274,100	Oct. 1, '20	1%	Q	8	8	8	-	-	1,400
94%	50	125%	115	122 Jan. 3	44	Am. Hide & Leather Co. pf.	10,953,700	Oct. 1, '20	1%	Q	40%	45%	45%	+ 1%	+ 1%	6,200
49%	11%	46%	37%	37% Mar. 19	37	Am. Ice	5,101,400	Apr. 24, '20	1	Q	41%	41%	41%	+ 1%	+ 1%	400
61	28%	76%	54%	68 Jan. 2	53	Am. Ship & Com. (ph.)	14,220,000	Oct. 25, '20	1%	Q	50%	50%	50%	- 1%	- 1%	200
..	..	132%	103%	119% Jan. 5	38%	Am. International	49,000,000	Sep. 30, '20	1%	Q	41%	43%	41%	-	-	34,200
47%	27	80	14%	95 Apr. 1	51	Am. Lined Co.	16,750,000	Nov. 15, '20	25%	Q	94	94	94	+ 1%	+ 1%	200
92	80%	98%	85	90% Jan. 27	86	Am. Linseed Co. pf.	16,750,000	Sep. 30, '20	1%	Q	61	56	56	- 5%	- 5%	8,300
71%	53%	117%	93	100% Apr. 8	84	Am. Locomotive Co.	25,000,000	Sep. 30, '20	1%	Q	84	87	87	+ 3%	+ 3%	10,100
102%	95	100%	100	107 Mar. 9	95	Am. Locomotive Co. pf.	25,000,000	Sep. 30, '20	1%	Q	101%	101%	101%	-	-	300
..	..	67	39%	44 Jan. 2	21	Am. Radiator (\$25)	13,806,225	70	70	68	- 2%	- 2%	400
..	73	73% Nov. 21	68	Am. Safety Razor (\$25)	12,300,000	10	10	9	- 10%	- 10%	11,200
144	90	135	135	135 Jan. 6	95	Am. Shipbuilding	7,900,000	Nov. 1, '20	1%	Q	125	125	125	-	-	..
..	..	47%	36	36% Jan. 6	95	Am. Ship & Com. (ph.)	522,130	11%	11%	10%	- 1%	- 1%	18,200
94%	73	80%	61%	72 Jan. 3	42	Am. Smelt. & Ref. Co.	60,000,000	Sep. 15, '20	1	Q	45%	46%	46%	+ 1%	+ 1%	17,400
110%	103	100%	94%	94% Mar. 10	70%	Am. Smelt. & Ref. Co. pf.	50,000,000	Dec. 1, '20	1%	Q	88	87	87	- 1%	- 1%	1,650
96	89%	94%	79%	79% Mar. 20	68	Am. Smelters pf. A.	2,442,800	Oct. 1, '20	1%	Q	72	71	71	- 2%	- 2%	200
107%	85	140%	115%	115 Jan. 15	115	American Snuff	11,000,000	Oct. 1, '20	1%	Q	160%	160%	160%	-	-	1,600
*85	*85	99	80	85 Jan. 13	80	American Snuff pf.	3,052,800	Oct. 1, '20	1%	Q	29%	33%	33%	+ 3%	+ 3%	12,500
..	..	47	33%	50 Mar. 22	26	Am. Steel Found. (\$33 1-3)	18,215,160	Oct. 15, '20	75%	Q	29%	29%	29%	-	-	..
..	..	96%	91%	93 Jan. 10	82	Am. Steel Found. pf.	8,481,300	Sep. 30, '20	1%	Q	84	84	84	-	-	100
116	98	148%	111%	142% Apr. 14	95	Am. Sugar Ref. Co.	45,000,000	Oct. 2, '20	12%	Q	92%	94%	94%	+ 3%	+ 3%	5,000
114%	108%	119%	113%	118% Jan. 7	100	Am. Sugar Ref. Co. pf.	45,000,000	Oct. 1, '20	1%	Q	103	100%	100%	+ 1%	+ 1%	1,200
145%	60%	120%	73	73% Mar. 22	60%	Am. Sunray Tobacco	14,447,400	Nov. 1, '20	2%	Q	72%	71%	71%	+ 3%	+ 3%	3,200
103	81	100	90%	105 Mar. 18	80	Am. Sunray Tobacco pf.	1,968,500	Sep. 1, '20	1%	SA	85	85	85	+ 5%	+ 5%	100
60	51	63	52	52 Jan. 5	46	Am. Tel. & Cable	14,000,000	Dec. 1, '20	1%	Q	100%	100%	99	-	-	9,300
100%	108%	95	100%	95% Mar. 31	50	Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.	4,200,000	Dec. 1, '20	2	Q	117%	118%	118%			

New York Stock Exchange Transactions—Continued

1918.	High.	Low.	Yearly High.	Price Ranges This Year	Ranges This Year	to Date, Date.	STOCKS.	Amount Capital Stock Listed.	Last Dividend Paid.	Per Cent.	Pe- riod.	Last Week's Transactions					Sales.	
												First.	High.	Low.	Last.	Change.		
54%	34%	56	34%	44%	Jan. 3	28	May 20	Colorado Fuel & Iron.	34,235,500	Nov. 20, '20	2%	Q	20%	28%	29	— %	1,400	
101	*101	120	101	205	Apr. 21	97%	Colorado Fuel & Iron pf.	2,000,000	Nov. 20, '20	2%	Q	28%	28	29	—	—	—	
27%	18	31	31%	19	30%	Oct. 21	20	Colorado & Southern.	31,000,000	Dec. 31, '19	1	SA	28%	29	32	—	—	—
55	47	58	58%	48	54	Aug. 4	46	Colorado & Southern 1st pf.	8,500,000	June 30, '20	2	SA	—	—	43	—	—	—
48	40	51	51%	45	43	Jan. 16	35	Colorado & Southern 2d pf.	8,500,000	Dec. 15, '19	4	A	56%	58	+ 2	—	3,800	
44%	28%	69	30%	67	Jan. 9	50	May 19	Columbia Gas & Electric.	50,000,000	Nov. 15, '20	1%	Q	14%	12%	13%	+ 1%	24,500	
—	—	75%	50%	65%	Jan. 3	11%	Nov. 19	Columbia Graph. (sh.)	1,251,475	Oct. 1, '20	125%	Q	14	14%	13	+ 2	300	
—	—	95%	91%	92%	Jan. 14	65	Nov. 27	Columbia Graph. pf.	10,581,500	Oct. 1, '20	1%	Q	38%	40	40	+ 2	400	
39	30	63	37%	36	Jan. 16	37%	Nov. 20	Comp.-Tab.-Rec. (sh.)	90,000	Oct. 1, '20	1%	Q	36	54%	55	—	700	
—	—	75	34	39%	Aug. 26	52%	Dec. 2	Consolidated Cigar (sh.)	4,000,000	Dec. 1, '20	1%	Q	75	75	75	—	100	
105%	82%	106%	78%	89%	Aug. 26	75	July 28	Consolidated Cigar pf.	100,384,500	Sep. 15, '20	1%	Q	80%	81%	77%	+ 1%	10,400	
38	95	111%	109	—	Sept. 15	15	Oct. 1, '20	Con. G. El. & P., Balt.	14,607,700	Oct. 1, '20	2	Q	—	—	109%	—	—	
113	90	94	85	85	Sept. 15	85	Oct. 30, '20	Con. Coal Md. (sh.)	40,205,490	Oct. 30, '20	1%	Q	85	85	85	—	—	
13	71%	23	5%	20%	Jan. 3	6%	Nov. 15	Con. Interstate Cal. M. (\$10)	4,395,960	Sep. 30, '20	50%	Q	7%	7%	7%	+ 1%	2,650	
—	—	37%	30%	40%	Apr. 26	17%	Consolidated Textile (sh.)	267,355	Oct. 15, '20	75c	Q	10%	20%	19%	20%	+ 1	4,300	
95	65%	103%	97%	98%	Apr. 8	55	Nov. 20	Continental Can Co.	13,500,000	Oct. 1, '20	1%	Q	63%	62	63%	+ 1%	3,000	
107	99	110	100%	108%	Jan. 22	97%	June 22	Continental Can. Co. pf.	4,435,000	Oct. 1, '20	1%	Q	5	5%	5	+ 1%	4,000	
—	—	10	14%	14%	Apr. 16	5	Nov. 20	Continental Candy (sh.)	500,000	Oct. 20, '20	25c	Q	67	67	67	—	100	
60	44	84%	58%	65	Jan. 20	65	Nov. 20	Continental Insur. Co. (\$25)	10,000,000	July 7, '20	\$2.50	SA	72%	70%	74%	+ 1%	34,500	
50%	20%	96	46	103%	Apr. 13	67	Nov. 20	Corn Products Refining Co.	49,784,000	Oct. 20, '20	1%	Q	100%	100	100	+ 4%	300	
194	90%	100%	102	107	Jan. 9	99%	Oct. 1, '20	Corden & Co. (sh.)	29,827,000	Oct. 15, '20	1%	Q	32%	32%	31%	—	15,400	
54%	40	79	48	64	Apr. 17	45%	Nov. 20	Crex Carpet Co.	2,088,500	June 15, '20	3	SA	80%	97%	97%	+ 8%	85,900	
74%	52	261	52%	278%	Apr. 7	85	Nov. 20	Crucible Steel Co.	31,500,000	Oct. 20, '20	1%	Q	84	87%	86%	+ 3%	700	
91%	86	105	91	100	Jan. 7	83	Nov. 12	Crucible Steel Co. pf.	25,000,000	Sep. 30, '20	1%	Q	31	31%	31%	+ 3%	2,900	
95	90	107%	101%	106	Jan. 20	93%	Nov. 27	Cuban-American Sugar (sh.)	7,883,800	Sep. 30, '20	1%	Q	24%	25%	24%	—	5,400	
34	27%	55	36	39%	Apr. 14	64	Nov. 13	Cuba-Cane Sugar pf.	500,000	Oct. 1, '20	1%	Q	68%	67%	68%	+ 1%	1,800	
83	74%	87%	60%	85%	Jan. 21	64	Nov. 13	Durham Hosier Class B (\$10)	50,000,000	Oct. 1, '20	1%	Q	88	88	88	—	—	
—	—	40	35%	30	Sept. 25	30	Nov. 22	DAVISON CHEMICAL (sh.)	183,519	Nov. 15, '20	\$1	—	31%	32	32	+ 2	500	
—	—	35%	27%	35%	May 27	18%	Oct. 3	De Beers Co. (sh.)	62,900	July 28, '20	\$2.300%	—	19%	18%	18%	—	500	
96	90	103	93%	101	Feb. 9	82	Nov. 20	Deere & Co. pf.	37,826,500	Oct. 1, '20	1%	Q	103	101	101	—	—	
119%	100	116	91%	106	Oct. 2	83%	June 21	Delaware, Lack. & West. (\$50)	42,503,000	Sep. 20, '20	2%	Q	226	220	220	+ 1%	800	
185	100	217	172%	206%	Jan. 15	16%	Dec. 11	Delaware, Lack. & West. (\$50)	42,277,000	Oct. 20, '20	5	—	1	1%	1	—	2,600	
7	2%	15%	3%	4%	Aug. 24	3%	Nov. 22	Denver & Rio Grande pf.	38,000,000	Jan. 15, '21	2%	—	1%	1%	1%	—	3,500	
13%	5	24	16%	16%	Feb. 24	4%	Nov. 22	Denver & Rio Grande pf.	49,728,400	Oct. 15, '20	2%	—	91	91	91	—	—	
100	86	106	110	108	Mar. 30	96%	July 30	Detroit United Railway	15,000,000	Dec. 1, '20	2	Q	—	—	118	—	—	
143	*113	118	112	—	Jan. 19	94	May 19	Diamond Match	4,000,000	Oct. 20, '20	25c	Q	11%	11%	11%	+ 1%	2,000	
15	6	16%	13	13	Jan. 3	94	May 19	Dome Mtns (\$10)	—	—	—	—	45	45	45	—	—	
45	2%	6%	2%	8	Oct. 2	3	May 30	Duluth, South St. & Atlantic	10,000,000	Oct. 1, '20	1%	Q	84%	84%	84%	—	—	
8%	4%	11%	5%	12%	Oct. 2	4	Sept. 29	Duluth, South St. & At. pf.	3,252,850	Oct. 1, '20	1%	Q	38	38	38	—	—	
—	—	101%	100%	102%	Jan. 13	88	Nov. 16	Durham Hosier Class B (\$50)	3,000,000	Oct. 1, '20	1%	Q	88	88	88	—	—	
—	—	155	85%	93%	Aug. 25	115	July 27	Eastman Kodak	19,586,200	Oct. 1, '20	1%	Q	128%	128%	128%	—	—	
50%	48	137	55	130	July 7	115	Oct. 13	Elk Horn Coal (sh.)	12,000,000	Oct. 1, '20	1%	Q	17%	17%	17%	+ 1%	1,300	
31%	22	43	23%	28	Jan. 2	16%	Dec. 1	Elk Horn Coal pf. (\$30)	6,000,000	Sep. 10, '20	75c	Q	32%	32%	32%	+ 1%	1,100	
43%	35	43	24%	29	Jan. 20	21	Dec. 1	Emerson Brantingham pf.	10,132,500	Nov. 20	1%	Q	7%	7%	7%	—	—	
—	—	101	88	91	Jan. 3	53%	Nov. 18	Endicott-Johnson (\$50)	12,170,500	Nov. 1, '20	1%	Q	56%	55%	55%	+ 1%	7,900	
—	—	150	80	117	Jan. 6	88%	Nov. 26	Endicott-Johnson pf.	15,000,000	Oct. 1, '20	1%	Q	80%	80%	80%	+ 1%	800	
—	—	107%	101%	104	Jan. 2	98%	Feb. 13	Erie 1st pf.	112,481,900	Apr. 9, '20	2	—	23%	23%	23%	+ 1%	11,000	
23%	14	20%	12%	21%	Sept. 20	90%	Feb. 19	Erie 2d pf.	47,904,000	Apr. 9, '20	2	—	14%	14%	14%	+ 1%	1,400	
30%	23%	33	10%	30%	Sept. 23	12%	June 21	Erie & Pittsburgh (\$40)	16,000,000	Sep. 10, '20	1%	Q	14%	14%	14%	+ 1%	17,000	
27%	18%	25	13%	25%	Oct. 5	15%	Nov. 19	FAIRBANKS CO. (\$25)	4,000,000	Oct. 28, '19	\$1.12%	Q	—	—	—	—	—	
—	—	94	72	93%	Jan. 2	45	Nov. 18	Fairbanks Co. pf.	2,000,000	Oct. 1, '20	2	Q	96%	96%	96%	—	—	
—	—	123	83	95%	Jan. 5	45	Nov. 17	Famous Players-Lasky (sh.)	214,677	Oct. 1, '20	\$2	Q	54%	54%	54%	+ 1%	10,30	


New York Stock Exchange Transactions—Continued

1918.	Early 1919.		Price Range		This Year to Date.		STOCKS.	Amount Capital Stock Listed.	Last Dividend		Last Week's Transactions							
	High.	Low.	High.	Low.	Date.	Low.			Date Paid.	Per Cent.	Per cent.	First.	High.	Low.	Last.	Change.	Sales.	
..	80%	Apr. 27	52	Aug. 11	Mallinson (H. R.) pf.	3,000,000	Oct. 1, '20	1%	Q	76	76	72%	55	- 8	1,300	
..	137	130	151%	Apr. 14	72%	Dec. 4	Manati Sugar pf.	10,000,000	Dec. 1, '20	2%	Q	
..	105	Jan. 8	86	Oct. 29	Manati Sugar pf.	3,500,000	Oct. 1, '20	1%	Q	
100%	78%	88	37%	Oct. 22	38%	July 2	Manhattan Electric Supply	3,000,000	Oct. 1, '20	1%	Q	53	53	50%	32	- 3	900	
..	%	%	16%	Jan. 5	18%	Dec. 4	Manhattan Elevated ltd.	58,173,600	Oct. 1, '20	1%	Q	
100%	78%	88	37%	Oct. 22	38%	July 2	Manhattan Beach	5,000,000	
..	..	136	100	23%	Jan. 5	18%	Dec. 4	Manhattan Shirt (\$25)	5,000,000	Dec. 1, '20	43%	c	17	17	16%	- 3%	- 300	
..	117	117	Manhattan Shirt pf.	1,600,000	Oct. 1, '20	1%	Q	
87	75	80%	61%	Jan. 5	35%	Oct. 1	Marlin-Rockwell (sh.)	81,136	
..	..	31%	23	30%	Jan. 8	14%	Nov. 19	Martin-Perry (sh.)	22,705	Dec. 1, '20	50c	Q	15%	16	15%	16	+ 1%	900
40	40	43	25	33	July 29	18%	Feb. 15	Matheson Alkali (\$50)	5,885,700	100
42%	23%	61	26%	38	April. 8	2%	Nov. 15	Maxwell Motors	4,715,100	July 2, '17	2%	..	2%	2%	2%	..	700	
..	43	28	35%	Jan. 5	2	Nov. 15	Maxwell Motors c. of dep.	8,000,100	
60%	50	84%	50%	63%	Jan. 5	5%	Nov. 17	Maxwell Motors 1st pf.	3,754,520	Oct. 1, '18	1%	Q
..	60%	59	62%	Jan. 6	7	Oct. 13	Maxwell Motors 1st pf. c. of d.	9,578,900	
22%	19	46%	19%	30%	Jan. 10	2%	Nov. 20	Maxwell Motors 2d pf.	1,006,900	July 2, '17	1%	
..	34	28%	30%	Jan. 10	3%	Oct. 27	Maxwell Motors 2d pf. c. of d.	8,226,600	
..	2%	Nov. 1	6	Dec. 1	Maxwell Motors 1st pf. c. of d. st. as.		
..	7%	Oct. 26	1	Dec. 3	Max. Motors 1st pf. c. of d. st. as.		
..	2%	Dec. 3	Max. Mot. 2d pf. c. of d. st. as	500		
65%	47	131%	60	131%	Apr. 19	69%	Nov. 19	May Department Stores	15,000,000	Dec. 1, '20	2	Q	74%	74%	74%	74%	- 3%	500
104	98	110	104	107	June 12	12%	Sept. 3	May Department Stores pf.	6,250,000	Oct. 1, '20	1%	Q	97	97	95%	97	- 2	300
154	70	118%	102%	202%	Jan. 5	93%	Aug. 20	Mexican Petroleum pf.	33,091,700	Oct. 11, '20	3	Q	157	180%	155%	180	+ 23%	152,000
107	87	118%	105	106	Jan. 6	93%	Aug. 20	Miami Copper (\$20)	12,000,000	Oct. 1, '20	2	Q
33%	32%	21	28	26	Dec. 1	16	Dec. 16	Michigan Central	3,735,570	Nov. 15, '20	50c	Q	17	17	16	16%	- 3%	8,800
*80%	*100	*80	*74	July 16	*74	July 16	Midvale Steel & Ord. (\$50)	18,738,000	July 29, '20	2	SA	
61	41	62%	40%	52%	Jan. 5	30%	Nov. 20	Middle States O (\$10)	100,000,000	Nov. 1, '20	\$1	Q	32%	33	31%	33	+ 1	32,900
15%	7%	24%	9%	21	Oct. 5	9	Feb. 13	Minn. & St. Louis (new)	24,679,300	Oct. 1, '20	40c	Q	12%	13%	12%	12%	- 2%	8,700
97%	80%	98%	70	90%	Oct. 4	63	Feb. 13	Minn. St. P. & S. S. M.	25,206,800	Oct. 15, '20	3%	SA	76%	76%	75	75%	- 3%	700
113	105	100%	60	95	Nov. 6	80%	June 23	Minn. St. P. & S. S. M. pf.	12,600,000	Oct. 15, '20	3%	SA	93	93	93	93	- 2%	200
62	62	80%	50%	60	Jan. 15	50	Feb. 23	Minn. St. P. & S. S. M. I.	11,184,100	Apr. 1, '20	2	SA
6%	4%	16%	4%	11	Feb. 21	3%	Dec. 1	Missouri, Kansas & Texas	63,300,300	3%	3%	3%	3%	- 3%	10,100
13%	6%	25%	8%	18	Feb. 19	5%	Nov. 30	Missouri, Kansas & Texas pf.	13,000,000	Nov. 10, '19	2	..	7%	7%	5%	5%	- 1%	3,000
31%	20	38%	22%	33%	Feb. 28	19	Dec. 1	Missouri Pacific	78,000,000	22%	22%	19	21	+ 1%	32,850
62	41	58%	37%	55%	Oct. 4	36	Feb. 11	Moline Pipe Line pf.	3,355,500	Sept. 1, '20	1%	Q	43	44	40	42%	- 3%	10,600
*95	95	96	94	Monon Valley Traction (\$25)	7,500,000	
81%	64	64	54	60%	Jan. 5	5	Dec. 1	Montana Power	43,633,300	Oct. 1, '20	3%	Q	57%	57%	52%	53%	- 6%	1,400
100%	96	100%	100%	100%	Jan. 5	95	May 3	Montana Power pf.	9,700,000	Oct. 1, '20	1%	Q
..	Montgomery Ward & Co. (sh.)	850,000	Feb. 19	\$1	..	20%	21	18%	- 2%	7,000		
70	70	72	71%	72	Jan. 8	80%	June 21	Morris & Essex (\$50)	15,000,000	July 1, '20	\$1.75	SA	*60%	400
..	53	60	Jan. 5	24	Nov. 20	Mullins Body (sh.)	96,150	Nov. 1, '20	\$1	Q	24%	24	24	- 3%
..	90%	99	Mullins Body 8% pf.	1,000,000	Nov. 1, '20	2	Q	90%	
119%	117	119%	111	111	Jan. 14	100	Aug. 16	NASH, CHAT. & ST. LOUIS	16,000,000	Aug. 2, '20	3%	SA	100%	107	100%	107	- 1%	20
33	20%	43%	29%	40	Mar. 19	28%	Nov. 26	N. Acme Co. (\$50)	25,000,000	Dec. 1, '20	87%	c	30	29	28%	+ 1%	1,100	
..	75	45	86%	70	July 9	44	Feb. 13	Nat. Anil. & Chem. (sh.)	242,683	52%	52%	52%	- 3%
..	..	91%	87	97	June 26	83	Feb. 13	Nat. Anil. & Chem. pf.	13,358,300
110%	90	139	107	123	Jan. 3	98%	Nov. 10	National Biscuit Co.	29,236,000	Oct. 1, '20	1%	Q	104%	105%	104%	105%	+ 1%	1,000
114	106%	121	112	116	Jan. 9	103%	July 13	National Biscuit Co. pf.	24,804,500	Oct. 30, '20	1%	Q	108	109	107	107	+ 1%	300
..	59	Oct. 26	45%	Nov. 22	National Cloth & Suit pf.	12,000,000	July 15, '20	1%	Q	
67%	55	92	70	80	Jan. 3	71	Dec. 3	National Cloth & Suit pf.	4,180,000	Dec. 1, '20	1%	Q	71%	71%	71%	71%	- 1%	300
104	100	108%	102%	102%	Jan. 3	74	Nov. 14	Nat. Cloth & Suit (sh.)	250,000	Oct. 17, '19	\$1	
21%	13	24%	8%	13	Apr. 7	7	Dec. 14	Nat. Cloth & Suit (sh.)	10,000,000	Sept. 20, '20	1%	Q
54%	37%	88%	45%	50%	Jan. 2	45	Nov. 19	Nat. Enam. & St. Co. pf.	15,501,000	Oct. 1, '20	1%	Q
90%	84%	94%	64	93%	Apr. 12	66%	Nov. 18	National Lead Co.	20,655,500	Sept. 30, '20	1%	Q	70%	75	70%	75%	+ 4%	1,600
100%	90%	112	102	110	Jan. 5	100%	May 21	National Ry. of Mexico 1st pf.	28,212,000	Sept. 15, '20	1%	Q	102%	102%	102%	102%	- 1%	200

New York Stock Exchange Transactions—Continued

1918.	Yearly Price Ranges				Year to Date	Stocks.	Amount Capital Stock Listed.	Last Dividend Paid.	Per Cent.	Period.	Last Week's Transactions						
	High.	Low.	High.	This Date.							First.	High.	Low.	Last	Change.		
71 1/4	39	89	46 1/4	82 1/2	Jan. 26	51	Nov. 20	Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron...	10,000,000	Nov. 10, '20	1 1/2	Q	34	55	53 1/2	+ 1/2	1,300
93 1/2	81	97 1/2	55	94 1/2	Apr. 19	83	Nov. 6	Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron pf.	6,700,000	Oct. 1, '20	1 1/2	Q	83	83	83	—	300
102	120	205	122	310	Apr. 14	97	Nov. 15	South Porto Rico Sugar...	5,625,000	Oct. 1, '20	1 1/2	Q	105	105	100	-10	—
110	102	117	107	116	Jan. 2	103	Nov. 10	South Porto Rico Sugar pf.	5,000,000	Oct. 1, '20	2	Q	100	100	100	—	433,800
110	80 1/2	115	91 1/2	118 1/2	Feb. 4	88 1/2	Feb. 13	Southern Pacific...	302,087,400	Oct. 1, '20	2 1/2	Q	112 1/2	113 1/2	104 1/2	+ 10 1/2	433,800
138 1/2	*114 1/2	—	137 1/2	June 3	137 1/2	3	Southern Pac. trust receipts...	1,047,200	—	—	—	—	21 1/2	24 1/2	20 1/2	+ 2 1/2	76,540
—	—	—	24 1/2	Dec. 4	20 1/2	Lee. 3	Southern Pacific rights...	—	—	—	—	—	24 1/2	25 1/2	23 1/2	+ 1 1/2	24,400
34 1/2	20 1/2	33	20 1/2	33 1/2	Oct. 5	18 1/2	Feb. 11	Southern Railway pf.	94,500,000	Oct. 1, '20	2 1/2	Q	102	102	98 1/2	+ 3 1/2	1,600
70 1/2	51	125	52 1/2	69 1/2	Mar. 5	51 1/2	Jan. 5	Sou. Ry. M. & O. stc. r.	5,750,100	Oct. 1, '20	2 1/2	SA	51 1/2	51 1/2	50 1/2	—	—
120	84	100	124	160	Apr. 12	120	Feb. 11	Standard Milling...	7,300,000	Nov. 30, '20	2	Q	—	—	125	—	—
86 1/2	79	94 1/2	85 1/2	85	Apr. 13	77 1/2	Nov. 4	Standard Milling pf...	6,488,000	Nov. 30, '20	1 1/2	Q	44 1/2	44 1/2	43 1/2	+ 1/2	32,800
—	—	—	—	105%	Sept. 14	100%	June 26	Stanard Oil N. J.	98,338,300	Sep. 15, '20	5	Q	620	651	620	+ 12	490
—	—	—	113 1/2	June 17	100%	Standard Oil N. J. pf.	98,338,300	Sep. 15, '20	1 1/2	Q	105	105	103 1/2	—	5,000		
—	—	—	91 1/2	June 24	79 1/2	Stern Bros. pf...	17,500,000	Oct. 1, '20	1 1/2	Q	83	83	82	+ 2 1/2	500		
—	—	—	97 1/2	June 24	90	Tetra. 13	3,000,000	Dec. 1, '20	1 1/2	Q	—	—	90	—	—		
—	—	—	51 1/2	Mar. 26	26	Thewar War. Sp. (sh.)...	400,000	Nov. 15, '20	1 1/2	Q	20	20	20	—	600		
72 1/2	35 1/2	109 1/2	36 1/2	118 1/2	Apr. 8	38 1/2	Nov. 27	Stromberg Carb. (sh.)...	74,026	Oct. 1, '20	1 1/2	Q	41 1/2	41 1/2	41 1/2	+ 1/2	32,800
100	80 1/2	104 1/2	92 1/2	101 1/2	Jan. 31	83 1/2	Nov. 18	Studebaker Co. pf...	60,000,000	Dec. 1, '20	1 1/2	Q	84	84	84	—	9,000
—	—	—	20%	Sept. 13	13 1/2	Superior Oil (sh.)...	1,250,000	Dec. 1, '20	1 1/2	Q	10	10	10	—	7,300		
47 1/2	34 1/2	54 1/2	52	60	Apr. 8	41	Feb. 13	Superior Steel (sh.)...	426,708	Nov. 1, '20	1 1/2	Q	14 1/2	14 1/2	14 1/2	+ 1/2	800
100	85	105	92 1/2	102	Jan. 12	96	Aug. 31	Superior Steel 1st pf...	6,000,000	Nov. 1, '20	1 1/2	Q	45	45	45	—	—
—	—	—	2,560,000	Nov. 15, '20	2	Q	—	—	—	—	97 1/2	—	—	—	—		
—	—	—	47	Apr. 7	30	Nov. 18	TEMPTON CORN & F. PROD., A (sh.)...	137,000	Oct. 5, '20	\$1	Q	33 1/2	33 1/2	33 1/2	+ 1/2	100	
21	12 1/2	17 1/2	9 1/2	13 1/2	Mar. 26	38	Tem. C. & C. Co. (sh.)...	55,550	Oct. 5, '20	\$1	Q	38	38	38	—	11,400	
—	—	—	53 1/2	Sept. 20	40 1/2	Tenn. C. & C. Co. (sh.)...	84,996,300	May 13, '18	\$1	Q	85 1/2	85 1/2	85 1/2	+ 1/2	90,400		
20 1/2	14	50 1/2	27 1/2	47	Mar. 22	158	Feb. 11	Tex sub. rets. f. pd.	38,700,000	Sep. 30, '20	—	—	20 1/2	20 1/2	20 1/2	+ 1/2	22,700
—	—	—	17	Dec. 1	17	Texas & Pacific...	6,000,000	Sep. 30, '20	2 1/2	Q	25 1/2	31 1/2	32 1/2	+ 5 1/2	—		
150	130 1/2	460	180	420	Apr. 17	240	Feb. 13	Texas Pac. Land Tr...	2,600,700	Oct. 1, '20	1 1/2	Q	15	15	15	—	200
31 1/2	25 1/2	25 1/2	11	22 1/2	Oct. 21	94	Aug. 6	Third Avenue...	16,500,000	Oct. 30, '20	1	Q	200	200	200	—	—
200 1/2	178	275	207	220	Mar. 18	190	May 3	Tide Water Oil...	40,576,700	Oct. 27, '20	62 1/2	Q	12	12	10 1/2	+ 1/2	1,500
82 1/2	48 1/2	115	72 1/2	69 1/2	Mar. 3	48 1/2	Nov. 19	Tobacco Products pf...	17,586,000	Nov. 15, '20	1 1/2	Q	55	55	55	+ 2	7,600
104 1/2	81 1/2	120	97 1/2	100	Jan. 1	82 1/2	Nov. 15	United Cigar Stores pf...	1,000,000	Oct. 1, '20	1 1/2	Q	82	82	82	—	100
78 1/2	4 1/2	133 1/2	109 1/2	109 1/2	Sept. 29	10	Nov. 15	United Drug 1st pf. (\$30)	16,250,000	Oct. 1, '20	1 1/2	Q	10 1/2	10 1/2	10 1/2	+ 1/2	800
16	8 1/2	29 1/2	10	24 1/2	Sept. 29	15	Nov. 15	United Drug 2d pf...	8,636,700	Oct. 1, '20	1 1/2	Q	18 1/2	18 1/2	18 1/2	+ 1/2	19,300
42	36 1/2	82 1/2	34 1/2	38 1/2	Sept. 29	5	Nov. 20	Transcont. Oil. (sh.)...	2,000,000	Oct. 15, '20	\$1.25	Q	41	41	41	+ 1/2	400
42	36 1/2	74 1/2	66 1/2	66 1/2	Jan. 3	40	Aug. 11	Transc. & Wm. (sh.)...	100,000	Oct. 15, '20	\$1.25	Q	42 1/2	42 1/2	42 1/2	+ 1/2	300
65 1/2	52	60	28	43	Oct. 22	27 1/2	June 23	Twin City Rap. Transit...	22,000,000	Jan. 2, '19	1	Q	80	80	80	—	—
125	100	102 1/2	80	80	June 4	7	June 14	Twin City Rap. Transit pf...	8,000,000	Oct. 1, '20	1 1/2	Q	—	—	—	—	—
112	100	197 1/2	115	200	Apr. 15	152	Sept. 27	UNDERWOOD TYPEWR...	9,000,000	Oct. 1, '20	2	Q	—	—	—	—	—
112	104	121	112	110	Jan. 28	100	Sept. 14	Underwood Typewriter pf...	3,900,000	Oct. 1, '20	1 1/2	Q	11	11	11	—	500
80	65	100	75	127	Apr. 14	73 1/2	May 22	Union Bag & Paper...	14,897,000	Sep. 13, '20	2	Q	22 1/2	23 1/2	23 1/2	+ 1/2	23,500
—	45 1/2	34 1/2	38	38	Jan. 3	20 1/2	Dec. 1	Union Oil (sh.)...	1,357,300	Oct. 1, '20	2 1/2	Q	121 1/2	122 1/2	122 1/2	+ 1/2	21,000
137 1/2	109 1/2	138 1/2	129 1/2	Nov. 4	110	Feb. 13	Union Pacific...	222,291,600	Oct. 1, '20	2 1/2	Q	64	64	64	—	2,000	
76 1/2	69	74 1/2	63	69 1/2	Mar. 24	63 1/2	Oct. 1, '20	Union Pacific pf...	99,545,000	Oct. 1, '20	2 1/2	Q	33	32 1/2	32 1/2	+ 1/2	2,500
44 1/2	36 1/2	58 1/2	37 1/2	53	Jan. 5	32	Nov. 19	United Cigar Stores...	525,000	Oct. 20, '20	1	Q	170	—	—	—	—
108 1/2	83 1/2	255	107 1/2	170	Oct. 5	130	Oct. 25	United Cigar Stores pf...	715,400	Nov. 15, '20	2 1/2	Q	101	—	—	—	—
110	101 1/2	122	100	100	Jan. 13	100	Nov. 15	United Drug 1st pf. (\$30)	29,041,000	Oct. 15, '20	2	Q	100	100	100	—	100
90 1/2	69	175 1/2	90 1/2	90 1/2	Jan. 13	44	Aug. 2	United Drug 2d pf. (\$30)	16,250,000	Oct. 1, '20	8 1/2	Q	52	52	52	—	100
89 1/2	75	163 1/2	58	58	Mar. 29	52	Dec. 4	United Dyewood pf...	13,918,300	Oct							

The Trend of Bond Prices—Average of 40 Listed Issues



Stock Exchange Bond Trading

Week Ended December 4

Total Sales \$80,769,650 Par Value

Range, 1920	High	Low	Sales	High	Low	Last	Chge	Range, 1920	High	Low	Sales	High	Low	Last	Chge	Range, 1920	High	Low	Sales	High	Low	Last	Chge		
65 1/2	54	14	ADAMS EXP. 4s., .20	50	57	57	- 2 1/2	86	80	5	CIN. GAS REI. 5s., .85	85	85	+ 2	.02%	85	13	M. S. S. M. & ATL. 4s.	80%	80%	80%	+ 2%			
21 1/2	11	10	Alas. G. M. ex. 6s. A	100%	16 1/2	17	- 3	71	60	19	C. C. C. & ST. L. gen. 4s	69	67 1/2	- 1 1/2	.08%	70	8	M. S. S. M. con. 4s.	70	70	70	- 1			
72 1/2	45	5	Alt. & Susq. 3 1/2s.	70%	70 1/2	70 1/2	+ 1 1/2	90	88	54	C. C. C. & S. L. r. & 1 1/2	88	88	- 1 1/2	.02%	72	48	2	M. O. K. & O. 1st 5s.	68%	68%	68%	- 2%		
90 1/2	80	21	Am. Art. Ch. deb. 5s.	90	80	90	- 2	73	60	1	C. C. C. & ST. L.	1	St. L. Div. 4s.	.71 1/2	.71 1/2	+ 1/2	.03%	147	147	147	M. O. K. & T. 1st 4s.	60%	57 1/2	58	- 2 1/2
100	70	26	Am. Art. Ch. ex. 5s.	91	90	91	- 1	100	94	10	C. C. C. & ST. L.	1	St. L. Div. 4s.	.71 1/2	.71 1/2	+ 1/2	.04%	20	19	19	M. O. K. & T. 2d 4s.	36 1/2	31	34	- 2
80 1/2	76	6	Am. Cotton Oil 5s.	70	70	70	- 1	75	68	1	C. C. C. & ST. L.	1	C. C. C. & ST. L.	.71 1/2	.71 1/2	+ 1/2	.04%	30	30	3	M. O. K. & T. 1st r. 4s	52	52	52	- 1
80 1/2	70	202	Am. S. & R. 1st 5s.	75 1/2	74 1/2	75 1/2	+ 1/2	84 1/2	82 1/2	5	Cleve. & Mar. 4s.	84	84	+ 2	.04%	48 1/2	48 1/2	48 1/2	M. O. K. & T. 2d 4s.	80 1/2	80 1/2	80 1/2	- 1/2		
80 1/2	92	122 1/2	Am. T. & T. ex. 5s.	60	65 1/2	65 1/2	+ 1/2	85 1/2	70 1/2	5	Col. Fuel & L. gen. 4s	70 1/2	70 1/2	- 1/2	.02%	25 1/2	23	10	M. O. K. & T. 1st 5s.	70	70	70	- 1		
80 1/2	73	152	Am. T. & T. co. 7s.	77	75	75	- 2	74	65	1	Col. Industrial 5s.	65	65	- 1	.02%	80	79 1/2	4	M. O. K. & T. 1st 4s.	82	82	82	- 2 1/2		
80 1/2	7	Am. T. & T. ex. 5s.	64 1/2	64 1/2	64 1/2	- 1/2	85 1/2	74	14	Col. & Son 1st 4s.	81	80	+ 1	.08%	85	74 1/2	10	M. O. K. & T. 1st 4s.	84	84	84	- 1/2			
80 1/2	91	91	Am. T. & T. ex. 5s.	80	70	70	- 10	80 1/2	75	1	Col. & Son ref. 4s.	72	72	- 1	.02%	91 1/2	91 1/2	100	M. O. K. & T. 1st 4s.	91 1/2	91 1/2	91 1/2	- 1/2		
80 1/2	75	13	Am. T. & T. ex. 4 1/2s.	80	80	80	- 1/2	79	66	32	Col. & Son ref. 4s.	72	72	- 1	.02%	80 1/2	74	5	M. O. K. & T. 1st 4s.	75	75	75	- 1/2		
80 1/2	58	4	Ann Arbor 4s.	50	50	50	- 1/2	40	19 1/2	6	Col. & 9th Av. 5s.	19 1/2	19 1/2	- 1/2	.02%	80 1/2	74	5	M. O. K. & T. 1st 4s.	75	75	75	- 1/2		
80 1/2	82	6	Am. Writ. Paper 7s.	75 1/2	74 1/2	75 1/2	- 1/2	89	86 1/2	3	Columbia G. & E. 5s.	82	82	+ 1	.08%	80 1/2	74	11	M. O. K. & T. 1st 4s.	84	84	84	- 1/2		
80 1/2	73	152	Armour & Co. 4 1/2s.	76 1/2	75	75	- 1/2	102	90 1/2	150	Con. Gas ex. 7s.	100	99	- 1/2	.02%	91 1/2	91 1/2	100	M. O. K. & T. 1st 4s.	91 1/2	91 1/2	91 1/2	- 1/2		
80 1/2	80	325	A. T. & S. F. gen. 4s.	75 1/2	75 1/2	75 1/2	- 1/2	60 1/2	60	4	Conn. Ry. & L. 4 1/2s. sta.	60	60	- 1	.02%	95 1/2	94 1/2	2	M. O. K. & T. 1st 4s.	91 1/2	91 1/2	91 1/2	- 1/2		
80 1/2	67	10	A. T. & S. F. gen. 4s.	74	74	74	- 2 1/2	100	84	223	Cuba C. Sug. ex. 7s.	84	84	- 1	.08%	80 1/2	74	5	M. O. K. & T. 1st 4s.	75	75	75	- 1/2		
80 1/2	65	16	A. T. & S. F. ex. 4 1/2s.	65 1/2	65 1/2	65 1/2	- 1/2	85 1/2	78	25	Cumberland Tel. 5s.	80	80	- 1	.02%	77	68	16	M. O. K. & T. 1st 4s.	73	73	73	- 1/2		
80 1/2	62	2	A. T. & S. F. adj. 4s.	60	60	60	- 1/2	99 1/2	94 1/2	1	C. I. C. Div. 4s.	74	74	- 1	.02%	86	76 1/2	34	Montana Power 5s.	81 1/2	80	81 1/2	- 1/2		
80 1/2	15	15	A. T. & S. F. adj. 4s.	70	70	70	- 1/2	10 1/2	10 1/2	10	D. & H. Hen. ex. 4 1/2s.	95 1/2	95 1/2	+ 1/2	.02%	80 1/2	72 1/2	10	Mor. & Essex 3 1/2s.	80 1/2	80 1/2	80 1/2	- 1/2		
80 1/2	82	13	A. T. & S. F. 4 1/2s.	84	83 1/2	83 1/2	- 1/2	10 1/2	99 1/2	103 1/2	D. & H. Hud. 5s.	103 1/2	103 1/2	+ 1/2	.02%	80 1/2	72 1/2	10	Mor. & Essex 3 1/2s.	80 1/2	80 1/2	80 1/2	- 1/2		
80 1/2	64	6	A. T. & S. F. Ry. M. 4s.	60	60	60	- 1	87 1/2	72	31	Dell. & Hud. com. 5s.	82	84 1/2	+ 1/2	.02%	28	18	4	NASSAU ELEC. R. R. 18	18	18	18	- 1/2		
80 1/2	77	1	A. T. & S. F. Ry. M. 4s.	75	75	75	- 1/2	81 1/2	81	8	Dell. & Hud. ref. 4s.	78	78	- 1	.02%	1	N. C. & ST. L. c. 5s.	92 1/2	92 1/2	92 1/2	- 1/2				
80 1/2	91	12	A. T. & S. F. Ry. S. L. 4s.	76 1/2	76 1/2	76 1/2	- 1/2	87 1/2	83	4	Dell. Ed. col. tr. 5s.	88	88	- 1	.02%	20	20	20	Nat. Ry. M. 1st 4s.	22	22	22	- 1/2		
80 1/2	92	12	A. T. & S. F. Ry. S. L. 4s.	76 1/2	76 1/2	76 1/2	- 1/2	87 1/2	83	4	Dell. Ed. 1st & ref. 4s.	89	87	- 2	.02%	2	Nat. Ry. R. Mex. 4s.	34 1/2	34 1/2	34 1/2	- 1/2				
80 1/2	67	12	A. T. & S. F. Ry. S. L. 4s.	76 1/2	76 1/2	76 1/2	- 1/2	87 1/2	83	4	Dell. Ed. 1st & ref. 4s.	89	87	- 2	.02%	5	Nat. Tube 5s.	80 1/2	80 1/2	80 1/2	- 1/2				
80 1/2	9	9	Alt. & Arin. 4s.	77 1/2	77 1/2	77 1/2	- 1/2	56	39	140 1/2	D. & R. G. 1st ref. 4s.	50	48	- 2	.02%	86	86	247	N. Y. Cent. deb. 6s.	92 1/2	91 1/2	91 1/2	- 1/2		
80 1/2	52	9	Atlanta & Hiram 4s.	65 1/2	65 1/2	65 1/2	- 1/2	54	39	1	D. & R. G. 1st ref. 4s.	50	48	- 2	.02%	52	52	52	N. O. T. & M. inc. 5s.	50	50	50	- 1/2		
80 1/2	27	27	Atlantic Coast R. 7s.	102 1/2	101 1/2	101 1/2	- 1/2	80	69 1/2	10	Dell. River Tun. 4s.	77	77	- 1	.02%	99	64	5	N. O. T. & M. 6s.	90 1/2	90 1/2	90 1/2	- 1/2		
80 1/2	48	2	Balt. & L. 4s.	64	74	74	- 4	80	69 1/2	10	Dell. Edison 4s.	81	81	- 1	.02%	67	58	11	New Or. Term. 4s.	61 1/2	60 1/2	60 1/2	- 1/2		
80 1/2	53	13	Balt. C. L. L. & N. C. 4s.	72 1/2	71	71	- 2	95	82 1/2	4	Dell. Ed. col. tr. 5s.	88	88	- 1	.02%	80	74	2	N.O.N. & E. ref. 1 1/2s.	74	74	74	- 1/2		
80 1/2	81	1	Balt. C. L. L. 4s.	81	81	81	- 1	91	87	2	Dell. Ed. 1st & ref. 4s.	87	87	- 1	.02%	99	90	1	N. Y. Air. B. 1st 6s.	90	90	90	- 1/2		
80 1/2	82	4	Balt. C. L. L. 4s.	86 1/2	86 1/2	86 1/2	- 1/2	56	58 1/2	24	Detroit United 4s.	63	62 1/2	- 1/2	.02%	103 1/2	100 1/2	114	N. Y. Cent. 7s. rets.	102 1/2	101 1/2	101 1/2	- 1/2		
80 1/2	70	212	Atlantic Fruit 5s.	75	70	71	- 1	80	58	1	D. & G. 4s.	60	59 1/2	- 1/2	.02%	93 1/2	86	247	N. Y. Cent. deb. 6s.	92 1/2	91 1/2	91 1/2	- 1/2		
80 1/2	67	9	Alt. & Yakin 4s.	65 1/2	65 1/2	65 1/2	- 1/2	91	80	9	D. & G. 4s.	60	59 1/2	- 1/2	.02%	93 1/2	86	247	N. Y. Cent. deb. 6s.	92 1/2	91 1/2	91 1/2	- 1/2		
80 1/2	74	123	BALT. & O. gold 4s.	68 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	- 1/2	90	90	1	E. TENN. rear. 5s.	90	90	- 1	.02%	70 1/2	64 1/2	64 1/2							

Stock Exchange Bond Trading—Continued

Range, 1920										Range, 1920										Range, 1920									
High	Low	Sales	High	Low	Last	Chg/e	Net	High	Low	Sales	High	Low	Last	Chg/e	Net	High	Low	Sales	High	Low	Last	Chg/e	Net						
72	66	35	St.L., I.M. & S.s. & r.4s	72	70	70%	- 1%	98%	97	87	U. S. Rubber 7%gs.	98	97%	- 3%	-	99%	95	48	City of Berne 8s...	96	95	- 3	-	-					
72	63%	20	St. L. I. M. & S.	72	70	70%	- 1%	103%	97	11	U. S. Rubber 7%gs.	98	98%	+ 3%	-	12%	79	3	City of Bordeaux 6s	79	79	-	-	-					
			River & Gulf 4s...	68%	68%	-	-	90	75	332	U.S. Rub. 1st & ref.5s	76%	75	- 1%	-	12%	79	3	C. of Christiania 8s	96%	96%	-	-	-					
64	32	385	St. L. & S.F. pr.ln.4s	61	60	60%	-	97%	79	53	U.S. Sm. R. & M.c.v.6s	95	92%	- 2%	-	80%	72	44	C. of Copenhagen 5%gs	74%	72%	-	-	-					
72	62%	71%	St. L. & S.F. pr.ln.5s	74	73	73%	-	96%	89%	477	U. S. Steel 5s...	92%	90%	- 2%	-	80%	72	8	City of Lyons 6s...	90	79	79	1	-					
102	92	1	St. L. & S.F. gen. 6s	95	95	95	-	92%	84%	8	Utah & Nor. 1st 5s	91	89%	-	-	92%	79	13	C. of Marseilles 6s...	80	79	79	-	-					
91%	81	37	St. L. & S.F. pr.ln.6s	87%	86	86	-	85%	70	15	Utah Pow. & L. 5s	78%	76	- 1%	-	92%	79	13	C. of Zurich 8s...	97%	94	94%	-	-					
70	56%	250	St. L. & S.F. adj. 6s	65%	63%	- 5%	-	95%	90%	28	V.A.-CAR. CH. 1st 5s	93%	91	- 3%	-	12%	94	100	100	100%	100%	100%	-	-	-				
60	36%	397	St. L. & S.F. inc. 6s	51	49	50%	+ 8%	101	92%	4	Va.-Car. Ch. ev. 6s	92%	92%	- 1%	-	60%	45%	7	City of Tokio 5s...	46	45%	45%	-	-					
67%	49	43	St. L. & S.W. 1st Ter. 5s	63	62	62%	-	86%	72%	40	Virginia Ry. 5s...	82	82	-	-	27%	75	75	Dominican Rep. 5s...	75%	75	-	-	-					
71%	60	22	St. L. & S.W. 1st 6s	66	66	-	-	95%	89%	1	Va. Mid'l. Ser. R. 5s	88%	88%	-	-	90%	96%	113	Dom. of C. 5s, 1921	96%	98%	+ 8%	-	-					
60%	39%	1	St. L. & S.W. 2d inc. 5s	58%	58%	+ 1%	-	70	63	1	Va. Ry. & Power 5s	69%	69%	+ 3%	-	98%	93%	101	Dom. of C. 5s, 1921	96%	98%	+ 8%	-	-					
66%	48%	54	St. L. & S.W. con. 4s	63%	62%	- 1%	-	91	79	42	WABASH 1st 5s...	83%	83%	-	-	25%	87	45	Dom. of C. 5s, 1926	91%	92%	+ 8%	-	-					
60	33	7	St. P. & K.C. S.L. 4%gs	64%	64	-	-	84	73	7	Wabash 2d 5s...	80	77%	- 1%	-	97%	89%	56	Dom. of C. 5s, 1929	91%	89%	+ 8%	-	-					
92	83%	7	St. P. M. & M. 4%gs	89	88	-	-	76	64%	36	West Shore 4s...	70	70%	-	-	102%	84%	51	Dom. of C. 5s, 1931	90%	89%	+ 8%	-	-					
102%	90%	1	St.P.M. & M.C.C. 6s	102%	102%	-	-	97%	93	3	Western Elec. 5s...	93%	93%	+ 3%	-	104%	100%	100%	French Govt. 8s...	100%	100%	-	-	-					
87%	76%	2	St. P. M. & M.	97	96	-	-	91	81	14	W. N. Y. & P. 1st 5s	86%	86%	+ 3%	-	82	68	45%	Jap. 4%gs, star. loan	75	74%	75	+ 8%	-					
88%	81%	2	St. P. M. & M.con. 4s	82%	82%	-	-	86%	76%	22	Western Pacific 5s...	84%	81%	- 3%	-	82	67%	133	Jap. 4%gs, 2d Series	75%	74%	75	+ 8%	-					
82	70%	2	St. P. M. & M. E.	82	82	-	-	59%	57	18	Western Md. 4s...	54%	55%	-	-	71	50%	131	Jap. 4%gs, star. loan	57%	56%	57%	+ 8%	-					
102%	97%	2	St. P. & Nor. Pac. 6s	100	100	-	-	100	91	1	W. U. Tel. col. R. 8s	78%	78%	-	-	101	90%	90	King of Belg. 7%gs	98%	97%	+ 8%	-	-					
64%	55%	50	San An. & A. P. 4. 6s	61	60	+ 1%	-	96	94%	1	W. U. Tel. col. tr. 8s	81%	81%	- 1%	-	98%	90%	18	K. of Belg. 6s...	91%	91%	-	-	-					
60%	50%	3	S. A. L. gold 4s...	56	55%	- 1%	-	60%	50	5	W. & L. E. con. 4s...	60%	59%	- 1%	-	15%	85	85	King of Belg. 6s...	85	85	-	-	-					
61	49%	1	S. A. L. g. 5s...	52	52	- 1%	-	91%	84%	35	Wilson & Co. 1st 6s	87%	86%	- 1%	-	86%	85	15	Rep. of Cuba 5s...	79	79	-	-	-					
49%	39%	15	S. A. L. ref. 4s...	42%	41	- 1%	-	96%	80%	79	Wilson & Co. ev. 6s	82	82%	- 1%	-	72	76	25	Rep. of Cuba 4%gs...	77	78	+ 8%	-	-					
45%	37%	91	S. A. L. adj. 5s...	38%	37	- 1%	-	73%	60%	12	Wta. Cent. gen. 4s...	70%	70%	+ 6%	-	76	62	3	Rep. of Cuba 4%gs...	62	62	- 1%	-	-					
72	61%	43	So. Pac. col. 4s...	70%	69	- 1%	-	73	62%	2	Wm.-S. S'bound 6s	67%	67%	- 1%	-	16%	92%	23	U.K.G.B. & 1.5%gs	91%	92%	+ 8%	-	-					
117	93%	133%	So. Pac. conv. 5s...	122%	122%	-	-	104%	105%	-	Wm.-S. S'bound 6s	67%	67%	- 1%	-	15%	90	186	U.K.G.B. & 1.5%gs	95%	94%	+ 8%	-	-					
84%	73%	315	So. Pac. conv. 4s...	76%	76%	-	-	70%	67%	-	Wm.-S. S'bound 6s	67%	67%	- 1%	-	12%	88	88	U.K.G.B. & 1.5%gs	89%	88%	+ 8%	-	-					
70%	68%	223	So. Pac. ref. 4s...	74%	73%	- 1%	-	90%	87%	-	Wm.-S. S'bound 6s	67%	67%	- 1%	-	12%	88	88	U.K.G.B. & 1.5%gs	87%	88%	- 1%	-	-					
73%	62%	15	So. Pac. S.F. Ter. 7%gs	65%	65%	-	-	90%	87%	-	Wm.-S. S'bound 6s	67%	67%	- 1%	-	12%	88	88	U.K.G.B. & 1.5%gs	87%	88%	- 1%	-	-					
90%	77%	36	Southern Ry. 5s...	86%	85%	-	-	100	89	30	Southern Ry. 5s...	92	92%	- 2%	-	90%	81%	290	U.K.G.B. & 1.5%gs	87%	88%	- 1%	-	-					
65%	50%	37	Sou. Ry. gen. 4s...	50%	50%	-	-	94	84	60	Southern Ry. 5s...	90	90%	- 2%	-	47%	30	280	U.S. of Mexico 5s...	45%	44	- 1%	-	-					
66%	50%	50	Sou. Ry. M.O.C. 4s	38%	37	- 1%	-	92	80	30	Southern Ry. 5s...	88	88%	- 1%	-	37	26	31	U.S. of Mexico 4s...	35%	35%	+ 1%	-	-					
70%	62%	2	S. Ry. St. L. Div. 4s	67%	67%	-	-	92	80	10	Southern Ry. 5s...	88	88%	- 1%	-	101	90%	100	Total sales	100%	100%	-	-	-					
85%	78%	92	So. Bell Tel. 5s...	82	82	-	-	92	80	10	Southern Ry. 5s...	88	88%	- 1%	-	90	90	1	N. Y. State 4s, 1961	90	90	-	-	-					
86%	80%	1	T. of St. L. con. 5s	89	89	+ 1%	-	90	80	10	Southern Ry. 5s...	88	88%	- 1%	-	76%	50	22	Va. def. 6s, B.B.ctfs.	75%	75%	-	-	-					
74%	62%	16	T. of St. L. 4s	71	69%	- 2%	-	92	70	81	Southern Ry. 5s...	88	88%	- 1%	-	90	90	1	New York City Bonds	75%	75%	-	-	-					
88%	75%	1	Tex. & Pac. 1st 5s	80%	80%	-	-	92	80	10	Southern Ry. 5s...	88	88%	- 1%	-	90	90	1	STATE BONDS	75%	75%	-	-	-					
34%	38%	4	Third Ar. ref. 4s...	49%	49	-	-	97	50	84	Southern Ry. 5s...	88	88%	- 1%	-	90	90	1	STATE BONDS	75%	75%	-	-	-					
37	19%	148	Third Ar. adj. 5s...	29%	29%	-	-	97	50	84	Southern Ry. 5s...	88	88%	- 1%	-	90	90	1	STATE BONDS	75%	75%	-	-	-					
84%	75%	1	Tol. & O.C.W. Div. 5s	75%	75%	-	-	94	98	87	Southern Ry. 5s...	88	88%	- 1%	-	90	90	1	STATE BONDS	75%	75%	-	-	-					
56%	42%	11	Tol. & O.C.W. Div. 5s	75%	75%	-	-	92	94	86	Southern Ry. 5s...	88	88%	- 1%	-	90	90												

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Annalist Open Market

Contributions to this list are invited from dealers and brokers of recognized standing. When bids or offers are received for the same security from more than one house the highest bid and the lowest offer are given. No consideration of any kind is accepted for the insertion of these quotations. They are given strictly as news and are as of the Friday before publication, this date being selected as the last full day of the financial week on which more quotations are available than on the half day of Saturday when many brokers are absent from their offices and on which the volume of business is relatively small. Nevertheless, it is to be recognized that changes occurring on Saturday will be reflected at the opening of the market on Monday, so that the quotations given below are subject to alteration. Address, The Open Market, Wall Street Office, The Annalist, 2 Rector Street, N. Y.

Bonds

Bonds

UNITED STATES AND TERRITORIES

	—Bid for—	—Offered—
	At	By
U. S. 2s, reg., 1930	100% Folsom & Adams	101 C. F. Childs & Co.
Do coupon, 1930	100%	101
U. S. 4s, reg., 1925	104½	105% Folsom & Adams
Do coupon, 1925	105%	105% C. F. Childs & Co.
U. S. 5s, reg., 1930	100%	100% Folsom & Adams
Pan. Canal 2s, reg., 1938	100%	101
Do coupon, 1938-38	100%	101
Panama 3s, reg., 1961	79	80
Do coupon	79	80

OTHER FOREIGN, Including Notes

Alberta 5½s, Jan., 1939	81½ Lynch & McDermott	84 Lynch & McDermott
Do So. May, 1925	88	90
Do 1s, June, 1929	90	92
Argentine Govt. 5s, 1945	63 Bull & Eldredge	64 Bull & Eldredge
Belgian Govt. 6s, 1-yr., Jan., 21	90½ Salomon Bros. & Hutzler	100 Salomon Bros. & Hutz.
Do 6s, 5-yr., Jan., 1925	91	91½
Christiania 8s, 1945	98	98½
British Columbia 4½s, Dec., 1925	84½ Lynch & McDermott	87 Lynch & McDermott
Do 5½s, March, 1939	80	82
Calgary 7s, June, 1928	93	95
Do 5s, April, 1922	92	94½
Do 5s, April, 1923	90	91½
French 5s, 1945	100% Bull & Eldredge	100% Bull & Eldredge
Mexican Govt. 6½ Treasury bonds, Series A	39 Seawoodgood, Haas & McDon.	41 Seawoodgood, H. & M.
Do 5½s, 1945	37	38
Norway 6s, 1923	94½ Salomon Bros. & Hutzler	96½ Salomon Bros. & H.
Do 5s, 1940	96½	98
Montreal 4½s, Jan., 1926	83 Lynch & McDermott	84½ Lynch & McDermott
Do 6s, Dec., 1922	94%	95½
Do 6s, May, 1923	94%	95%
New Brunswick 5½s, Dec., 1926	85	89
Ontario 6s, April, 1925	93	94½
Quebec 6s, March, 1925	87	89
Do 5s, June, 1926	95	97
Russian Government 5½s, 1921	11 Bull & Eldredge	12 Bull & Eldredge
Do 5½s, 1919	10	10
Swedish Govt. 6s, 1929	79 Salomon Bros. & Hutzler	79½ Salomon Bros. & H.
Switzerland 5½s, Aug., 1929	81½	82½
Saskatchewan 6s, Feb., 1924	93 Lynch & McDermott	93 Lynch & McDermott
Do 5s, July, 1923	87	89
United Kingdom of Gt. Britain and Ireland 5½s, 1921	97½ Bull & Eldredge	98 Bull & Eldredge
Do 5½s, 1922	95	95½
Do 5½s, 1929	88%	89
Do 5½s, 1937	84	84½

MUNICIPALS, Etc., Including Notes

Arlington (Mass.) cpn. 4s, 1925	*5.37 Estabrook & Co.
Athol (Mass.) cpn. 4s, 1924	*5.50
Boston (Mass.) 4s, 1926	*5.25
Bryan (Ohio) Waterworks 5½s, 1926-33	*5.40 A. E. Aub & Co., Cin.
Bridgeport (Conn.) School 5s, 1945-49	*4.80 R. M. Grant & Co.
Bridgeport (Conn.) 5s, 1931-35	*4.90
Brockton (Mass.) reg. 4s, 1922	*5.75 Estabrook & Co.
Cambridge (Mass.) 4s, 1936	*5.25 R. M. Grant & Co.
Carter Co. (Tenn.) Road 6s, 1935-50	*5.75
Cleveland Heights (Ohio) School District 6s, 1946	*6.00 A. E. Aub & Co., Cin.
Cleveland (Ohio) coupon 4½s, 1923	*6.00 Estabrook & Co.
Comanche County (Texas) Road Dist. 5s, 1921-39	*6.00 A. E. Aub & Co., Cin.
Cumberland County (N. C.) School 6s, 1922-23	*5.50 P. M. Chapman & Co.
Cook County (Ill.) School 6s, 1922-23	*5.25 R. M. Grant & Co.
Dade County (Fla.) funding 5s, 1927	*6.00 A. E. Aub & Co., Cin.
Do Highway 6s, 1942-49	*5.65 R. M. Grant & Co.
Delaware County (Ohio) redemption 4½s, 1921	*5.25
Dallas (Texas) coupon 4½s, 1944-45	*6.00 A. E. Aub & Co., Cin.
Decatur (Ill.) 4s, 1922	*5.10 Estabrook & Co.
Durham (N. C.) coupon 5½s, 1923	*5.00 R. M. Grant & Co.
Do coupon 5½s, 1929	*5.15 Estabrook & Co.
Do coupon 5½s, 1940	*5.00 R. M. Grant & Co.
Des Moines (Iowa) Water 5s, 1932-34	*5.00 P. W. Chapman & Co.
Flint (Mich.) 5s, 1936-47	*5.00 R. M. Grant & Co.
Do 5s, 1936-50	*5.10
Fort Worth (Texas) 5s, 1941-59	*5.20
Do 5s, 1930-34	*5.50
Gallipolis (Ohio) redemption 5s, 1921-44	*5.50, 5.30 A. E. Aub & Co., Cin.
Grayson County (Texas) Road Dist. No. 1 4½s, 1924-20	*6.00
Greenlee County (Ariz.) 6s, 1928-29	*5.60
Hot Springs (Ark.) notes	*7.00 R. M. Grant & Co.
Holiday Inn Highway 5s, 1924	*5.25 A. E. Aub & Co., Cin.
Hunt County (Texas) Road 5s, 1928-51	*5.50 Estabrook & Co.
Hixland Township (Ill.) Road 5s, 1921-24	*5.50
Knoxville (Tenn.) 5½s, 1950	*5.35 R. M. Grant & Co.
Kansas City (Mo.) 4½s, 1933	*5.00 Estabrook & Co.
Little River D. D. (Mo.) cpn. 5½s, 1922	*5.00
Malden (Mass.) cpn. 4s, 1924	*5.25
Milwaukee (Wis.) 4s, 1922	*5.75
Minneapolis (Minn.) cpn. 5s, 1923-25	*5.50
Do cpn. 5s, 1935-36	*5.05
Middletown (Conn.) cpn. 3½s, 1921	*5.15 R. M. Grant & Co.
Milwaukee (Wis.) 4s, 1930	*5.50 Estabrook & Co.
New Bedford (Mass.) reg. 4s, 1928-30	*5.50
Narragansett (R. I.) cpn. 5s, 1924-25	*5.50
New Bern (N. C.) Imp. 6s, 1922	*6.50 R. M. Grant & Co.
New Britain (Conn.) School 4s, 1923-24	*5.50
Newark (N. J.) 4s, 1921	*5.00
North Hempstead (N. Y.) Water reg. 4.50, Nov. 1, 1921-30	*5.25 R. M. Grant & Co.
Omaha (Neb.) cpn. 4½s, 1941	*5.00 Estabrook & Co.
Portsmouth (Va.) reg. 5½s, 1930	*5.25 R. M. Grant & Co.
Portland (Ore.) 5s, 1923-26	*5.75 Estabrook & Co.
Putnam (Conn.) 4½s, 1928	*5.75 R. M. Grant & Co.
Quincy (Mass.) Sewer reg. 4s, June 1, 1921-43	*5.25
Richmond (Va.) reg. 4½s, 1928	*5.25 Estabrook & Co.
Rochester (N. Y.) reg. 4½s, 1928	*5.25 A. E. Aub & Co., Cin.
Scioto County (Ohio) Flood Emergency 5s, 1934	*5.00 Steinberg & Co., St. Louis
St. Louis City 4s, 1928-29	*5.00 Steinberg & Co., St. Louis
Sioux Falls, S. D., School Dist. 5½s, Dec. 1, 1940	*5.00 Stix & Co., St. L.
Stamford (Texas) Waterworks 5s, 1923	*5.35 P. W. Chapman & Co.
South Bend (Ind.) 6s, 1925	*5.40 Estabrook & Co.
Do 1930	*5.25
Vinna Township, Ill., Road 5s, 1921-1924	*5.00 P. W. Chapman & Co.
Wyoming (Ohio) Sewer Extension 5s, 1932-35	*5.10 A. E. Aub & Co., Cin.
Waterbury (Conn.) 4s, 1921	*5.50 R. M. Grant & Co.
Waterbury (Conn.) cpn. 4½s, 1938-59	*5.00 Estabrook & Co.
Youngstown (Ohio) 5s, 1921	*5.00
Xenia (Ohio) Waterworks 5½s, 1927	*5.30 A. E. Aub & Co., Cin.
Ybasis	*5.25

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Annalist Open Market

PUBLIC UTILITIES

Sold for At	Offered By
77½ Pynchon & Co.	80 Pynchon & Co.
"	79 J. Nickerson Jr.
40 A. F. Ingold & Co.	42 A. F. Ingold & Co.
65 Redmond & Co.	75 Redmond & Co.
30 Stix & Co., St. L.	40 Stix & Co., St. L.
63 Joseph Gilman	72 Pynchon & Co.
70 Pynchon & Co.	93 "
"	92½
54 A. F. Ingold & Co.	54 A. F. Ingold & Co.
78 Pynchon & Co.	78 Pynchon & Co.
23 Redmond & Co.	30 Redmond & Co.
70 Stone & Webster	70 Stone & Webster
79 Lynch & McDermott	79 Lynch & McDermott
95	97 A. F. Ingold & Co.
53 J. Nickerson, Jr.	57 J. Nickerson, Jr.
82 Pynchon & Co.	88 Pynchon & Co.
78	78
"	96
92 Lynch & McDermott	92 Lynch & McDermott
75 Pynchon & Co.	75 Pynchon & Co.
80	80
81 Stix & Co., St. L.	81 Stix & Co., St. L.
84 Joseph Gilman	84 Joseph Gilman
77½ J. Nickerson, Jr.	77½ J. Nickerson, Jr.
70 A. F. Ingold & Co.	70 A. F. Ingold & Co.
74 Joseph Gilman	74 Joseph Gilman
754 J. Nickerson, Jr.	754 J. Nickerson, Jr.
75 Pynchon & Co.	75 Pynchon & Co.
80	80
79 Stone & Webster	79 Stone & Webster
87 Stix & Co., St. L.	87 Stix & Co., St. L.
87 Joseph Gilman	87 Joseph Gilman
81½ J. Nickerson, Jr.	81½ J. Nickerson, Jr.
73 A. F. Ingold & Co.	73 A. F. Ingold & Co.
83 Joseph Gilman	83 Joseph Gilman
74½ J. Nickerson Jr.	74½ J. Nickerson Jr.
90 Pynchon & Co.	90 Pynchon & Co.
91 H. L. Doherty & Co.	91 H. L. Doherty & Co.
90 A. B. Leach & Co.	90 A. B. Leach & Co.
82 Pynchon & Co.	82 Pynchon & Co.
83 A. B. Leach & Co.	83 A. B. Leach & Co.
90	90
87 Stix & Co., St. L.	87 Stix & Co., St. L.
87 Pynchon & Co.	87 Pynchon & Co.
93 Redmond & Co.	93 Redmond & Co.
25 Joseph Gilman	25 Joseph Gilman
50 Pynchon & Co.	50 Pynchon & Co.
90 Redmond & Co.	90 Redmond & Co.
85	85
65 Joseph Gilman	65 Joseph Gilman
68 B. H. & F. W. Pelzer	68 B. H. & F. W. Pelzer
75 A. B. Leach & Co.	75 A. B. Leach & Co.
33 A. F. Ingold & Co.	33 A. F. Ingold & Co.
83½ Spencer Trask & Co.	83½ Spencer Trask & Co.
84½ J. Nickerson, Jr.	84½ J. Nickerson, Jr.
98	98
73 Stone & Webster	73 Stone & Webster
82 J. Nickerson, Jr.	82 J. Nickerson, Jr.
86 Steinberg & Co., St. L.	86 Steinberg & Co., St. L.
93 Cahn, McCabe & Co., L.A.	93 Cahn, McCabe & Co., L.A.
94 Stone & Webster	94 Stone & Webster
75 Pynchon & Co.	75 Pynchon & Co.
91 Redmond & Co.	91 Redmond & Co.
80 Lynch & McDermott	80 Lynch & McDermott
83 Pynchon & Co.	83 Pynchon & Co.
70 B. H. & F. W. Pelzer	70 B. H. & F. W. Pelzer
72 Stone & Webster	72 Stone & Webster
80 J. Nickerson, Jr.	80 J. Nickerson, Jr.
90 Stone & Webster	90 Stone & Webster
100% Cahn, McCabe & Co., L.A.	100% Cahn, McCabe & Co., L.A.
85 Redmond & Co.	85 Redmond & Co.
87½ Cahn, McCabe & Co., L.A.	87½ Cahn, McCabe & Co., L.A.
77 J. Nickerson, Jr.	77 J. Nickerson, Jr.
84 Cahn, McCabe & Co., L.A.	84 Cahn, McCabe & Co., L.A.
85 Redmond & Co.	85 Redmond & Co.
80 J. Nickerson, Jr.	80 J. Nickerson, Jr.
88 Steinberg & Co., St. L.	88 Steinberg & Co., St. L.
83 Steinberg & Co., St. L.	83 Steinberg & Co., St. L.
80 Pynecon & Co.	80 Pynecon & Co.
83 Stix & Co., St. L.	83 Stix & Co., St. L.
90	90
91	91
63 Pynchon & Co.	63 Pynchon & Co.
76 Lynch & McDermott	76 Lynch & McDermott
83 Joseph Gilman	83 Joseph Gilman
88 Lynch & McDermott	88 Lynch & McDermott
70 Pynchon & Co.	70 Pynchon & Co.
80	80
94 J. Nickerson, Jr.	94 J. Nickerson, Jr.
88 Spencer Trask & Co.	88 Spencer Trask & Co.
90	90
75 Pynchon & Co.	75 Pynchon & Co.
82 Pynchon & Co.	82 Pynchon & Co.
80 Redmond & Co.	80 Redmond & Co.
75 J. Nickerson, Jr.	75 J. Nickerson, Jr.
80 Stone & Webster	80 Stone & Webster
86 Stix & Co., St. L.	86 Stix & Co., St. L.
85	85
76 Pynchon & Co.	76 Pynchon & Co.
74 J. Nickerson, Jr.	74 J. Nickerson, Jr.
75 Stone & Webster	75 Stone & Webster
76 Pynchon & Co.	76 Pynchon & Co.
79 J. Nickerson, Jr.	79 J. Nickerson, Jr.
80 Pynchon & Co.	80 Pynchon & Co.
86 Steinberg & Co., St. L.	86 Steinberg & Co., St. L.
88	88
71 Steinberg & Co., St. L.	71 Steinberg & Co., St. L.
75 B. H. & F. W. Pelzer	75 B. H. & F. W. Pelzer
77 Pynchon & Co.	77 Pynchon & Co.
80 Redmond & Co.	80 Redmond & Co.
85	85
74½	74½
76 Stone & Webster	76 Stone & Webster
76 Pynchon & Co.	76 Pynchon & Co.
79 J. Nickerson, Jr.	79 J. Nickerson, Jr.
80 Pynchon & Co.	80 Pynchon & Co.
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77 Pynchon & Co.	77 Pynchon & Co.
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79 J. Nickerson, Jr.	79 J. Nickerson, Jr.
80 Pynchon & Co.	80 Pynchon & Co.
86 Steinberg & Co., St. L.	86 Steinberg & Co., St. L.
88	88
71 Steinberg & Co., St. L.	71 Steinberg & Co., St. L.
75 B. H. & F. W. Pelzer	75 B. H. & F. W. Pelzer
77 Pynchon & Co.	77 Pynchon & Co.
80 Redmond & Co.	80 Redmond & Co.
85	85
74½	74½
76 Stone & Webster	76 Stone & Webster
76 Pynchon & Co.	76 Pynchon & Co.
79 J. Nickerson, Jr.	79 J. Nickerson, Jr.
80 Pynchon & Co.	80 Pynchon & Co.
86 Steinberg & Co., St. L.	86 Steinberg & Co., St. L.
88	88
71 Steinberg & Co., St. L.	71 Steinberg & Co., St. L.
75 B. H. & F. W. Pelzer	75 B. H. & F. W. Pelzer
77 Pynchon & Co.	77 Pynchon & Co.
8	

*Annalist Open Market**Annalist Open Market*

PUBLIC UTILITIES—Continued

	Bid for— At By	Offered— At By
Texas Pr. & L. Ist 5a, 1927.	25 Lynch & Co.	77 Pynchon & Co.
Toronto Power 5a, 1924.	27 " "	78 Lynch & McDermott.
Twin States Gas & Elec. 5a, 1923.	28 " "	83 Pynchon & Co.
Union Elec. L. & P. Co. ref. and ext. 5a, 1923.	33 J. Nickerson Jr.	75 J. Nickerson Jr.
United Elec. (N. J.) 5a, 1924.	35 B. H. & F. W. Peizer.	69 B. H. & F. W. Peizer.
United Lt. & Ry. 1st 5a, 1922.	65 Pynchon & Co.	72 Pynchon & Co.
United Ry. (St. L.) 5a, 1924.	45 " "	47 " "
Washington Water Power 1st and ref. 5a, 1929.	85 J. Nickerson Jr.	90 J. Nickerson, Jr.
West States G. & E. 1st 5a, 1941.	76 " "	78% " "
Yadkin River Power Co. Ist 5a, 1941.	71% " "	74 " "

RAILROADS

	Bid for— At By	Offered— At By
Atlanta & Birmingham 1st 5a, 1924.	62 F. J. Lissman & Co.	72 F. J. Lissman & Co.
Do income 5a, 1930.	25 " "	35 " "
Can. Nat. Ry. 5a, 1935.	100 Lynch & McDermott.	101 Lynch & McDermott.
Cin. Ham. & Day. gen. 5a, 1921.	68 F. J. Lissman & Co.	78 F. J. Lissman & Co.
Duluth, Missabe & Iron gen. 5a, 1921.	63 E. A. Baker & Son.	75 P. W. Chapman & Co.
Fila. East Coast 4% 5a, 1929.	70% P. W. Chapman & Co.	77% P. W. Chapman & Co.
Fonda, Johnstown & Gl. 4% 5a, 1922.	44 J. U. Kirk & Co.	46 J. U. Kirk & Co.
Grand Trunk Western 4% 5a, 1920.	62 Lynch & McDermott.	64 Lynch & McDermott.
Gulf & Mex. Pacific 3% 5a, 1922.	72 " "	47 " "
Miss. Central 5a, 1949.	72 Brooks & Co., Scranton.	72 Stix & Co., St. L.
Miss. River & Bonne Terre 5a, 1931.	58 Stix & Co., St. L.	80 F. J. Lissman & Co.
New Mexico Ry. & Coal 5a, 1947.	70 F. J. Lissman & Co.	72 Stix & Co., St. L.
Rock Island-Frisco Ter. 1st 5a, 1927.	80 Stix & Co., St. L.	82 Stix & Co., St. L.
San Antonio Belt. & Ry. 6a, 1924.	92 St. Louis, Iron Mt. & So. Ry. g.	92 St. Louis, Iron Mt. & So. Ry. g.
St. Louis, Iron Mt. & So. Ry. g. 4%, 1933.	45% P. W. Chapman & Co.	67 P. W. Chapman & Co.
Vicksburg & Meridian 1st 5a, 21.	97 F. J. Lissman & Co.	100 F. J. Lissman & Co.
Verdigars Val. Ind. & W. 1st 5a, 26.	83 P. W. Chapman & Co.	86 P. W. Chapman & Co.

INDUSTRIAL AND MISCELLANEOUS

	Bid for— At By	Offered— At By
Aetna Explosives 6a, 1941.	62 E. A. Baker & Son.	60 Brooks & Co., Scranton.
Acker, Merrill & Condit deb. 6a, 23.	62 Carruthers, Pell & Co.	62 Carruthers, Pell & Co.
Auto Sales G. & C. Co. 6a, 1931.	15 " "	15 " "
Atlas Powder Cement 6a, 1925.	30 " "	30 " "
Arrow Coal 1st 5a, 1920.	78 " "	69 J. Nickerson, Jr.
Atlantic Fruit 7a, 1934.	83 Carruthers, Pell & Co.	83 E. A. Baker & Son.
Am. Steel Edg. deb. 5a, 1923.	90 E. A. Baker & Son.	72 E. A. Baker & Son.
Buff. & Susq. Iron deh. 5a, 1926.	78 A. F. Ingold & Co.	78 Carruthers, Pell & Co.
Canadian Car & Fdy. 5a, Dec. 29.	78 E. A. Baker & Son.	86 Carruthers, Pell & Co.
Central Foundry 5a, 1931.	70 Carruthers, Pell & Co.	73 E. A. Baker & Son.
Central Iron & Coal 5a, 1938.	85 Carruthers, Pell & Co.	74 E. A. Baker & Son.
Consolidation Coal 5a, 1929.	73 Do 6a, 1923.	96 Carruthers, Pell & Co.
Consolidation Coal 5a, 1934.	74 Do 6a, 1923.	76 Carruthers, Pell & Co.
Clyde Steamship 5a, 1931.	74 Do 6a, 1923.	76 Carruthers, Pell & Co.
Cudahy Packing 5a, 1946.	74 Do 6a, 1923.	76 Carruthers, Pell & Co.
Cone. Paper 1st 5a, 1920.	94 Carruthers, Pell & Co.	94 Carruthers, Pell & Co.
Dominion Glass 1st 5a, 1933.	85 Do 6a, 1923.	85 Do 6a, 1923.
Dominion Coal 5a, 1940.	77 Do 6a, 1923.	77 Do 6a, 1923.
Eck Horn Coal 5a, 1925.	80 Do 6a, 1923.	80 Do 6a, 1923.
Fairmont Coal 5a, 1931.	80 Do 6a, 1923.	80 Do 6a, 1923.
General Baking 5a, 1939.	85 Do 6a, 1923.	85 Do 6a, 1923.
Great Northern Paper 1st 5a, 1927.	95 Do 6a, 1923.	95 Do 6a, 1923.
Huntington col. tr. 6a, 1927.	91 Do 6a, 1923.	91 Do 6a, 1923.
Inland Steel 5a, 1942.	86 Do 6a, 1923.	86 Do 6a, 1923.
Keystone C. & C. ref. 6a, 1921-31.	96 Do 6a, 1923.	96 Do 6a, 1923.
Jamison Coal & Coke (Georges Creek) 5a, 1930.	87 Do 6a, 1923.	87 Do 6a, 1923.
Do 6a, 1921.	93 Do 6a, 1923.	93 Do 6a, 1923.
Lima Locomotive Corp. 1st 5a, 1929.	88 Redmond & Co.	95 Redmond & Co.
L. & N.-B. Coal 1st 5a, 1923.	82 H. I. Nicholas & Co.	92 H. I. Nicholas & Co.
Merchants Coal joint 5a, 1924.	99 Carruthers, Pell & Co.	95% E. A. Baker & Son.
Magnolia Petroleum 5a, 1927.	94 Carruthers, Pell & Co.	94 Carruthers, Pell & Co.
Monon Coal 1st a. f. 5a, 1936.	44% Carruthers, Pell & Co.	46% Carruthers, Pell & Co.
New Jersey Zinc 5a, 1926.	90 Carruthers, Pell & Co.	94 Carruthers, Pell & Co.
Norwalk Steel 4% 5a, 1929.	38 Do 6a, 1923.	40% Do 6a, 1923.
Oxford Paper 1st 5a, 1930.	97 Do 6a, 1923.	97 Do 6a, 1923.
Pleasant Valley Coal 5a, 1928.	80 Do 6a, 1923.	80 Do 6a, 1923.
Pan Amer. Petroleum 5a, 1930.	89 Do 6a, 1923.	94 Carruthers, Pell & Co.
Penn. Marv. Cos. 1st 5a, 1930.	97 Do 6a, 1923.	97 Do 6a, 1923.
Penn. Metal Steel 6a, 1925.	92 Do 6a, 1923.	92 Do 6a, 1923.
Springfield Coal 5a, 1923.	70 Do 6a, 1923.	70 Do 6a, 1923.
Standard Steel Works 5a, 1928.	95 Do 6a, 1923.	95 Do 6a, 1923.
United Lead 5a, 1943.	76 Do 6a, 1923.	76 Do 6a, 1923.
W. Va. C. & C. 6a, 1921-1925.	85 Do 6a, 1923.	85 Do 6a, 1923.
Wax & Parchment Paper 5a, 1940.	45 Do 6a, 1923.	45 Do 6a, 1923.
Welshing Scales 5a, 1931.	68 Do 6a, 1923.	68 Do 6a, 1923.
W. P. Pocahontas Corp. 4% 5a, 1945.	65 Do 6a, 1923.	65 Do 6a, 1923.
Wilkes-Barre Colliery 5a, 1923.	97 Do 6a, 1923.	97 Do 6a, 1923.

*Basic.

Notes

Notes

RAILROADS

	Bid for— At By	Offered— At By
Canadian Pac. 6a, March, 1924.	94% Salomon Bros. & Hutzler.	94% Salomon Bros. & Hutzler.
Chi. Burlington & Quincy 1st 21.	94% Mann, Pell & Peake.	94% Mann, Pell & Peake.
Hocking Valley 5a, 1924.	92% Bull & Eldredge.	92% Bull & Eldredge.
Kansas City Terminal 5a, 1923.	94% Mann, Pell & Peake.	94% Mann, Pell & Peake.
Penn. 4%a, June, 1921.	99% Salomon Bros. & Hutzler.	99% Salomon Bros. & Hutzler.
Southern Ry. 6a, 1922.	94% Mann, Pell & Peake.	94% Mann, Pell & Peake.
St. Paul Union Depot 5a, 1923.	95% Mann, Pell & Peake.	95% Mann, Pell & Peake.

PUBLIC UTILITIES

	Bid for— At By	Offered— At By
Baton Rouge Elec. 7a, Jan. 1923.	95 Stone & Webster.	98% Stone & Webster.
Dallas Electric 6a, 1921.	98% Do 1923.	100 Do 1923.
El Paso Elec. 7a, 1925.	91 Do 1923.	95 Do 1923.
E. Texas Elec. 7a, 1925.	92 Do 1923.	96 Do 1923.
Inter. Rap. Trans. 7a, 1921.	100% Bull & Eldredge.	71% Bull & Eldredge.
Pub. Ser. (N. J.) 1st 1921.	87% Steinberg & Co., St. Louis.	86% Steinberg & Co., St. L.
Southwestern Bell 1st 5a, 1923.	92% Steinberg & Co., St. Louis.	94% Steinberg & Co., St. L.
Twin States G. & E. 5a, 1921.	61 A. H. Bickmore & Co.	63 Steinberg & Co., St. Louis.
Union Electric 7a, 1923.	94% Steinberg & Co., St. Louis.	97 Steinberg & Co., St. L.

INDUSTRIAL AND MISCELLANEOUS

	Bid for— At By	Offered— At By
Am. Cotton Oil 6a, Sept. 1924.	89% Salomon Bros. & Hutzler.	89% Mann, Pell & Peake.
Am. Tel. & Tel. 6a, Feb. 1924.	93% Do 1923.	93% Bull & Eldredge.
Do 6a, 1922.	95% Do 1923.	95% Do 1923.
Am. Tobacco 7a, 1921.	100% Salomon Bros. & Hutzler.	100% Salomon Bros. & H.
Do 7a, 1922.	99% Do 1923.	99% Do 1923.
Do 7a, 1923.	99% Do 1923.	99% Do 1923.
Anglo-Am. Oil 7a, 1923.	98% Do 1923.	98% Do 1923.
Anaconda 6a, 1929.	84% Mann, Pell & Peake.	84% Bull & Eldredge.
Armour & Co. 6a, 1921 to 1924.	94 Do 1923.	94 Do 1923.
Associated Sm. Hard. 5a, 1925.	92 Steinberg & Co., St. Louis.	92 Steinberg & Co., St. L.
Bethlehem Steel 7a, 1922.	97% Salomon Bros. & Hutzler.	97% Salomon Bros. & H.
Do 7a, 1923.	97% Do 1923.	97% Do 1923.
Cudahy Packing 7a, 1923.	97% Mann, Pell & Peake.	97% Bull & Eldredge.
Federal Sugar Ref. Jan. 1924.	92 Steinberg & Co., St. Louis.	92 Steinberg & Co., St. L.
Goodrich Co. (B. F.) 7a.	94% Do 1923.	94% Do 1923.
Fed. Land Bank Farm Loan 4% 5a, May, 1929, op. 1924.	90% Do 1923.	91% Do 1923.
Do 4%a, Nov. 1928, op. 1924.	90% Do 1923.	91% Do 1923.
Do 4%a, May, 1929, op. 1923.	90% Do 1923.	90% Do 1923.
Do 5%a, May, 1928, op. 1923.	90% Do 1923.	90% Do 1923.
Gulf Oil Corp. 6a, July, 1921.	98% Mann, Pell & Peake.	98% Do 1923.
Do 6a, July, 1922.	95% Do 1923.	95% Do 1923.
Kenecott Copper Corp. 7a, 1930.	91% Salomon Bros. & Hutzler.	92% Mann, Pell & Peake.
Laclede Gas 7a, 1929.	89% Mann, Pell & Peake.	89% Bull & Eldredge.
Liggard & Myers 6a, 1921.	98% Do 1923.	98% Do 1923.
Procter & G. 7a, March, 1921.	96% Salomon Bros. & Hutzler.	96% Do 1923.
Do 7a, March, 1922.	96% Do 1923.	96% Do 1923.
Do 7a, March, 1923.	100% Do 1923.	98% Do 1923.
Reynolds R. J. 6a, 1922.	95% Do 1923.	95% Do 1923.
Shell Oil 7a, 1925.	90% Bull & Eldredge.	90% Do 1923.
Swif. & Co. 6a, 1921.	97% Do 1923.	97% Do 1923.
Texas Co. 7a, March, 1923.	97% Do 1923.	97% Do 1923.
Utah Securities 6a, 1922.	80 Mann, Pell & Peake.	82 Mann, Pell & Peake.
Western Electric 7a, 1923.	98% Salomon Bros. & Hutzler.	98% Do 1923.

Stocks

Stocks

BANKS

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Annalist Open Market Annalist Open Market

INDUSTRIAL AND MISCELLANEOUS—Continued

—Bid for—		—Offered—	
At	By	At	By
Bucyrus	16	M. Lachenbruch & Co.	18 M. Lachenbruch & Co.
*10 pf.	18		18
Can. Explosives pf.	71	A. F. Ingold & Co.	74 A. F. Ingold & Co.
Celuloid	145	Williamson & Squire	150 Williamson & Squire
Central Aguirre Sugar	62	M. Lachenbruch & Co.	64 M. Lachenbruch & Co.
Central Coal & Coke	84	Steinberg & Co., St. Louis	97 Steinberg & Co., St. L.
Central Sugar	12	M. Lachenbruch & Co.	14 M. Lachenbruch & Co.
Do 10 pf.	38		44
Chicago Ry. Equipment	115	Steinberg & Co., St. Louis	115 Steinberg & Co., St. L.
Chlorite	44	Williamson & Squire	80 Williamson & Squire
Clinchfield Coal	87	M. Lachenbruch & Co.	90 M. Lachenbruch & Co.
Columbia Sugar	12		14 M. Lachenbruch & Co.
Consolidated Coal	79	Steinberg & Co., St. Louis	81½ Steinberg & Co., St. L.
Cont. Motors pf.	92	Pynchos & Co.	96 Pynchos & Co.
Curtiss Aero pf.			99 J. U. Kirk & Co.
Crocker-Wheeler			100 J. U. Kirk & Co.
Do pf.			100 J. U. Kirk & Co.
D. L. & W. Coal	175	Williamson & Squire	185 Williamson & Squire
Du Pont Powder	165		175
East Bear Ridge Colliery Co.	74½	Brooks & Co., Scranton	77½
Eastern Kodak	520	A. F. Ingold & Co.	525 A. F. Ingold & Co.
Eastern Steel	40	Glidden, Davidge & Co.	60 Glidden, Davidge & Co.
Do pf.	67		74
Eisenmann Magneto pf.	40	Glidden, Davidge & Co.	85 Pynchos & Co.
Empire Steel & Iron	50		85 Glidden, Davidge & Co.
Do pf.	81		85 Glidden, Davidge & Co.
Fall Motors	15½	M. Lachenbruch & Co.	25 M. Lachenbruch & Co.
Do pf.			25 M. Lachenbruch & Co.
Fireside Tire 7% pf.	75	Pynchos & Co.	80 Pynchos & Co.
Fisk Rubber pf.	75		79
Flint Iron	55	Steinberg & Co., St. Louis	57½ Steinberg & Co., St. L.
Do pf.	98		101
Gen. Amer. Truck Car 1st pf.	82½	J. Nickerson, Jr.	86 J. Nickerson, Jr.
General Electric rights			86 J. Nickerson, Jr.
General Oil	1	Kohler, Bremer & Co.	15 Kohler, Bremer & Co.
Gillette Safety Razor	134	M. Lachenbruch & Co.	136 M. Lachenbruch & Co.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber pf.	66	Pynchos & Co.	68½ A. R. Clark & Co.
Godchaux Sugar	Do pf.		73 M. Lachenbruch & Co.
Green Watch 1st pf.	74	Steinberg & Co., St. Louis	83 M. Lachenbruch & Co.
Great Western Sugar pf.	100	Westheimer & Co., Cin.	108 Westheimer & Co., St. L.
Griffith Wheel pf.	100	Pynchos & Co.	111 Pynchos & Co.
H. O. H.	78		111 Pynchos & Co.
Hercules Powder	15	Kohler, Bremer & Co.	15 Kohler, Bremer & Co.
Do pf.	100	M. Lachenbruch & Co.	185 Williamson & Squire
Herschell-Spill	91	Williamson & Squire	93 M. Lachenbruch & Co.
Do pf.			93 M. Lachenbruch & Co.
Hocking Valley Products, new			94 M. Lachenbruch & Co.
Holly Sugar	5	Glidden, Davidge & Co.	8 Glidden, Davidge & Co.
Holly Sugar pf.	80	M. Lachenbruch & Co.	34 M. Lachenbruch & Co.
Hydraulic Steel pf.	74	Pynchos & Co.	82 Pynchos & Co.
Hupp Motors pf.	91		97 Pynchos & Co.
Intercultural Pub.	1	Brooks & Co., Scranton	2 Brooks & Co., Scranton
Do pf.	9		95½
International Textbook	72		74
Inter. Shoe	100	Steinberg & Co., St. L.	106 Steinberg & Co., St. L.
Do pf.	100		106 Steinberg & Co., St. L.
Kirby Lumber	30	M. Lachenbruch & Co.	35 M. Lachenbruch & Co.
Do pf.	97		35 M. Lachenbruch & Co.
Kansas & Gulf Oil	13	Kohler, Bremer & Co.	15 Kohler, Bremer & Co.
Kaufman Dept. Stores	64	Williamson & Squire	67 Williamson & Squire
Libbey Oven Sheet G. pf.	104	Pynchos & Co.	100 Pynchos & Co.
Lima Locomotive pf.	84		88 Pynchos & Co.
Lehigh Valley Coal Sales	76	Glidden, Davidge & Co.	78 Glidden, Davidge & Co.

Dividends Declared and Awaiting Payment

Continued from Page 729

Pe-Pay- Company.	Books Rate, riod. able. Close.	Books Close.
Am. Pub. S. pf. 1%	Q Jan. 3 Dec. 15	Clifton Mfg. — Jan. 1 Dec. 20
Am. Radiator	\$1 Q Dec. 31 Dec. 15	Cleveland Stone.3 — Dec. 10 *Dec. 1
Am. Rolt. Mill.3 Stk	Feb. 1 Dec. 31	Columb. Grap. 25% Q Jan. 1 *Dec. 10
Am. Sm. pf. A. 1½	Q Jan. 3 Dec. 14	Columb. Grap. 1-20 Stk Jan. 1 *Dec. 10
Do pf. B. 1½	Q Jan. 3 Dec. 14	Do pf. 1% Q Jan. 1 *Dec. 10
Am. Snuff.	2 Q Jan. 3 *Dec. 10	Comp. Tab. Rec. \$1 Q Jan. 10 Dec. 24
Do pf.	1% Q Jan. 3 *Dec. 10	Consol. Cigar. \$1.75 Q Jan. 15 Jan. 3
Am. Steel Fds. 75¢	Q Jan. 15 Dec. 30	Con. G. E. H. & P. Balt. 2 Q Jan. 3 Dec. 15
Am. Steel Fds. 84¢	Stk Dec. 31 Dec. 15	Cont. Motors. 10c Q Dec. 15 Dec. 8
Do pf.	1% Q Dec. 31 Dec. 15	Continental Oil.2 Q Dec. 15 Nov. 24
Am. Stores. \$1	Q Jan. 1 Dec. 21	Con. Gas. N. Y. 1½ Q Dec. 15 Nov. 27
Do 1st & 2d pf. 1% Q Jan. 1 Dec. 21		Crescent P. L. 75% Q Dec. 15 Nov. 24
Am. Sugar com.	& pf. 1% Q Jan. 3 *Dec. 1	Cres. Carpet.3 — Dec. 15 *Nov. 30
Am. Sm. & Ref. I	Q Dec. 15 Nov. 29	Cruc. Steel pf. 1% Q Dec. 15 Dec. 15
Am. Tel. & Tel. 2	Q Jan. 15 *Dec. 20	Cub.-Am. Sug. 1% Q Jan. 3 *Dec. 10
Am. Thr'd pf. 12½	— Jan. 1 Nov. 14	Cuba C. Sug. pf. 1% Q Jan. 3 Dec. 10
Am. Toc. pf. 1½	Q Jan. 3 Dec. 10	Cumberl. P. L. 12% — Dec. 15 Nov. 30
Am. W. G. Mac.3	Q Jan. 1 Dec. 10	Davis Mill.2 — Dec. 24 Dec. 10
Do pf.	1% Q Jan. 1 Dec. 10	Dayton Mill.2 pf. 3½ — Jan. 1 Dec. 15
Am. Woolen.1% Q Jan. 15 *Dec. 15		Do & Cl. Nav. 2% Q Jan. 1 Dec. 15
Do pf.	1% Q Jan. 1 *Dec. 15	Do & Cl. Nav. ½ Ex. Jan. 1 Dec. 15
Am. Nat. Gas. 20c	Q Dec. 31 Dec. 10	Diam. Match. 2% Q Dec. 15 *Nov. 30
Am. Nat. Gas. 10c Ex.	Dec. 31 Dec. 10	Dixon (J.) Cruc. 150 Stk Dec. 20 Dec. 10
Armour & Co. pf. 1%	Q Jan. 3 Dec. 15	
A. G. & W. I. 5	S Feb. 1 Dec. 30	
AL T. Cotta pf.4	— Dec. 20 Dec. 10	
Atlantic Ref. 5	Q Dec. 15 Nov. 22	
Atlas Powder.3	Q Dec. 10 Nov. 30	
Atlas Powder.5	5 Stk Dec. 10 Nov. 30	
Autocar Co. 2½	Q Dec. 10 Nov. 30	
Autosales pf. 4% 1	Q Dec. 31 Dec. 15	
Baldwin Locom. com. & pf. 3½	S Jan. 1 Dec. 4	
Barrett Co.2	Q Jan. 3 Dec. 15	
Do pf.	1% Q Jan. 15 Dec. 30	
Beaver Board. \$1	Q Dec. 15	
Do pf.	1% Q Dec. 15	
Belding (Paul)	Corticelli pf. 1% Q Dec. 15 *Dec. 1	
Beth. Stl. com.		ALEXIS I. DUPONT, Secretary
& Class. B. 1½	Q Jan. 3 *Dec. 15	
Do 7% pf.	— 1% Q Jan. 3 *Dec. 15	
Do 8% pf.	— 2 Q Jan. 3 *Dec. 15	
Booth Mills.	1% Q Jan. 3 Nov. 20	
Borden Co. pf. 1%	Q Dec. 15 Dec. 1	
Boston Wov. H. & Rubber.	3% Q Dec. 15 Dec. 1	
Do pf.	3% Q Dec. 15 Dec. 1	
Buckeye P. L. 32	Q Dec. 15 Nov. 22	
Bucyrus pf. 1½	Q Jan. 2 Dec. 20	
Bucyrus pf. 1½ Acc. Jan. 2 Dec. 20		
Bucyrus pf. 3 Acc. Jan. 2 Dec. 20		
Buf. Gen. Elec.2	Q Dec. 31 Dec. 15	
Caine B. Pap. pf. 3½	Q Dec. 15 Nov. 15	
Caine B. Pap. pf. 3½ Ex. Dec. 15 Nov. 15		
Cal. Pack. 1½	Q Dec. 15	
Cal. & Arizona.1% Q Dec. 20 *Dec. 16		
Cambr. Steel. 75¢	Q Dec. 15 Nov. 30	
Cambr. Steel. 25c Ex.	Dec. 15 Nov. 30	
Can. C. & Fy. pf. 1%	Q Jan. 10 Dec. 27	
Can. C. Rub. pf. 1%	Q Dec. 31 Dec. 22	
Can. S. S. Lines.1% Q Dec. 15 Dec. 1		
Do pf.	1% Q Jan. 2 Dec. 15	
Can. Gen. Elec.2 Q Jan. 1 Dec. 15		
Carbo-Hyd. pf. 1% Q Dec. 31 *Dec. 1		
Carter (W.) Co. pf.	1% Q Dec. 15 Dec. 10	
Case (J. L.) Th.	5 Stk Dec. 15 Nov. 29	
Do pf.	1% Q Jan. 1 Dec. 13	
Case (J. L.) Plow		Transfer books will not close.
1st & 2d pf. 1% Q Jan. 3 Dec. 15		C. T. ULRICH, Secretary
Cent C. & Coke.1% Q Jan. 15 Dec. 31		
Do pf.	1% Q Jan. 15 Dec. 31	
Cen. Leath. pf. 1%	Q Jan. 3 Dec. 10	
Cert-teed Prod. \$1	Q Jan. 1 *Dec. 16	
Do 1st & 2d pf. 1% Q Jan. 1 *Dec. 16		
Chandler Mot. \$2.50	Q Jan. 3 Dec. 20	
Chesee. Mfg. 3½ Q Dec. 30 Dec. 14		
Do pf.	1% Q Dec. 30 Dec. 14	
Ch. Mill & Lum.	— 1% Q Jan. 1 Dec. 23	
Chicago Tele.2	Q Dec. 31 Dec. 30	
Childs Co.2	Q Dec. 10 Nov. 26	
Childs Co. ½ Ex. Dec. 10 Nov. 26		
Do pf.	1% Q Dec. 10 Nov. 26	
Cit. S. Elk. Sh. 29c M Jan. 1 Dec. 15		
City Investing.5	— Dec. 20 Dec. 10	

FINANCIAL AND LEGAL NOTICES. 40 cents per agate line.

E. I. DU PONT DE Nemours & Co.
Wilmington, Del., November 24, 1920.
The Board of Directors has this day declared a dividend of 4½% on the Common Stock of this Company, payable December 15th, 1920, to stockholders of record at the close of business on November 30th, 1920. Said dividend to be payable as follows: Two dollars per share in cash and two dollars per share in additional paid up Common Capital Stock of this Company of the par value of one hundred dollars per share; also dividend of 1½% on the Debenture Stock of this Company, payable January 25th, 1921, to stockholders of record at the close of business on January 10th, 1921.
ALEXIS I. DUPONT, Secretary.
AMERICAN LOCOMOTIVE CO.
30 Church St., New York, Nov. 4, 1920.
A Quarterly Dividend of One and One-Half Per Cent. (1½%) upon the Preferred Capital Stock of the American Locomotive Company has been declared payable on December 31, 1920, to the Preferred Stockholders of record at the close of business on December 13, 1920. Dividend checks will be mailed December 30, 1920.
W. SPENCER ROBERTSON, Secretary.
KENNEDY COPPER CORPORATION
120 Broadway, New York, November 24, 1920.
The Board of Directors of the Kennecott Copper Corporation has today declared a dividend of 25¢ per share and a capital distribution of 25¢ per share, payable December 31, 1920, to stockholders of record at the close of business at 3 o'clock P. M., December 6, 1920.

UTAH COPPER COMPANY,
23 Broad St., New York, December 3, 1920.
The Board of Directors of Utah Copper Company has this day declared a quarterly distribution of \$1.50 per share, payable December 31, 1920, to stockholders of record at the close of business December 18, 1920.
JOHN RIDGEWAY, Assistant Treasurer.

INDUSTRIAL AND MISCELLANEOUS—Continued

—Bid for—		—Offered—	
At	By	At	By
Lyons Petroleum	1 Kohler, Bremer & Co.	1½ Kohler, Bremer & Co.	
Marconi (American)	2 F. T. Stanton & Co.	2 F. T. Stanton & Co.	
Do (Canadian)	1	4	"
Do (English)	8	13	"
Do (Spanish)	1	4	"
Metropolitan Cred.	10 Kohler, Bremer & Co.	82 Kohler, Bremer & Co.	
Metropolitan Stores	30	35	"
Do pf.			

Transactions on Out-of-Town Markets

Boston

MINING

Sales	High	Low	Last	Chg.	Net
150 Adventure	.60	.50	.50	..	
100 Alaska G. M.	1	1	1	..	
208 Ahmeek	.40	.45	.45	..	
200 Allouez	19%	18%	18%	..	
100 Am. Zinc pf.	31%	31%	31%	..	
325 Anaconda	40%	38%	38%	..	
51 Aransas Con.	25%	25%	25%	..	
1,135 Art. Com.	75	75	75	..	
22,004 Big Horn	6%	6%	6%	..	
635 Bingham	10	8%	8%	-1	
75 Butte & Sup.	10%	10%	10%	..	
1,191 Cal. & Ariz.	8%	8%	8%	-1	
422 Cal. & Hecla	44%	45%	45%	..	
4,550 Carson Hill.	14%	12%	14%	..	
15 Chile	9%	9%	9%	..	
405 China	18%	18%	18%	..	
2,932 Copper Range	27	27	27	..	
110 Dale-West	4%	4%	4%	..	
1,101 Davis-Baly	8%	5%	5%	+3	
1,130 Elko Butte	8%	8%	8%	..	
10 Franklin	2%	2%	2%	..	
20 Granby	20	20	20	..	
560 Helvetia	2%	1%	1%	-1	
400 Indiana	4%	4%	4%	..	
300 Ins. Copper	34	32	32	-2	
645 Island Creek	50	47%	48	+1	
35 Island Cr. pf.	77	75%	77	+1	
220 Isle Royale	21	19%	21	+1	
220 Kerr Lake	3	2%	2%	-1	
500 Keweenaw	1%	1%	1%	..	
480 Lake Copper	2%	2%	2%	..	
140 Lake Salt	2%	2%	2%	..	
500 Marion O. C.	3%	3%	3%	..	
50 Mason Valley	96%	96%	96%	-1	
25 Mass. Con.	2%	2%	2%	..	
45 Miami	17	16%	16%	..	
560 Mohawk	46%	43%	44	-1	
85 Nevada	9%	9%	9%	..	
1,350 N. Cornellia	15%	15%	15%	..	
200 New Idria	11%	11%	11%	..	
500 New River	43	42%	42%	-1	
193 New River pf.	88	87	87	..	
50 North Lake	4%	3%	3%	..	
340 Nipissing	8%	8%	8%	..	
2,280 Old Butte	10%	10%	10%	..	
348 Old Dom.	17%	17%	17%	-2	
1,393 Oscoda	22%	22%	22%	..	
300 Pond Creek	14%	13%	13%	..	
116 Quincy	39	35	35	-2	
45 Ray Con.	11%	11%	11%	..	
325 St. Mary's L.	31	29	30	..	
100 Shattuck	5%	5%	5%	+3	
25 Seneca Cope.	17%	17%	17%	-1	
45 Shannon	1	1	1	..	
300 South Utah	.08	.06	.06	..	
45 Superior Cop.	4%	3%	4	..	
915 Sup. & Boat	2%	1%	1%	-1	
1,242 Trinity	.90	.90	.90	+1	
320 U. S. Smelt	43	33	40	+2	
377 U. S. Sm. pf.	43	40%	42	-1	
80 Utah Copper	51	51	51	..	
980 Utah Apex	3%	2%	3%	+1	

Sales	High	Low	Last	Chg.	Net
4,890 Utah Con.	3%	3	3	-1	
3,341 Utah Metals	1%	1	1	..	
425 Victoria	1%	1%	1%	..	
24 Winona	50	35	35	..	
1,160 Wolverine	10%	10	10	..	
RAILROADS.					
392 Bost. & Alb.	128	121	121	-6%	
1,450 Bost. Elev.	62%	60	62%	+1	
15 Bost. El. pf.	42	31	31	..	
960 Bost. & Me.	29	24%	24%	-3%	
45 Bost. & Prov.	25	25	25	..	
4 Chi. June	130	130	130	..	
985 Maine Cent.	38	37	37	-1%	
200 Maine Cent. pf	52	50	52	..	
6,016 N.Y., N.H.&H.	22%	19	20%	-1%	
11 North. N.	78	78	78	..	
10 Nor. & Wor. pf	85	85	85	..	
23 Old Colony	74	69%	72	-3	
20 Rutland pf.	20	20	20	-1	
1,063 West End	38%	38	38%	-1	
242 West End pf.	30	40	40%	..	
MISCELLANEOUS					
55 Am. Ag. Ch.	65%	65%	65%	..	
780 Am. A. C. pf.	82%	81%	81%	..	
2,306 Am. P. S.	2%	1%	2	..	
106 Am. P. S. pf.	9%	9%	9%	..	
15 Am. B. Mag.	85%	85%	85%	..	
85 Am. Sugar	94%	95%	94%	+1%	
102 Am. Sup. pf.	101	102%	101	-1%	
4,210 Am. T. & T.	98%	98%	98%	..	
11 Am. Wool.	74%	70%	74%	+4%	
235 Am. Wool. pf.	92%	93%	93%	-1%	
542 Amoskeag	71%	70%	71	+1%	
115 Amoskeag pf.	71	70	70%	-1	
20 A. & G. W. 100%	105%	106%	105%	-1%	
4 Art Metal	10	10	10	..	
5,300 Atlantic Tack	20	18%	19%	+1%	
1,000 Anglo-A. Oil	56	50	50	..	
110 Beacon Chec.	5	4%	5	-1	
400 Booth Flats	1%	1%	1%	..	
425 Booth M. Pe.	1%	1%	1%	..	
1,850 Century Steel	1	1	1	..	
307 Eastern Mfg.	23	23%	24%	+1%	
320 Eastern Ss.	18	17	17%	+1%	
30 East. SS. pf.	71	70	70	..	
351 Edison Elec.	100	157	159	+1%	
1,852 Elder Corp.	19	17%	18	-1	
1,620 Gen. Electric	128%	128%	128%	+2%	
1,005 Gorton P. Fish	12	11	11	-1	
5,000 Gray & Davis	13%	13%	13%	..	
2,800 Great T. & T.	33%	33%	33%	..	
15 Int. C. M.	82	82	82	..	
264 Int. P. Cement	25	23	24	+1%	
45 Int. Prod. pf.	30	25	26	-1	
700 Island Oil	54%	54%	54%	..	
250 J. T. Connor	12%	12%	12%	..	
732 Loew's Thea.	11%	11%	11%	+4%	
401 Mass. Gas.	84	85%	85%	-1	
920 McElwain pf.	60	58	58	..	
324 Mex. Inv.	26	25	26	+1	
1,400 Mex. Inv.	26%	25	26	+1	
329 Merg. Lino.	124	124	124	..	
375 Merg. Lino. pf.	4%	4%	4%	..	
4 N. E. Cot. Yarn	83	83	83	..	
BONDS					
\$1,000 A. T. & T. 6a	94%	94%	94%	..	
16,000 A. G. & W. 15a	70%	70	70	-1	
3,630 Carson Ts.	91	91	91	..	
24,000 C. R. & Q. 4a	96%	96%	96%	..	
13,000 Chi. June 5a	78%	65	65	..	
1,000 Chi. June 7a	65	65	65	..	
1,000 Mass Gas 7a	79	79	79	..	
4,000 Miss. R. P. 5a	76	75%	76	+1	
7,000 N. E. Tel. 5a	81%	81%	81%	-1	
1,000 New River 5a	80	80	80	..	
11,000 Pond Crk. 6a	96	96	96	..	
7,000 Prop. Cap. 5a	84	84	84	..	
92,000 Swift Co. 5a	81%	81%	81%	..	
11,000 West. Tel. 7a	78	78	78	..	
1,000 So. Bell. Tel. 5a	81%	81%	81%	..	
1,000 Un. Fruit 4½a 100	100	100	100	..	
STOCKS					
Sales	High	Low	Last	Chg.	Net
1,655 Armour pf.	80%	80%	80%	..	
2,168 Armour Leath.	15%	15%	15%	..	
25 Arm. Lth. pf.	92%	92%	92%	..	
100 Booth Fish.	4%	4%	4%	..	
180 Booth Fish. pf.	25	25	25	-1	
1,755 Briscoe Motor.	10	70	70	..	
90 Bunte Bros.	12%	12%	12%	..	
150 Case Plow.	7	6	6	..	
150 C. M. City Ry.	45	45	45	..	
1,000 C. R. Ry. 5a 'A'	40	40	40	..	
2,000 C. R. Ry. 5a 'B'	30	30	30	..	
11,000 C. Ry. Inc. 5a	10	10	10	..	
19,000 Com. Ed. 5a	70%	70%	70%	-1	
6,000 Met. El. 1st pf.	47	47	47	..	
7,000 Met. E. ext. 4%	42%	42%	42%	..	
12,000 Morris 4½a 45%	72	72	72	..	
1,000 Prosp. Gas 5a	62%	62%	62%	-2	
18,000 S. Side 4½a 62%	62%	62%	62%	-2	
20,000 Swift Co. 5a 82%	82%	82%	82%	-2	
5,000 U. El. Loop 5a 46	46	46	46	..	
STOCKS					
Sales	High	Low	Last	Chg.	Net
30 Alliance Ins.	10%	10%	10%	..	
206 Am. Gas.	31	29%	31	+1	
601 Am. Stores.	50%	49%	50%	+1	
8 Am. S. 1st pf.	80	80	80	..	
506 Am. Rya. pf.	25	26	24	-1	
500 Am. Pipe.	4	4	4	..	
40 Berg. & Eng.	1%	1%	1%	..	
8 Berg. & E. pf.	11%	11%	11%	..	
10 Cambrian Iron.	37	37	37	..	
740 Brill (J. G.)	52	52	52	..	
100 Buff. & S. pf.	45	45	45	..	
4,377 El. St. Bat. 105	98%	104%	104%	+6%	
450 Gen. Asph.	44%	43	44%	-1	

Financial Credit Essential to Electric Railway Industry

Special Committee of the United States Chamber of Commerce Submits Eight Proposals for the Improvement of the Situation—Sees No Solution of Present Problems in Public Ownership and Urges that Elasticity in Regulation be Substituted for Rigidity

EIGHT proposals for the improvement of the situation of the nation's street railway lines are made in a report to the Chamber of Commerce of the United States by a Special Committee on Public Utilities, whose recommendations have been made the subject of a referendum vote among the chamber's membership. The following are the recommendations on which the balloting is still uncompleted:

1. Existing traction facilities should be conserved.
2. The attitude now taken toward street railway problems should be based upon the present and future needs of the community.
3. The attitude which is taken toward street railway problems should contemplate private ownership and operation.
4. Regulation should everywhere be instituted that will promptly follow changes in the situation of the companies rendering services of local transportation.
5. Provision should be made against the consequences of unfair competition.
6. All burdens unrelated to the service performed should be removed from street railways.
7. Official responsibility should be definitely fixed for the application of regulation.
8. Each company should seek to have available for the public at all times the facts as to the results of operation, and should have resident responsibility executives wholly conversant with local requirements.

THE REPORT

A summary of the committee's report is given as follows:

The Federal Commission found that the electric railway industry is without financial credit, and is not performing properly its public function. The commission concludes that the first essential is to restore credit to the street railways in order that they obtain necessary new capital for the extension and improvement of service. In this finding and conclusion your committee concurs, and it recommends that, as the first step in bringing about this result, existing traction facilities should be conserved. The attitude taken toward them by the public must be constructive and not destructive. The point of view must be that local transportation is an industry to be fostered and developed, with ample provision for correcting abuses, and from preventing any one from taking unfair advantage of the public attitude.

In the United States one great cause for public indifference to the situation of local street railways lies in widespread belief that in the earlier history of many traction companies there was financial mismanagement. Even in cases where this has been the fact, however, it becomes relatively unimportant at this time, inasmuch as the problem should be approached from the point of view of the value of the property used for the public service rather than from the point of view of the outstanding securities. If it be conceded that the public interest is to obtain good service at lowest cost, and that street railways are essential and necessary, then the sensible way to deal with the problem is to permit existing organizations and present properties to earn a sufficient sum over their operating expense to induce investment of capital for extensions and improvements to existing facilities. It is not a question of past financing,

but of present earnings, and there should be provided a margin sufficient to insure the best and cheapest service to patrons of utilities and to the public in the communities served. Believing that this position is in the highest public interest the committee recommends that the attitude which is now taken toward street railway problems should be based upon the present and future needs of the community and not upon earlier conditions. Equitable readjustment and not past performance is the immediate problem.

A canvass of every consideration that has been brought forward in support of public ownership has resulted in the committee's finding in it no solution for present problems or means for meeting future requirements. The committee accordingly recommends that the attitude which is taken toward street railway problems should contemplate private ownership and operation of local transportation facilities.

Regulation is recognized as a necessary corollary to private ownership and operation. The purpose of regulation is to conserve the public interest, and the public interest centres in adequacy of service at reasonable rates. As adequacy of service is possible only from an enterprise that can command capital with which to provide the facilities the public interest requires, regulation must in this regard contemplate the situation of the companies that are regulated.

Both for the present and the future elasticity should be substituted for rigidity. Through public authority provision can be made on the one hand to adjust charges to yield revenues that are adequate for proper conduct of the utility. Moreover, adjustments through regulation must promptly follow the conditions that call for them, for every delay in the application of a remedy that bears upon a matter of public interest is detrimental to the public itself. The committee accordingly recommends that regulation should everywhere be instituted that will promptly follow changes in the situation of the companies rendering service of local transportation.

OBLIGATIONS LAID ON THE PUBLIC

Whatever the form regulation takes it involves duties on the part of the public as well as on the part of the companies. One of these duties is to protect a company serving the public from unfair competition from any source. This does not mean that local transportation as it now exists should be perpetuated regardless of advances that may be achieved in the art of transportation or in the science of regulation. It does mean, however, that a company which is rendering service and should be developed in efficiency should not be subjected to competition from any other source which is not under corresponding regulation and obligation. The committee recommends that careful provision be made to prevent the disastrous consequences of unfair competition.

The whole purpose of regulation likewise implies that the companies subject to regulation should be responsible only for performing the service they have undertaken. Their efficiency and the reasonableness of their rates of charge are the matters which should have undivided attention.

Reasonableness in rates should be decided only with reference to the service that is rendered. In other words, the rates charged for street railway transportation should not be made an indirect method of taxation for the community. A street railway company should be taxed only on the basis of other comparable taxpayers. Your committee recommends that all burdens placed upon street railway companies and unrelated to the performance of the service they render the public should be discarded.

The kind of regulation the committee recommends is responsible regulation. Both the public and a company which serves it should be able to look to a single agency of the public, whether a local official or a board, or a public utilities commission, as directly and solely responsible for the application of regulation. Responsibility for exercise of the public function involved in finding facts and applying to them the principles which have been laid down by the public should be clearly located. In matters of public importance there should be no division of authority, for division of authority is almost invariably followed by escape of every one from responsibility for performance of the public function. The committee recommends that official responsibility should be definitely and unmistakably fixed for the application of the regulation that has been decided upon.

Adequate provision for having the public informed regarding the company and its operations and for having the company acquainted with the needs of the community will serve to prevent controversies that may have little relation to facts, and to concentrate attention upon the one question which is of paramount importance to the company and to the public—adequate and efficient service at the lowest rates consistent with the maintenance of such service. To this end the committee recommends that a company providing local transportation should seek to have available for the public at all times the facts as to the results of its operation, and should always have resident responsible executives wholly conversant with local requirements.

In connection with the recommendation that regulations should follow changes in the situation of the companies the committee takes occasion to call attention to the so-called service-at-cost plan, but makes no specific recommendation with respect to it.

Those signing the report were:

Lewis E. Pierson, Chairman of the Board of Directors, Irving National Bank, New York; Henry G. Bradlee, President of Stone & Webster, Boston, Mass.; Arthur W. Brady, President of the Union Traction Company, Anderson, Ind.; F. B. De Berard, Director of Research of the Merchants' Association, New York; E. K. Hall, Vice President of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, New York; Albert W. Harris, President of the Harris Trust and Savings Bank, Chicago, Ill.; Charles L. Harrison, President of the Sinking Fund Trustees, City of Cincinnati, Bank Building, Cincinnati, Ohio; J. W. Lieb, Vice President of the New York Edison Company, New York; H. L. McCune of the firm of McCune, Caldwell & Downing, Kansas City, Mo.; P. N. Myers, President of the St. Paul Association of Public and Business Affairs, St. Paul, Minn.; John W. Van Allen of the firm of Wilcox & Van Allen, Buffalo, N. Y.

Montreal

STOCKS

Sales	High	Low	Last Chg'd	Net
6,785 Abitibi	58%	52	55 - 3%	
5 Abitibi pf.	85	85	- 3	
25 Ames Hold. pf.	32	32	-	
960 Asbestos	82	82	-	
22 Asbestos pf.	92	90%	90% - 2%	
4,015 Atlantic Sug.	22	25	-	
10 Bk. of Comm.	186	186	-	
190 Bk. of Mont.	191%	193%	+ 2	
40 Bk. of N. E.	250	250	-	
96 Bell Telep.	102	101	- 1%	
160 C. F. & P.	29	29	+ 1%	
2,782 Brompton	31%	33	+ 3	
60 Can. C. & F.	35	33	+ 2	
250 Can. C. & C. pf.	78%	79	+ 1%	
195 Can. Cement.	55	56	- 1	
173 Can. Cem. pf.	91%	90	+ 1%	
90 Can. Cottons.	78	77%	78	-
130 Can. Conv't.	61	60	- %	
15 Can. Gen. Ed.	95	95	+ 3	
855 Can. S. S. L.	49%	47%	- 3	
10 Can. R.R.	46	46	-	
425 Can. S. S. pf.	70	70	- 1%	
95 Coverage Can.	8	8	-	
5 Cuban Can. pf.	57	57	-	
5,810 Con. M. & Sm.	18%	18%	- 1%	
150 Det. Un. Ry.	101%	98%	- 5	
565 Dom. Bridge.	77	74	+ 2%	
58 Dom. Cannery	30%	30%	+ 3%	
25 Dom. Coal pf.	77	77	-	
158 Dom. Glass.	62	61	- 1	
30 Dom. Glass pf.	83	83	+ 1%	
5 Dom. Iron pf.	69	69	- 2	
1,245 Dom. S. Corp.	47%	45%	-	

Sales

Sales	High	Low	Last Chg'd	Net
115 Dom. Stl. pf.	65	63%	65 - 1%	
537 Dom. Textile	100%	100	-	
285 Dryden	27	27	-	
4 Hock. Bank.	153	153	-	
390 H. Smith P.M.13	105	110	- 4	
125 H. Smith P.pf.	93	92	-	
5 Ill. Trac. pf.	65	65	-	
25 Inter. Coal.	50	50	+ 3	
5 Imperial Bk.	185%	185%	-	
1,423 Laurentide	93	91%	- 2%	
760 Laurens. Pow.	52	52	-	
113 L. of Woods	140	138	+ 4	
28 L. of Wds. pf	96	94	- 1	
10 Lyon Const.	45	43	-	
120 MacDon Ic. Co.	190	20	- 2%	
184 McEach. Bank	165	162	- 3%	
18 Molson's Bk.	174	173	+ 1	
71 Mont. Teleg.	110	110	-	
362 Mont. Power	80	78%	79	-
10 Mont. Trans.	125	125	+ 20	
7,225 Nat. Brew.	54	46%	48% - 5%	
2,160 N. A. P. & P.	5	5	-	
20 North. Elec.	85	85	-	
265 Ogilvie Mill	199	199	- 1	
30 Ogilvie P. pf.	97%	97%	+ 1%	
40 Ont. Stl. Pr.	58	58	-	
22 Penman	107	101	- 13	
50 Price Bros.	290	290	-	
1,455 Q. R. L. H. & P.	22%	20%	- 1%	
1,970 Riordan Pap.	144	145	- 13	
458 Riordan Co.	30	31	-	
250 Riordan Co. pf.	78	78	-	
204 Royal Bank	182	182	+ 1%	
684 Shawinigan	103%	101	- 2%	
3,360 Spanish River	81%	84	+ 3%	
3,021 Span. Riv. pf.	91	91	+ 2%	
90 St. Law. F. M.	67	66	-	
735 St. Co. of C.	63	63	+ 2	
55 Stl. of C. pf.	88	88	-	

Sales

Sales	High	Low	Last Chg'd	Net
2,455 Toronto Ry.	62	45	+ 16	
72 Tuckett W. pf.	100%	83	- 16%	
625 Union & L.	11	10	- 1%	
64 Union Bank	140	139%	- 1%	
40 Wabasso Cot.	50	49	-	
3,320 Way. P. & P.	84	88	- 14%	
125 Winnipeg Ry.	33	33	-	
190 Whalen Pulp.	20	20	-	
BONDS				
\$15,000 Asbestos	58	76	-	
1,000 Bell Tel.	52	52	-	
3,000 Can. C. & F.	87	87	-	
2,000 Can. Can. Cem.	91%	91%	- 1%	
500 Can. Rail.	88	88	-	
3,000 City of Mont.	90	90	-	
1,000 City of Mont.	106	106	+ 3	
May 23	105%	105%	-	
7,500 Cedar Rap.	86	84	- 2%	
2,000 Dom. L. & E.	75	75	-	
3,000 Dom. Tex.	90%	90%	- 1%	
2,800 M. St. Ry. 4%.	90	90	-	
4,200 Mont. Tr. deb.	64	64	+ 1%	
2,000 Og. Mill. 6% C.	93	93	-	
4,000 Og. Mill. 6% A.	93	93	-	
22,000 Que. Ry. 5%.	57	57	-	
3,000 Riordan P. 6%.	90	90	-	
3,500 Wab. Cot. 6%.	85	85	-	
25,700 War. Loan.	91	91	- 1%	
21,100 War. Loan.	31	91	88%	
36,500 War. Loan.	93	94	- 1%	
42,000 Vlc. 9%.	94	94	-	
42,000 Vlc. Loan.	22	97	95%	
376,000 Vlc. Loan.	23	95	94%	
77,000 Vlc. Loan.	24	94	93%	
30,900 Vlc. Loan.	27	94	93%	
213,000 Vlc. Loan.	33	95%	95%	
432,000 Vlc. Loan.	34	92%	88%	
259,100 Vlc. Loan.	37	96	94%	

Pittsburgh

STOCKS

Sales	High	Low	Last Chg'd	Net
10 Am. Roll. Mill.	45	45	-	
10 Am. W. Gl. pf.	90	90	-	
340 Am. W. G. M.	117	116	-	
8,005 Ark. Gas.	9	8½	8¾	
1,000 Barnard A.	37	37	-	
100 Barnard B.	37	37	-	
1,145 Carr. L. & Z.	3%	4%	5	
100 Con. Ice.	3%	3%	3%	
475 Carb. Hyd.	14	14	-	
653 Carb. Hyd. pf.	3%	3%	3%	
2,680 C. & G.	29	29	-	
30 Har.-Val. pt.	100%			

England Faces Shipping Rivalry With Equanimity

Continued from Page 708

American seagoing man has been raised considerably within the last few years.

FREIGHT CAPACITY ABOVE DEMAND

It must not be forgotten, however, that the world's tonnage today is estimated by competent authorities to be fully 8,500,000 greater than it was before the war, even after allowances have been made for the destruction of shipping that took place during wartime. At the same time, it is highly probable that, because of reduced manpower in the lately belligerent countries, reduced average productivity of labor, and reduced buying power as well as reduced manufacturing power, the amount of trade offering for shipment is materially less than it was before the war.

In this connection the official export and import figures, usually published in terms of money, may be misleading. Prices have gone up so that in many cases a country may show an increase in both exports and imports, expressed in terms of money, while as a matter of fact the actual tonnage carried in both directions, which measures the amount of revenue available to the shipper, has actually decreased. This fact is well brought out by the accompanying figures showing the status of England's foreign trade for the first nine months of 1920, compared with similar statistics for the corresponding period of 1913:

1920 (9 mos.)			1913 (9 mos.)		
Imports—value	£1,501,191,000		Imports—value	£557,767,000	
Imports—weight, tons	34,128,000		Imports—weight, tons	41,619,000	
Exports—value	£1,007,278,000		Exports—value	£390,762,000	
Re-exports	180,458,000		Re-exports	82,364,000	
Exports—weight, tons—					
Coal	23,037,000		Coal	56,898,000	
All others	8,113,000		All others	11,225,000	

The result of this situation is that, for the time being, there seems to be too much tonnage afloat for the work it has to do, and so, after the abnormal period immediately following the armistice came to an end, there ensued a period of competition among the shippers for business which in some cases, particularly the tramps, has led to rate-cutting, and for the shipping business generally has meant a comparative depression.

BRITISH DECRY HARRIMAN COMBINE

Under such circumstances it is by no means surprising that there should be a tendency noticeable for great combinations of shipping interests, aiming at greater operating efficiency as a result of union and at centralization of finance and administration. The most prominent of the American combinations thus far is that amalgamation dominated by W. A. Harriman, now called the United American Lines, and including among others the American Ship and Commerce Company, the Livermore, Dearborn & Co. interests, the Hawaiian-American Steamship Company, and the Cramp engineering works.

British shipping comment on this organization appears to be unfavorable, or, more correctly stated, pessimistic in tone. Apart from the questions raised by the American Ship and Commerce agreement with the Hamburg-American Line, the impression appears to prevail that the company is overexpanding, and is hampered by an excessive, if inevitable, original cost for its tonnage.

The analogy is drawn with the old Morgan-Lord Pirrie amalgamation of 1900, which included among others the White Star Line, the International Navigation Company, the Leyland lines, but was unable to attract the Cunard group and, more ominous still, in the opinion of some, the tramp steamers. It was these omissions, and the high cost, for those times, of tonnage, about \$40 a ton, that led to the eventual failure of the enterprise. It is argued that if \$40 a ton was a high price to pay, then even with the great increase in costs that has taken place since then, \$170 to \$200 a ton is too high a price to pay at the present time.

While the tonnage of the world has increased by 8,500,000, this increase is almost entirely due to the increase of American shipping by 10,400,000 from its pre-war level of 2,000,000. British shipping has increased only 780,000 tons, so that British shipping men feel that there is considerable room for future expansion. Their theory is that a good deal of shipping is off the market at the present time, waiting for more favorable terms of business.

At the present time it is alleged that the corporation and excess profits taxes are deterring a good many people from entering the shipping business who would otherwise be anxious to do so, as the possibilities of profit are limited, while the possibilities of loss are not. With the recovery of Middle European industry to its pre-war level of activity, and with the prospective reopening of the Russian and Baltic trade, which is expected to be heavy in both directions, it is believed that better times will be in store for the whole industry. A period of depression may do good, too, in the opinion of some, by eliminating the fly-by-night operators who have been damaging the position of the long-established shipping lines.

Canadian shipping is undergoing a period of expansion under the energetic leadership of the Canadian Merchant Marine, Ltd. This undertaking is unique among Government-owned enterprises in its assumption of the form of a private corporation, and to date has been undeniably successful.

By the Summer of 1921 the company should have afloat 66 ships, of a total tonnage of 393,000, 34 of these ships being actually in service at the present time. This compares with a total Canadian tonnage of 1,449,683 deadweight as of Oct. 3, 1919, but the increase which has taken place since that time has been for the most part in the Merchant Marine services.

The costs of construction of this line have shown a steadily decreasing tendency, having been as high as \$210 a ton at one time, and for the latest steamers being as low as \$167.50 a ton. The Government practically had to embark on a policy of

shipbuilding and operating because of the necessity of feeding the Government-owned national railways, covering some 22,500 miles, with both import and export traffic. Incidentally, of course, all these ships have been built in Canadian shipyards by the Government.

Services varying from weekly to monthly have been established from Vancouver on the west and in the east Montreal, Quebec, in the Summer, and Halifax in the Winter, to India (a recent extension), the Straits Settlements, Java; Swansea, Cardiff and Newport; London, Glasgow and Liverpool; the West Indies, Cuba, South America, Australia and New Zealand. New services are being projected to South Africa and the west coast of South America, as only Brazil, Argentina and intermediate points are being covered now.

The most recent development has been the arrangement of passenger service from the east coast of Canada to the West Indies by special agreement with the West Indies governmental authorities, providing for twenty-eight passengers on each of the fortnightly sailings.

A POLICY OF CO-OPERATION

As an instance of the Merchant Marine's willingness to make use of the established channels of commerce, we may cite its arrangements with the Blue Funnel Line, owned by Alfred Holt & Co., providing that both parties to the contract shall furnish an equal number of ships for the Oriental trade, the Merchant Marine to have the benefit of the Holt Company's agents in the East, and to act as representatives of the company in Canada. A similar arrangement has been concluded with respect to the Java trade with the India Steam Navigation Company. The Marine policy is to co-operate with the established shipping interests rather than to compete with them, and to establish new services where these are desirable.

To date the financial achievements of the Merchant Marine have been quite respectable. In a speech in March of this year the Minister of Marine announced that at the time the company had been earning somewhat better than 5½ per cent. on the investment. At the latest complete statement of earnings, Dec. 31, 1919, the gross earnings were declared to be \$3,448,030, and the net earnings \$1,406,006, an operating ratio of less than 60 per cent., which is doing very well indeed. While earnings in the latter part of this year may have fallen off somewhat, the net results will, it is believed, show a fair profit. It can be unofficially stated that business is still very good at the present time, that rates have fallen very little—in fact, the tendency has been all the other way, because of increased costs of operation.

Canadian and—to a less certain extent—British shipping seems, therefore, to expect a prosperous period ahead. Owing to its great volume and comparative inexperience, American shipping faces a time of readjustment still to come, but fundamentally the outlook for the industry appears good, while the fortune of the various companies will have to be judged on their merits.

United States Displacing England as Purveyor to Canada

Continued from Page 716

the Dominion will have had time to make substantial recovery from the effect of her expenditure on war account, the total cost of which was about two billion dollars.

Of the total amount which the Minister of Finance proposes to pay off in the next thirty-eight years without resorting to new financing the sum due to the United States is \$150,873,000, or rather less than 6 per cent. of the grand aggregate. This amount does not, of course, represent Canada's total indebtedness to the United States. Including borrowings by provincial Governments, municipalities, railways and industrial corporations, the total exceeds half a billion.

Besides the principal which the Canadian Minister of Finance proposes to liquidate without resorting to new financing there are the annual interest charges on the public debt which have to be provided for. These now amount to \$140,000,000, compared with less than \$13,000,000 in 1914. Then there are the disbursements for pensions arising out of the late war. These last year amounted to \$33,000,000, or within \$600,000 of the sum paid by the United States in 1879, when its population was more than 50,000,000, as compared with the 9,000,000 which Canada is estimated to possess today.

Fortunately, Federal revenue is in a flourishing condition, the total for the first seven months of

the current fiscal year amounting to \$256,576,967, as compared with \$186,408,790 for the corresponding period of the previous year, an increase of \$70,168,177, or 37.64 per cent. The principal contributing factor to this increase is from war tax revenue, from which \$82,629,382, compared with \$38,503,511 a year ago, was obtained, a gain of \$44,125,871. In customs revenue, owing to the larger imports, there was an increase of \$23,312,689, in Post Office receipts of \$1,100,000, from public works more than \$3,000,000 and from miscellaneous accounts nearly \$9,000,000. The only source of revenue to show a decline was excise, in which the decrease was \$1,371,669.

True there was in the seven months also an increase in ordinary expenditure, but it was only \$21,341,507, or 13.41 per cent., as compared with a gain of 37.64 per cent. in revenue. The surplus in ordinary revenue over ordinary expenditure was \$76,186,054. It is obvious, therefore, that, as far as taking care of the \$40,000,000 indebtedness due in the United States in 1921, the Government is in a strong position financially.

The net debt of the Federal Government as at Oct. 31 was \$2,273,881,806. While this was a decrease from September of \$2,634,356, yet it shows an increase compared with October, 1919, of \$488,504,999 and of \$1,938,000,000 compared with the

fiscal year 1914. There is this, however, to be said of the net debt as it at present stands: It does not give credit to the non-active assets held by the Government. These non-active assets consist of the amounts invested in the Grand Trunk, Grand Trunk Pacific and Canadian Northern Railways, now Government owned, and which, not being on a paying basis, produce no net revenue. Consequently, to avoid inflation of assets, the Minister of Finance announced in May last that the sum of \$337,359,124, representing the amount invested in these railways, had in the meantime been placed in the suspense account, thus increasing the net debt by that amount. When it will be possible to restore these investments to the list of active assets is, of course, a moot question.

Curb Market Plans Expansion

EDWARD R. McCORMICK, President of the New York Curb Market Association, said Friday that plans for expansion were being formulated by the association whereby associate memberships would be established. This will make it possible for banking and brokerage firms throughout the country to become identified with the association with special privileges.

Finality of Settlement the Pressing Need of Tax Reform

Continued from Page 714

are asking inconsistent things he cannot give them both what they want, though there may be plausible arguments on both sides. There will be a group of taxpayers, for instance, who bought property high and are exchanging it—after it has depreciated—for nearly all the stock in a corporation. They point to the words in the act that an exchange of property for other property may be a realization. They claim a deductible loss, and cite the court decisions upholding the corporate entity as distinct from the stockholders. The door has hardly closed upon this group when there enters another militant group, who have done the same thing with property which had appreciated in value. They want to avoid paying tax on the gain, and insist—opposing the other view—that such an exchange is not a realization of gain or loss. One of these groups will be disgusted with what the Commissioner does, no matter what it is. So, also, a group who sold property on time in a year like 1913, when rates were low, and finished up their collections in a high-tax year, contends all the profit was realized in the year of the sale. Another group, selling at the peak of the tax-rate curve and collecting later, are urgently insistent that the whole profit is not realized in the year of the sale. In such contending seas the Commissioner, be he old or new, is going to get the best compass he can, figure out his bearings on the basis which he considers most consistent with theory, and try to weather the gale as best he may. He is going to learn by experience, if he does not know it already, that if he gets away from principle the very people he tried to help will be using this deviation as the statement of a new principle, and demanding its application to cases which demonstrate that it was unsound in the first place.

SOME ADVANTAGES

One of the compensating advantages which has resulted to business from the Federal income tax law is that the law has induced taxpayers to keep books, and to keep them accurately and soundly, so that at the end of each year they can tell with certainty whether they have made a success or a failure and why. It was not uncommon in the old days for concerns to continue to pay dividends on the assumption that they had a prosperous year, when, in fact, they were practically insolvent. The law has also had the effect of unifying various conflicting theories of accounting which had previously prevailed, and has tended to put the science of accounting on a much more accurate and consistent basis.

Unfortunately the present law, however, does not accord in all respects with well-organized principles of accounting. But we may expect that from time to time the law will be amended to conform with proper accounting theories, and that the science of accounting will be adjusted to the requirements of the law, to the great advantage both of the taxpayers and of the Government.

If any ruling made by the department, even a published regulation, after a conscientious study upon your part, seems to be wrong, do not hesitate to present fully and completely the fundamental principles which you consider to have been violated by the department's ruling or the facts which you regard as having been incorrectly viewed by the department. Such representations of the taxpayer are welcomed by the department, and ample provision is made by the department not only for one hearing, but for sufficient hearings thoroughly to canvass the matter. This is true even as to rulings which have been issued as regulations. If they are wrong they can be changed.

Especially is it worth while to analyze the decisions of courts so far as they construe regulations and rulings. Since 1909 there have been approximately 206 income tax decisions (including corporation excise tax law). Nearly one-third of these have been decided since last November, and the volume of these precedents is growing all the time. Incidentally, it is interesting to know that of 63 cases decided during the last year 17 were under the corporations excise tax law, though involving general principles, 40 related to income taxes imposed by later laws, and 4 involved excess profits taxes. The department is especially interested in the bearing these current decisions have on any pending question.

When a taxpayer receives a letter from the bureau notifying him that additional taxes will be assessed, and the taxpayer feels that the additional assessment is not warranted, the taxpayer, merely by writing promptly to the Commissioner at Washington, may get an appointment in Washington prior to assessment, at which the details can be learned and any additional points of law and fact urged by the taxpayer or his representative. And if the Income Tax Unit should refuse to make the adjustment desired, provision is made by which the taxpayer can secure a hearing before an Appeal Committee, sitting with attorneys from the office of the Solicitor of Internal Revenue or the Solicitor himself, before whom a full presentation of facts and legal arguments can be made. If this process of appeal requires time the assessment is held up until decision is reached.

Even where a taxpayer has failed to reply promptly to a letter announcing an intention to assess additional tax, and has delayed until an assessment is in the hands of the local collector for collection, the bureau has arranged so that if he believes the additional tax is not correct he may in nearly every case secure a hearing, and, if desired, a second hearing before the committee, without paying the disputed tax until adjudication. This is done by filing an abatement claim with the Collector, who, however, has discretion to refuse such claim if the interest of the United States are not fully protected as where the future responsibility of the taxpayer is not certain.

This plan which the bureau has worked out for

delaying actual payment in a bona fide disputed case is of immense benefit to taxpayers in view of the necessary slowness of the Government in refunding money once paid in. This slowness, as should be said, will usually not be primarily the fault of the bureau, but will be due to the lack of authorized appropriation.

Hearings before the committee have the advantage, essential in any true appeal, that the committee come to the question with fresh minds. Much depends upon retaining on the committee, or on any body which may succeed it, fully qualified men of broad viewpoint and the necessary knowledge of the problems of different industries. In all of the hearings referred to it is important for the principal facts, rulings, decided cases and arguments relied on by the taxpayer to be reduced to writing in as short a form as is consistent with a fair presentation. This is important, because the question will be studied after any oral presentation of it, and in some cases studied by persons who were not present at the oral presentation and must rely on the record. A careful brief of this kind often makes it unnecessary for the taxpayer to go to Washington.

A very practical question is: If these methods by which cases can be concluded are so well worked out, why are our returns still unaudited, and why are we kept in the dark as to whether we owe the Government or the Government owes us? The answer has been indicated—lack of power to settle finally, and lack of appropriation to hold the good, experienced men or to secure the services of new men of broad knowledge. Help on these points will go far to solve the problem.

The opportunity to be heard at Washington is a good thing, but decentralization of administration is a step that should be accomplished as soon as possible. Too many elementary questions have to be fought out at Washington instead of at the taxpayer's home. But decentralization cannot be accomplished without a highly experienced personnel trained at Washington, and at present rates of compensation the rate of turnover among employees is so great that even in Washington it is almost impossible to keep auditors after they have become proficient. The first step in satisfactory administration and in decentralization—for decentralization cannot occur until the head organization is well equipped with men who can co-ordinate the activities of the field men—is to pay better salaries to the men of proved ability.

We cannot, then, afford to cut expenses in the administration of the tax law, but in other Government expenditures substantial reductions seem possible. The greatest hope for tax relief lies in that; if our Government does not spend so much it will not have to collect so much in taxes. There is here a great and difficult field for constructive statesmanship; whoever can diminish the annual expenditures of the Government will earn the fervent gratitude of his fellow-citizens.


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WHEEL BASE—Total Engine, 27 ft. 10 in.


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